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HEGEL'S THEORY OF QUANTITY 
David Gray Carlson* 
INTRODUCTION 
What is quantity? Surprisingly, virtually no philosopher before 
Hegel ever hazarded a definition.^ Rather, the concept is viewed as self-
evident. ., 
To my knowledge, Hegel is the first philosopher to provide a 
sustained defmition. In common mathematical discourse, "[a] 
magnitude is usually defined as that which can be increased or 
diminished,"^ Hegel remarks. This, Hegel finds, is a poor definition. 
What does "increase" mean? It means "make the magnitude more. 
What does "diminish" mean? It means "make the magnitude less." 
Covertly the word defined ("magnitude") appears in the definition. 
Nothing is learned from such a definition, except that magnitude is 
magnitude. To rectify the poverty of this defmition, Hegel dedicated 
more pages of his monumental Science of Logic to this analytical task 
than to any other. . , x- v 
In the course of presenting philosophy's most rigorous definition 
of quantity, Hegel shows that numbers are not what they seem. Figures 
do lie after all. To illustrate, Hegel presents the well-known fact that a 
given natural number can, through well accepted mathematical laws, e 
expressed as an infinite series that merely approaches but never reaches 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University 
thanks go to Jon Heiner, Arthur Jacobson, Alan L.T. Paterson, Jeanne Schroeder, Alan Wolf, and 
members of the seminars on Hegel's Science of Logic held at the Benjamm N. Cardozo School of 
Law and the George Washington University School of Law. Thanks to Cyn Breon for 
'^°™?'T^e^'analytical" philosophers give credit to Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) as the first to 
hazard number's defmition. Roughly, Frege held number to be the universe of sets with the same 
number of members. For example, 3 is the set of all triads. For an excellent 
and Hegel, see Alan L.T. Paterson, FREGE AND HEGEL ON CONCEPTS AND NUMBER (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript). This manuscript can be retrieved over the Google search engme on die 
internet. Professor Paterson proclaims the Fregean concept to be too ^ig^ and suggests that 
Frege proceeded by abstraction while Hegel proceeded by deriving quantity from quality. 
2 G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 186 (A.V. Miller trans., 1969) [hereinafter 
SCIENCE OF LOGIC]. 
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the number. For example, l/(l-a) can be expressed as 1 + a + a + 
a^... a", where a < 1. If a = 0.5, the above expression approaches, but 
never reaches, 2. 
The implication of this is profound. Apparently, numbers are 
never entirely present, and arithmetic is, to borrow the Demdean 
phrase, a "philosophy of presence."^ In effect, every number is filled 
in" by the mathematician, so that the ellipsis (" ... ") is suppressed and 
the number seems complete. Numbers, Hegel will conclude, are 
constituted by an absence. Hegel will identify this absence as the vei^ 
quality of quantity. For Hegel, quantity stands for absolute openness to 
determination by something external to itself. Quantity has no 
integrity-no content of its own. Quantity is that which absolute y 
refuses to define itself. Paradoxically, quantity defines itsetf precisely 
when it refuses to define itself. When this pure refusal is isolated, 
quantity has defined itself after all and has exhibited its tme quality. 
This article—second in a series of nme^—explicates Hegel s 
theory of quantity from his Science of Logic The article contmues a 
series of pictographic conventions developed m the earlier essay. 
According to the conventions I have developed, logic is divided in o 
three distinct moves, which repeat themselves over and over. 
The first step belongs to what Hegel calls the Understanding. e 
Understanding begins by making a proposition about the universe. 1 his 
proposition, however, is one-sided. The Understanding is basical y 
stupid. It sees things immediately and one-sidedly. It refuses at firs 
see that everything is mediated (though, slowly, it is learning from its 
mistakes). Nevertheless, the Understanding is necessary to the logical 
system. There must be some proposition if the second and third steps 
are to do their work. 
The second step is that of Dialectical Reason. Dialectical Reason 
. knows that the Understanding's proposition is one-sided. It brings into 
the light what the Understanding has suppressed. Dialectical Reason is 
the voice of experience.^ It retrieves what has been learned before and 
sets this suppressed material in opposition to the proposition of the 
Understa g Reason brings forth what the Understanding has left 
3 For a description of "philosophy of presence," see David Gray Carlson, On the Margins of 
Microeconomics, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1869 (1993) CARDOZO 
4 For the first installment, see David Gray Carlson, Hegel s Theory of Quality, 22 CARDOZ 
TA^erJin parentheses refer to page numbers from SCIENCE OF LOGIC, si^ra note 2^ I 
have also omitted ellipses at the end of any quoted phrase. An ellipsis signals that a 
does not end with the quoted words. Hegel's sentences, however, never end, and so eUipses 
convey no useful informstion. XM* A cxTirtv OF THF 
6 See KENNETH R. WESTPHAL, KEGEL'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM. A STUDY OF THE 
AIM AND METHOD OF HEGEL'S Phenomenology of Spirit 130 (1989). 
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out. But in positivizing this negated material, Dialectical Reason 
suffers from the same one-sidedness as the Understanding. Dialectical 
Reason is the pot calling the kettle black. It is as one-sided to 
emphasize what is not as it is to emphasize what is. Speculative 
Reason, in the third stage, sees this. It intervenes, like an exasperated 
parent mediating between two quarrelsome siblings. It points out that 
both sides are right and wrong. Speculative Reason maintains that the 
positive and negative must be thought together. 
Once Speculative Reason reconciles the positions of the 
Understanding and Dialectical Reason, the Understanding again takes 
the stage to formulate a proposition about what it has learned. It 
reduces the lesson to a one-sided proposition. Dialectical Reason once 
again critiques the effort, and Speculative Reason mediates the dispute. 
These three steps replicate themselves again and again and again—^until 
mediation exhausts itself and confesses (at the very end of the Science 
of Logic) that mediation is an immediacy after all. 
By the time Hegel reaches the concept of Quantity,^ much progress 
has been achieved. At the beginning of the Logic, the Understanding 
put forth Being as something positive or affirmative. But Dialectical 
Reason showed that Being is just as much Nothing. Speculative Reason 
has stated that both sides are right. Being is in flux. It turns into 
nothing; it "ceases to be." And Nothing is constantly "coming to be." 
The Understanding gets smarter as the Science of Logic continues. 
Having learned that pure immediate Being is defeated by its origin in 
mediatedness, the Understanding begins to propose that Being is 
Nothing (just as Dialectical Reason predicted). A very key moment in 
this development is the idea of True Infinity—one of Hegel's most 
startling contributions to philosophy. The Understanding has proposed 
that Being is Finite. It must come to an end. Since Logic is timeless in 
quality. Finite Being is "always already" at an end. As Hegel 
memorably put it, "the being as such of finite things is to have the germ 
of decease as their being-within-self: the hour of their birth is the hour 
of their death." (129) 
Speculative Reason teaches that, while this is true, Finitude is a 
one-sided point of view. Even if Finite things end, Finitude as such 
endures infinitely. There is an infinite memory of what was. The 
upshot of True Infinity is that Being {i.e., immediate reality) repeals 
itself. But in abolishing itself, reality preserves itself (in thought). The 
slogan relevant to the True Infinite is that it becomes something else 
1 Hegel performs certain "necessary" logical progressions, but also includes a great many 
asides and commentaries that are "for us" and not strictly part of the Logic. I capitalize any term 
to the extent that it qualifies as an official step in the Logic. Thus, Quality, Quantity and 
Measure, are the fust three meta-steps in the Science of Logic. 
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while remaining what it is.^ This formulation expresses the law of 
"sublation." Sublation means cancellation and preservation 
simultaneously? . . 
Upon reaching the realm of Quantity, a word of comfort is in 
order. Many readers will suffer from "math anxiety. Such readers will 
have nothing to fear from Hegel. With the exception of some notorious 
(and quite extraneous) remarks on calculus, very little in Hegel's 
Quantity chapters extends beyond rudimentary algebra. Hegel was no 
great champion of math'"—though his education in it was formidable. 
In fact, he had great contempt for its spiritual worth.'^ Nevertheless, 
Quantity has an important place in the Science of Logic. In this first 
chapter on Quantity (the fourth chapter in the Logic),Hegel equates 
Pure Quantity with time, space and the ego—deeply metaphysical ideas. 
Everything that follows depends upon the logical attributes of Quantity. 
For Hegel, Quality precedes Quantity. "[Hjitherto," Hegel 
observes, "the determination of quantity has been made to precede 
quality... for no given reason." (79) Thus, Hegel reverses Kant's 
preferred order.''' Errol Harris suggests why; 
Kant gives quantity precedence over quality but that is because he 
maintains that the categories are applicable only to sensuously 
intuited experience the a priori forms of which are space and time. 
Space and time, therefore, take precedence over that which fills 
8 Carlson, supra note 4, at 541. As Hegel will say later, "The qualitative finite becomes the 
infinite; the quantitative finite is in its own self its beyond points beyond itself.-' (372) See 
also ANDREW HAAS, HEGEL AND THE PROBLEM OF MULTIPLICITY 79 (2000) ("withm its 
determination, a being is always beyond its determination, always signifies that which transcends 
determination"). 
9 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 453. 
10 Science of Logic, supra note 2, at 120; G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT f 42 
(A.v. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter PHENOMENOLOGY]; see also CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 
247 (1975) ("a low view of mathematics as a philosophical language"). 
11 The details of this education are set forth in Michael John Petry, The Significance of 
Kepler's Laws, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM 439, 476-83 (Michael John Petry ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM]. 
12 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 471-73. Hegel calls mathematics a "subordmate field. (27) 
He refers to the "dead bones" of mathematical logic. (54) Its claim to "necessity was inadequate, 
and its practitioners do nothing but ward off heterogeneity, an act itself teinted with 
heterogeneity. (40) In these remarks, and many others, Hegel will anticipate GOdel's critit^e of 
mathematics as inherently contingent and subjective. See Michael Kosok, The Formalization of 
Hegel's Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive Foundation, 
in HEGEL: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS 237, 263 (Alasdair Maclntyre ed., 1972) 
("[D]ialectic logic can be taken as a way of generalizing Goedel's theorem, and instwd of 
regarding it merely as a limitation to the expression of consistent systems in ordinary logical 
structures, it now becomes the starting point for a dialectic logic, which regards these limitations 
as the essence of its structure."). ^ • .v, 
13 Hegel starts renumbering his chapters after every section, so there is no chapter 4 m me 
Quantity chapters. 
14 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 104-05 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., 1990). 
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them, and space and time are quantitative schemata ... 
For Kant, space and time are subjective. They are added to the object 
by consciousness. For Hegel, however, space and time are Pure 
Quantities, which are derived from the very concept of Quality. This 
implies that "[t]he externality of space and time [exists] absolutely on 
its own account without the moment of subjectivity." (843) Space and 
time (Quantity) belong to the object (Quality) itself. Being derived 
from Quality, Quantity can impose itself on the qualitative realm of 
nature'® and, to paraphrase G.R.G. Mure, Quantity is able to supervene 
on a world that is not "wholly unprepared."'^ 
In the third chapter of the Science of Logic, Quality worked itself 
pure from a dependence on otherness. It became Being-for-self—being 
that was utterly indifferent to otherness and hence radically free. Yet "it 
cannot be conceived of as something which is entirely without 
relations ... as was the more basic category of pure being."'® In effect, 
Being-for-self is the pure idea of a relation without reference to any 
parts. In this mode, Being-for-self found out that its otherness was 
entirely outside itself. Ironically, it found itself completely dependent 
on otherness to define itself. Instead of being radically free, it was 
radically unfree. One can say of Being-for-self—now Quantity—that 
its "will is infinite ... and [its] act a slave to limit."'^ 
Quantity is Quality conceived as pure relation, divorced and 
separate from the "parts" which it relates. Quantity is devoid of all 
content. It is "indifferent to its affirmative determinateness." (372) 
Quantity represents the pure idea of simply not being Quality. The job 
of Quantity over the next three chapters is to recapture its own content. 
When it succeeds, it will pass over to Measure. Quality, Quantity, and 
Measure are the three parts of the Doctrine of Being. They may be 
drawn as follows: 
'5 ERROL E. HARRIS, AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LOGIC OF HEGEL 124 (1983). 
16 Nature—the material universe beyond thought—was shown to be that which is "non-
spiritual" in Hegel's chapter on Determinate Being. Carlson, supra note 4, at 503-06. According 
to Hyppolite, nature is "the fall of the idea, a past of reason, rather than an absolute manifestation 
of reason." JEAN HYPPOLITE, GENESIS AND STRUCTURE OF HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
SPIRIT 2AA (Samuel Chemiak & John Heckman trans., 1974). 
17 G.R.G. MURE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 117 (1965). 
1^ Merry Mule, Hegel on the Interaction Between Science and Philosophy, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, at 61,67. 
19 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TROILUS AND CRESSIDA Act 3 Scene 2. 
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The Doctrine of Being 
Section Two: Magnitude (Quantity) 
The preceding illustration invokes the conventions developed in 
the preceding Article on Quality. According to this convention, the left 
of the page stands for Being. Here is where the Understanding resides. 
Its proposition is qualitative. The right side of the page stands for 
negativity. Here is where Dialectical Reason resides. Its proposition is 
quantitative. Speculative Reason occupies the middle of the three 
circles. It is the true Measure of all things. Quantity is therefore a 
"rightward" leaning discourse, according to this convention. For this 
reason. Professor Clark Butler is correct to state that Quantity interrupts 
the development of Quality.^o That is to say. Quantity is a dialectical 
critique of Quality. 
What follows is a close analysis of how Hegel's logic of Quantity 
functions. I have replicated the subheadings in the Science of Logic 
precisely as they appear in A.V. Miller's translation of that work. 
Discussion under any given subhead roughly corresponds to Hegel's 
discussion. Every time Hegel locates a logical advance, I have 
memorialized it in a picture. Adding together the thirty official moves 
in the Quantity chapters, there are 51 logical progressions by the time 
the sixth chapter of the Science of Logic concludes. Twenty-one new 
steps are analyzed in the current installment. In all, 79 steps are needed 
to complete the Science of Logic. 
Also included here—for the first time in English—is a detailed 
analysis of Hegel's critique of calculus. Readers of the Science of Logic 
usually conclude that these remarks are a complete digression and so 
they simply skip over them. In the main, they are perfectly right to do 
so. When the time comes, I will invite my readers to do the same. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and in the name of true 
science, and also out of sheer cussedness, I have analyzed what Hegel 
has to say about the calculus. For what it is worth, Hegel's critique of 
the calculus is acute indeed. Nevertheless, for the non-mathematical 
reader, please be assured that these eommentaries can be safely skipped, 
in which case this article is significantly shorter than may seem to be the 
20 CLARK BUTLER, HEGEL'S LOGIC: BETWEEN DIALECTIC AND HISTORY 91 (1996). 
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case. 
I. FROM QUANTITY TO QUANTUM 
Prior to the commencement of Hegel's first Quantity chapter, there 
is a short introductory essay entitled "Magnitude (Quantity). Here 
Hegel states broadly that Quality was "the first, immediate 
determinateness." (185) Quantity, in contrast, is 
the determinateness which has become indifferent to being a lirrat 
which is just as much no limit, being-for-self which is absolutely 
identical with being-for-other—a repulsion of the "^ny ones which 
is directly the non-repulsion, the continuity of them. (l»o) 
A "determinateness" is a concept that combines the contradiction of 
Being and Nothing—thought together at the same tune. A 
determinateness is therefore alwaj^ mediated—never an "^edmte 
thought.^' That Quantity is a determinateness can be seen directly as [ , 
5, 6] in Figure22 io(c). 
Figure 10 (c) 
Quantity 
That Quantity is indifferent to "being" was documented through chapter 
3 of Quality. In effect, the Understanding constantly repulsed its own 
content—its own determinateness—until it had worked itself pure^ 
When this process was complete, Quantity was pure indifference to its 
my^from Quantity's perspective, is "being" a "limit which is just 
as much no limit"? Limit was a step in Quality, portrayed in Figure 
21 See Carlson, iwpra note 4, at 480. . , „ . /• r v. T„ Theorv of 
22 A "figure" represents an official move in the Science of ogi . g 
Ouolitv I identified thirty logical moves across the first three chapters o f  the Science of Logic 
A l^irp labeled (a) represents the proposition of the Understandmg. These figures will presen 
Quality and will be interpreted by the Understandmg m Figure 11(a). All of the previous rigu 
are replicated in Appendix A to this Article. 
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4(c).2^ By the time Figure 10(a) was reached, Limit has been sublated. 
It has rendered itself into a mere ideality—a memory of a past reality. 
Quantity therefore is, on the one hand, distinguishable from being in 
general. But, on the other hand, "being" is no limit, and so Quantity 
suffuses or "continues" into the heart of external being with no 
opposition. ., , r if 
In the above-quoted passage. Quantity is said to be Bemg-for-sel . 
This is obviously true on the law of sublation.^'* As a Being-for-self, it 
is identical with Being-for-other. This is just to say that Quantity has 
driven away all its otherness, and so now it has no content of its own. 
The other must supply all its content. Hence, Quantity is nothing but 
Being-for-other. , , . , ^ A 
Finally, Quantity has repulsed the Many Ones (which were equated 
in chapter 3 of Quality with Attraction). But Quantity is the middle 
term between Attraction and Repulsion.25 Hence, Quantity just as much 
attracts the Many ones. It is "continuous" with them. The idea of 
Quantity is therefore closely connected with and indeed is the idea of 
continuity. u f 
Continuity. It is worth contemplating on our own the idea or 
continuity—^recently the subject of a law review symposium under the 
name of "commensurability."^® If Quantity is continuous, then we 
must be implying that Quantity is a substance, such that it exists for 
itself but also flows—continues—into its other, so that the other can 
share in this substance. The substantiality of Quantity coheres with 
Hegel's notions. After all, Hegel has made Quantity the midsection of 
the Doctrine of Being. It must therefore be some species of "being.' 
Quantity, however, is likewise very negative—^though, on the law of 
sublation, full of inherent positivity. If all "things'' contain negativity, 
then Quantity has continued from itself into these things. Quantity is, in 
short, the "universal" that all things have in common. For this reason, 
all "things" are "commensurable." This is the truth of Dialectical 
Reason, which reigns supreme in Hegel's theory of Quantity. But 
negativity is only one side of the story. Hence, all "things" are just as 
much incommensurable. 
The law review symposium on commensurability entirely misses 
this point. What we find there are two groups of legal scholars each 
caught in the dogma of self-identity. Each side can only assert a one­
sided view. Thus, one group thinks things are universally 
commensurable. These are the utilitarians, who wish to assert that 
preferences can be weighted and aggregated, by virtue of something 
23 See Carlson, note 4, at 519. 
24 That is, sublation always obliterates and preserves the prior logical steps. Id. at 455 
25 See Figure 10(c). 
26 See Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1998). 
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universal that commensurates all things.What commensurates for 
these scholars is money. Everything has its price. Without this 
commensurability of utilities in money, policy science would instantly 
implode. As this cannot be permitted to happen, the concept of 
commensurability is asserted as a one-sided truth. 
The opponents of utilitarianism are rights-based dogmatists who 
insist that certain things are so sacred that they share nothing in 
common with other things. Thus, human dignity cannot be sold for 
cash.28 xhese theorists are what Hegel calls "pantheists."^^ 
Both sides suffer from self-identity. The utilitarians insist that 
preferences are quantities—commodities whose difference can be 
dissolved in the unified numeraire of money. The qualitative aspect of 
preferences is simply denied. The rights-based libertarians insist that 
certain values—chosen on an ad hoc basis according to the law of 
sentimentality which covertly governs their discourse are cornplete 
qualities. The commensurable side of these sacred values is simply 
denied. Each side can only shout slogans at the other side. No solufron 
is possible, and so the law review symposium on commensurability 
must be counted what Hegel would term a Spurious Infinity.^" 
Hegel provides the solution. Each side is partly right. Human 
values are commensurable, because they are in part negative and hence 
quantitative. The negative substance Hegel calls Pure Quantity 
continues in all discrete things—including the things the rights-based 
libertarians identify as sacred. Likewise, human values are 
incommensurable, because they are in part positive entities, just as the 
27 Perhaps the fringe extreme of this view is represented hy Eric A. Posner, The Strategic 
Basis of Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U PA. L. REV. 
1185 (1998), who goes so far to suggest that the very attribution of incommensurability is a 
strategic trick to obtain commensurable advantage over their fellows. Incommensuration is itself 
thus made a commodity commensurable with all other commodities. See id. at 1208. 
28 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MLCH. L. REV. 779 
(1994). 
29 "The maxim of Becoming, that Being is the passage into Nought, and Nought the passage 
into Being, is controverted hy the maxim of Pantheism, the doctrine of the eternity of 
matter " G.W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL'S LOGIC § 80 Remark (William Wallace trans., 1975) 
[hereinafter LESSER LOGIC]. 
30 Hegel pointedly denounces such thinking when he remarks: 
[P]roceeding analytically, [common sense] now extracts especially identity and then 
also again obtains difference alongside it, is now a positing of likeness and then also 
again a positing of unlikeness—likeness when abstraction is made from difference, 
and unlikeness when abstraction is made from the positing of likeness. These 
assertions and opinions about what reason does must be completely set aside, since 
they are in a certain measure merely historical, the truth is rather that a consideration 
of everything that is, shows that in its own self everything is in its self-sameness 
different from itself and self-contradictory, and that in its difference, in its 
contradiction, it is self-identical, and is in its own self this movement of transition of 
one of these categories into the other, and for this reason, that each is in its own self the 
opposite of itself. (412) 
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rights-based theorists insist. 
Where does that leave Hegel on the issue of human rights v. 
utilitarian contempt for rights? I think Hegel would recognize that each 
intuition" has its moment. Human rights are prior. They set up the 
boundaries in between which utilitarian calculation is permissible and 
legitimate. Utilitarian calculus can never be permitted to set its own 
boundaries. It must not decide who lives and who dies, or who is a 
slave and who is free, but it might govern in relatively unimportant 
human institutions, such as market exchange. How shall the borderline 
between rights and utilitarianism be discovered? In The Philosophy of 
Right f Hegel makes clear that Logic provides no clear answer. Rather, 
custom and tradition must set the precise border. It is useless for 
theorists to deduce the location of these borders from pure theory. In 
short, Hegel is ultimately a pragmatist in his politics, but, of course, 
when he philosophizes, he operates according to the dictates of 
necessity. Pragmatic politics is, in contrast, rife with contingency.^^ 
Quantity's Indifference. To continue our analysis of Hegel's 
introductory essay on magnitude, Hegel reminds us that, at the end of 
chapter 3 of Quality, Being-for-self has been forced to admit that it is 
the ultimate Being-for-other: "that which is for itself is now posited as 
not excluding its other, but rather as affirmatively continuing itself into 
it." (185) 
Quantity is therefore "otherness in so far as determinate being 
again appears in this continuity." (185) Of course. Quantity carmot be 
an otherness unless there is a determinate being into which Quantity can 
continue. When this other to Quantity appears. Quantity's 
determinateness will no longer be "in a simple self-relation." (185) That 
is, the relation will be overtly a relation with an external other. In this 
relation. Quantity "is posited as self-repelling, as in fact having the 
relation-to-self as a determinateness in another something (which is for 
itself).'''' (185) Or, in other words. Quantity will say, "I am not my 
radically external other." It will refuse to recognize itself in the "other 
something," but this refusal to recognize is the ultimate recognition.^^ 
Hence, Quantity is a slave to the other; only this other is truly "for 
itself." 
Quantity and its other will pose as mutually indifferent to one 
31 G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (Allen W. Wood trans., 1993) 
[hereinafter PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT]. 
33 In warning that philosophers are not licensed to make policy suggestions, Hegel wrote: 
"Plato could well have refrained fi'om recommending nurses never to stand still with children but 
to keep rocking them in their arms; and Fichte likewise need not have perfected his passport 
regulations . . . ." /ol. at 21. 
33 This was a major conclusion in Being-for-self, which is pure refusal to recognize the other. 
Refusal to consider the other was defined by Hegel as "the One." Carlson, supra note 4, at 557-
59. 
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another (which is a lie, of course). From this perspective of utter 
independence, both entities are "indifferent, relationless limits reflected 
into themselves." (185) In this pose, each entity can say that 
"determinateness in general is outside itself." (185) Th^e external 
determinatenesses are external "somethings," with which Quantity (m 
the false pose we are now considering) has nothing to do. Yet Quantity 
is also indifferent to its own Limit and so continues into these external 
somethings. This indifference "constitutes the quantitative 
determinateness of the something." (185) 
Preview. Hegel next gives a preview to the first chapter on 
Quantity. As always, the true demonstration of these ideas must await 
their detailed unfolding. It is not expected that the reader will fiilly 
grasp the import of the preview that follows. . , ^ . 
First we have Pure Quantity. This must be distinguished from its 
more complicated stage—Quantum. The challenge here is to remember 
that Quantum—I.e., "Number"—is too advanced. We are aiming to 
isolate the deeper substance of numbers. Number appears only m the 
second chapter on Quantity. 
Pure Quantity "develops a determinateness and will become 
Quantum. (185) This determinateness of Quantum will be posited as no 
determinateness—as a determinateness which is both inside and outside 
of Quantity. Quantum is therefore "indifferent determinateness, that is, 
a self-transcending, self-negating determinateness." (185) These 
remarks should make some sense. As with everything that has appeared 
after the True Infinite, Quantum is an infinite being that erases itself and 
yet retains its being. How this actually unfolds must await the second 
chapter in Quantity. Hegel at this point predicts that, when Quantum 
self-erases, it lapses into a Spurious Infinity—now to be called the 
mathematical infinite, an idea with which common sense is quite 
familiar. , ^ 
Earlier, we saw that the Spurious Infinite amounted to the pure act 
of self-erasure. This act of self-erasing is what the Finites did.^^ This 
unity between the Finite and the Spurious Infinite was precisely this 
self-abnegating activity, whose name is the True Infinite. Something 
similar will happen to the mathematical infinite. The self-erasure of the 
infinite integers will emerge as a True Infinite. When that happens. 
Quantity will have taken back its Quality. 
Once Quality is back together with Quantity, we will have arrived 
at final chapter in Quantity, which Hegel names Quanfitative Ratio. 
Here we will find that the qualitative other to Quantum is yet another 
Quantum—just as Being-for-other discovered that the repulsed other 
was yet another Being-for-other. Hence, quantum is in fact a ratio of 
34 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 535-38. 
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two quanta. 
In the ratio (by which Hegel means "relation in general"—not 
division or fractions), the quanta are still indifferent to each other. That 
is, the number 7 doesn't care if it is related to 8 or to 9 or any other 
quantum. It will accept any partner that the mathematician—an external 
force—cares to impose. We will discover, however, buried deep within 
the idea of "ratio" lies a true qualitative moment, in which the two 
quanta are not indifferent to each other after all. The relationship 
(which will turn out to be the square of a quantum)^^ have an 
objective resistance from outside manipulation. This resistance 
constitutes the reappearance of Quality within Quantity. When that 
point is reached, we are ready to move onto Measure—the culmination 
of the Doctrine of Being. 
Remark 
The essay introducing Quantity terminates with a short Remark, in 
which Hegel reminds us that Limit, in Figure 4(c), is determinateness.^^ 
When a quality exceeds its Limit, it changes radically. Beyond the 
Limit was the Finite, whose fate (i.e., Being-in-itself) was to erase itself. 
Not so with mere quantitative limit: 
If, however, by limit we mean quantitative limit, then when, for 
example, a field alters its limit it still remains what it was before, a 
field. If on the other hand its qualitative limit is altered, then since 
this is the determinateness which makes it a field, it becomes a 
meadow, wood, and so on. (186)^^ 
Hegel gives this example: "Red" is a quality of some thing—its color. 
Let's change its quantitative limit by making the thing brighter or paler 
red. It remains red all the same. But let's paint the thing blue. The 
thing has now undergone a qualitative change, not a mere quantitative 
change. In Marcuse's words, "A being whieh is immediately identical 
with its respective quality such as to remain the same throughout all its 
qualitative transformations, is no longer qualitatively but quantitatively 
35 That is, if we take 16 and contemplate x-x = 16, then the ratio of x-x is largely (but not 
totally) immune to outside manipulation. The internal integrity (or Quality) of the ratio insists 
that X = {4, -4}. See infra text accompanying notes 294-300. 
36 In Figure 4(c), Limit was the unity of Constitution—internal negativity implying change— 
and Determination of the in-itself. In effect, in Limit, inside and outside have switched places, 
and the self-destruction of "being" is launched. Carlson, supra note 4, at 519. 
33 Cf. TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 247: 
[Q]ualitatively considered, the determinateness or limit of a thing is not a matter of 
indifference; if we alter the limit, we alter the nature of the thing; but considered purely 
quantitatively, the limits of a thing can be altered without changing its nature; it is 
'indifferent' to them. It is thus a mark of the quantitative, says Hegel, that we are 
dealing with such indifferent limits, that the things can increase or decrease in 
extension without changing their nature. 
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defined."^^ 
With regard to red that waxes bright or pale, Hegel states that the 
degree of redness is its magnitude. In magnitude, redness "has a 
permanent substratum of being which is indifferent to its 
determinateness." (186) In other words, red as such continues to be red 
even as the brightness or paleness (its determinateness) is manipulated 
by outside forces. 
Magnitude. Hegel also, in this Remark, warns that "magnitude" 
means Quantum—^not Quantity. Magnitude is too advanced for the 
concept of Pure Quantity, because it implies a determinateness that is 
beyond Pure Quantity. Thus, in common mathematical discourse, "[a] 
magnitude is usually defined as that which can be increased or 
diminished." (186) As we have seen,^^ Hegel finds this to be a lousy 
definition. Nothing is learned from such a definition, except that 
magnitude is magnitude. It is nevertheless clear, however, that, in this 
definition, "the more or less can be resolved into an affumative 
addition" (or subtraction) which is externally added (or subtracted). 
(186) "It is this external form both of reality and of negation which in 
general characterizes the nature of alteration in quantum." (186) In 
other words. Quantum cannot alter itself. It requires an outside 
manipulator to make a thing more or less of what it is. Of "more or 
less," Hegel remarks: 
In that imperfect expression, therefore, one cannot fail to recognize 
the main point involved, namely the indifference of the alteration, so 
that the alteration's own more and less, its indifference to itself lies 
in its very Notion. (186) 
In other words, the essence of Quantum is that it is indifferent to being 
changed by outside forces. 
This last observation is significant. How many times have you 
heard someone, fearful of affirming something absolutely, refer to it as 
"more or less" true? What is aimed for here a switch from fragile 
qualitative Limit to robust quantitative Limit. If the speaker gains your 
acquiescence to this transition, then the speaker's proposition will be 
harder to refute. Of course, we should not fall for this trick. If the 
speaker is making a qualitative point, then the speaker is not entitled to 
the relative ease and comfort that mere quantitative Limit affords. 
38 HERBERT MARCUSE, HEGEL'S ONTOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF HISTORICITY 64 (Seyla 
Benhabib trans., 1987); see also LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 80 Remark: 
Quality is ... the character identical with being: so identical that a thing ceases to be 
what it is, if it loses its quality. Quantity... is the character external to being, and does 
not affect the being at all. Thus e.g. a house remains what it is, whether it be greater or 
smaller; and red remains red, whether it be brighter or darker. 
Hegel further remarks that "in quantity we have an alterable, which in spite of alterations still 
remains the same." Id. § 106 Addition. 
39 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
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Meanwhile, the arguer remains in control of how much "more or less" 
can be tolerated before qualitative change must be conceded.'*® 
Alteration of Quantum, then, is accomplished only externally— 
hence inessentially. This is the penalty Being-for-self pays for driving 
out all content. Only strangers can tell the Quantum what it is. The 
final chapter of Quantity, however, will reveal a moment of self-
integrity within Quantum, from which will spring forth the slave-
rebellion Hegel calls Measure.'** 
A. Pure Quantity 
Hegel begins his first chapter on Quantity by reminding us of what 
unfolded in chapter 3 of Quality. There, Quantity was "the repelling 
one." (187) This can be seen in Figure 9{c)^^ Repulsion said of itself: "I 
am not that." In so announcing, it "treats the other as identical with 
itself, and in doing so has lost its determination." (187) The expelled 
content was then united in Attraction, as Figure 10(a) showed.'*^ "The 
absolute brittleness of the repelling one has melted away" into 
Attraction. (187)'*'* Attraction, however, "is at the same time determined 
by the immanent repulsion." (187) This was shown in Figure 10(6).'*^ 
Of course. Quantity is the unity of Attraction and Repulsion, as shown 
in Figure 10(0)."® Reminiscing about the relationship portrayed in 
40 Some time ago I had cause to complain about a defense of legal determinism which 
asserted that the rule of law existed—more or less. David Gray Carlson, Liberalism's Troubled 
Relation to the Rule of Law, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 257 (1993). 
41 A criticism of sorts is offered by Professor Terry Pinkard, who writes that Hegel 
followed the tradition of his time in his assumption that the elements and principles of 
mathematical thought were related to quantity and number . . . [M]ore recent 
developments show that a whole set of mathematical ideas must be defmed without 
reference to quantity ... To make matters worse for Hegel, the traditional quantitative 
conception of measurement to which he appeals is not necessarily tied up with a 
conception of quality per sc. 
TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL'S DIALECTIC 42 (1988). In fact, this development is exactly what 
Hegel wanted! In the end, his point is that mathematics had insufficiently appreciated the role of 
quality in the constitution of quantity. According to Tom Rockmore: 
But it would be a mistake to argue that if [Hegel's view of mathematics] can be 
refuted, which cannot be shown, the position as a whole could be rejected. For 
whatever fate of the critique of mathematics, it is no more than an illustration of the 
more general point that a form of thought which is divorced from the movement of 
reality, and hence feeds only on itself, is necessarily one-sided and abstract, or linear. 
TOM ROCKMORE, HEGEL'S CIRCULAR EPISTEMOLOGY 9 (1986). 
42 Carlson, supra note 4, at 569. 
43 Id. at 571. 
44 It will be recalled that, in Figure 10(a), [7] posited the Void/Many Ones as not itself. But, 
covertly, [7]—Repulsion as an immediacy—was swept along and was not left behind, as it hoped 
to be. Hence, [7] entered into Attraction as an immediacy, but Dialectical Reason retrieved it in 
Figure 10(b). 
45 Id. at 575. 
45 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 10(c), the Understanding announces that Attraction is the 
moment of Continuity in Quantity. 
This brings us to Figure 11(a): 
The justification for this design is that Quantity has expelled all its 
content [4-7], Therefore, the "content" of Figure 11(a) must be found 
amidst the expelled entities. Attraction [4, 5] is plucked from the exiles 
and made the Understanding's focus of attention. According to the 
Understanding, Quantity is the flow between self [5] and related other 
[4]. Absolute otherness [6] is suppressed. The name of this relation 
between [4] and [5] is Continuity [l].^^ Of [1], Hegel writes: 
Continuity is, therefore, simple, self-same self-relation, which is not 
interrupted by any limit of exclusion; it is not, however, an 
immediate unity, but a unity of ones which possess being-for-self. 
The asunderness of the plurality is still contained in this unity, but at 
the same time as not differentiating or interrupting it. (187) 
The above passage shows a significant change of perspective. The first 
three chapters of the Science of Logic were the realm of "being"—the 
realm of immediacy. Hence, in those chapters, [1] was always 
immediate. Now, beyond the realm of immediacy, [1] is simple and not 
interrupted, but neither is it immediate. The Understanding continues to 
learn. It grasps [1] as a simple view of a complex "mediated" entity. 
Mediation as such now reigns in the extremes of Understanding and of 
Dialectical Reason. If immediacy exists at all within Continuity, it 
exists as a moment—a memory of its origin in reality. Indeed, Hegel 
will often use the word "immediate" in this and the following chapters. 
Understanding fully understands, however, that "immediacy" is always 
merely an ideal moment. The Understanding knows that it has left the 
crude realm of reality and exists now and forever in the realm of the 
Errol Harris usefiilly reminds us that continuity has the attributes of Attraction. That is, 
continuity is a plurality held together by an external will. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 126. 
Figure 11 (a) 
Continuity 
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ideal."^^ 
Dialectical Reason is now rather less insulting to and patronizing 
of the Understanding than before. Acknowledging that the 
Understanding sees that Continuity contains mediation within it the 
distinction of Many Ones—Dialectical Reason proposes with due 
respect that attention be focused on this moment of difference. 
Discreteness is the recovery of [6] in figure 11(a). Discreteness is the 
beyond of continuity. Hence, we have: 
Of Figure 11(b), Hegel writes: "In continuity, therefore, magnitude 
immediately possesses the moment of discreteness—repulsion has now 
a moment in quantity." (187) The word "immediately" probably should 
not be invested with much significance here, for the reason just stated. 
We are beyond the realm of immediacy. Nevertheless, one could say 
that [3] is an "immediate" moment—^but only in the ideal sense of 
remembering what [3] meant in the opening chapters of the Science of 
Logic. Hegel vindicates this judgment: 
Hence, discreteness on its side, is a coalescent discreteness, where 
the ones are not connected by the void, by the negative, but by their 
own continuity and do not interrupt this self-sameness in the many. 
In other words, [3] is not immediate, except in an ideal sense. The Many 
Ones are acknowledged in Discreteness; and they are acknowledged as 
connected by Continuity.'^^ 
Hegel next indicates that an enriched Quantity is the unity of 
Discreteness and Continuity: 
48 Reality ended and ideality began in the True Infinite. Carlson, supra note 4, at 538-48. 
49 Hegel gives this useful example of Continuity and Discreteness in the Lesser Logic: 
It may be said, the space occupied by this room is a continuous magnitude, and the 
hundred men assembled in it form a discrete magnitude. And yet the space is 
continuous and discrete at the same time; hence we speak of points of space, or we 
divide space, a certain length, into so many feet. . . which can be done on the 
hypothesis that space is also potentially discrete. Similarly ... the discrete magnitude, 
made up of a hundred men, is also continuous; and the circumstance on which this 
continuity depends is the common element, the species man, which pervades all the 
individuals and unites them with each other. 
LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 100 Remark. 
Figure 11 (b) 
Discreteness 
(187) 
2002] HEGEL'S THEORY OF QUANTITY 2043 
Figure 11 (c) 
Enriched Quantity 
Hegel does not use the phrase Enriched Continuity. I have added 
this to distinguish Figure 11(c), which brings Continuity to the fore, 
from Figure 10(c).5® In the next Remark, we learn that this Enriched 
Quantity is the same thing as time, space, the ego, and many other 
quantitative ideas. 
Of Figure 11(c), Hegel writes: "Quantity is the unity of these 
moments of continuity and discreteness, but at first it is so in Dae form of 
one of them, continuity, as a result of the dialectic of being-for-self, 
which has collapsed into the form of self-identical immediacy." (187) 
This is a direct reference to Quantity as portrayed in Figure 11(a). Here 
we have reference to [1] in Figure 11(a) as an immediacy, when we said 
that our days of immediacy were over—except as an ideal "moment." 
Of Quantity in this guise, Hegel states: "Quantity is, as such, this simple 
result in so far as being-for-self has not yet developed its moments and 
posited them within itself." (187) In other words, Hegel agrees that 
Quantity, taken as a mere immediacy, is retrogressive—a throwback to 
the last part of chapter 2 of Quality. This immediacy, however, is 
precisely what Being-for-self expelled by the end of chapter 3. Thus, 
Quantity, as portrayed in Figure 11(a), contains the moments of Being-
for-self 
posited as it is in truth. The determination of being-for-self was to 
be a self-sublating relation-to-self; a perpetual coming-out-of-itself. 
But what is repelled is itself; repulsion is, therefore, the creative 
flowing away of itself. (187-88) 
This "creative" flowing of content out of Being-for-self is precisely 
what Continuity is. Thus, Being-for-self flows into all the other Ones: 
"On account of the self-sameness of what is repelled, this distinguishing 
or differentiation is an uninterrupted continuity." (188) 
5" Could I have said that Figure 11 (c) is the same as Figure 10(c), but with the names of the 
extremes changed? I did something similar once before. In chapter 1, Figure 1(c) was Pure 
Being, Pure Nothing, and Becoming. Then the names changed, without an advance. Figure 1(c) 
became coming-to-be, ceasing-to-be, and Determinate Being. Carlson, supra note 4, at 438^8 & 
n.58. Nevertheless, an advance to Figure 11(c) is justified. In Figure 10(a), [1] was Attraction— 
precisely a stubborn unity that nevertheless covertly implies Repulsion. In Figure 11(c), 
Continuity shows no such stubbornness. 
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Hegel finishes his discussion of Pure Quantity by restating that 
Continuity—[1] in Figure 11(a)—"without being interrupted, is at the 
same time a plurality, which no less immediately remains in its self-
identicalness." (188) Once again, "immediacy" must be taken only as an 
ideal moment. The Understanding has a simple, yet mediated, view of 
Quantity as a substance that continues itself in all things. (For this 
reason, everything, except God, can be enumerated.) 
Remark 1: The Conception of Pure Quantity 
In Remark 1, Hegel emphasizes that Pure Quantity does not yet 
have any Limit. Even when it becomes Quantum, it will not be 
bounded by Limit "but, on the contrary, consists precisely in not being 
bounded by limit." (188) In Figure 11(b), Discreteness has appeared, 
but this is no Limit: 
The presence in it of discreteness as a moment can be expressed by 
saying that quantity is simply the omnipresent real possibility within 
itself of the one, but conversely that the one is no less absolutely 
continuous. (188) 
That is, Quantity holds the promise of self-limitation—of being "the 
one." This is what Continuity's relation to Discreteness portends. For 
now. Quantity is absolutely continuous. 
In bad philosophy—what Hegel calls "thinking that is not based on 
the Notion"—Continuity quickly devolves into "mere composition, that 
is, an external relation of the ones to one another, in which the one is 
maintained in its absolute brittleness and exclusiveness." (188) For 
Hegel, "composition" is a derogatory term, suggesting that the unity is 
not immanent to the entities but is imposed upon them from the 
outside.Compositional philosophies fail to see that the One 
"essentially and spontaneously {an und fur sick selbsty passes over into 
ideality. (188) This spontaneous action was documented at the end of 
chapter 2 of Quality (when True Infinity appeared) and throughout 
chapter 3. This action proves that Continuity belongs to the One—here. 
Enriched Quantity in Figure 11(c).  
Atomism—much denounced in chapter 3^^—holds that Continuity 
is external to the One, an idea that "ordinary thinking finds it difficult to 
forsake." (188) (Here, as we shall soon discover, Hegel is thinking 
about the concept of time and space.) Mathematics, however, rises 
above this naive view. It "rejects a metaphysics which would make 
51 According to Hegel, composition is "the worst form in which anything can be considered 
. . . That the form of the untruest existence should be assigned, above all, to the ego, to the 
Notion, that is something we should not have expeeted and that can only be described as inept 
and barbarous." (615) 
52 Carlson, supra note 4, at 564-66. 
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time consist of points of time [or space] ... It allows no validity to such 
discontinuous ones." (188) A plane may consist of the sum of infinitely 
many lines, but the Discreteness of the lines is only a moment. The 
sublation of this moment is implied by the infinite plurality of the lines. 
Time, space, "matter as such,"^^ the ego—these are to be taken as 
examples of Pure Quantity. These things are "expansions, pluralities 
which are a coming-out-of-self, a flowing which, however, does not 
pass over into its opposite, into quality or the one." (189) Thus, space is 
"absolute self-externality which equally is absolutely uninterrupted, a 
perpetual becoming-other which is self-identical." (189)^'' Time 
likewise "is an absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189) It generates the 
"now"—^the present—^but then immediately annihilates it. Time is the 
"continuous annihilation of this passing away" and the "spontaneous 
generating of non-being." (189) In its pure destructivity, self-devouring 
time is "a simple self-sameness and self-identity." (189)^^ 
The ego is also Pure Quantity. It is "an absolute becoming-other, 
an infinite removal or all-round repulsion to the negative freedom of 
being-for-self." (190) In short, the ego constantly states, "1 am not that." 
No proposition ever captures all of the ego, which is nothing at all but 
Continuity over time—"utter simple continuity." (190) That the ego is 
Continuity (which is time itself) Hegel expresses this way: the ego is 
the continuity of universality or being-with-self uninterrupted by the 
infinitely manifold limits, by the content of sensations, intuitions, 
and so forth. (190) 
53 In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel identifies matter as the unity of Attraction and 
Repulsion, which is, of course, exactly what Quantity is. Host-Heino von Borzeszkowski, 
Hegel's Interpretation of Classical Mechanics, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, at 
73, 79 (citing HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE § 262 (A.V. Miller trans., 1970)). 
Hegel also distinguishes between Pure Quantity and matter. Quantity is a determination of 
pure thought. Matter is the same thing, but in outer existence. Hegel quotes Leibniz for this: Non 
omnino improbabile est, materiam et quantitatem esse realiter idem. (189) ("Not every thing is 
improbable, matter and quantity being the same reality."). 
54 Space (Pure Quantity) will be the starting point for Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, just as 
consciousness is the starting point for the Phenomenology and the autonomous individual is the 
starting point for the Philosophy of Right. See Lawrence S. Stepelevich, Hegel's Conception of 
Space, 1 NATURE AND SYSTEM 111 (1979). 
In chapter 2, we saw Hegel derive nature as other to Spirit taken as other. We now may 
add that nature so expelled by Spirit is Pure Quantity. MURE, supra note 17, at 116 ("Quantity is 
conspicuous in Nature, since self-externality as opposed to the self-possession of spirit is the 
distinctive character of Nature."). 
55 See Richard Dien Winfield, Space, Time and Matter: Conceiving Nature Without 
Foundations, 29, 61-62, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Stephen Houlgate ed., 
1998) (calling time "this self-devourer"). Andrew Haas describes Hegel's view of time nicely: 
[T]he "now" (and "this"), exempliiying the immediacy of sense-certainty (that does not 
yet think "time and space"), is not the now—for the now is no longer at precisely the 
moment when it is now; it is far more a not-now, a having-been: "'now'"; it has 
already ceased to be in being shown; the now that is, is another now than the one 
shown, and we see that the now is just this; already when it is, to be no more. 
HAAS, supra note 8, at 252. 
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The equation of the ego with being-with-self (which I interpret to be Ae 
same as "being-within-self) is very significant. In chapter 2 of Quality, 
we saw that being-within-self equates with [4]—the sole that 
always appears in all three circles.^® It connoted immanence and hence 
freedom from outside compulsion. The birth of being-within-self in 
chapter 2 was therefore also the birth of human self-consciousne^ 
though that concept as such was far too advanced for us in chapter 2 or 
even now." . • .4 
The ego continues through its content—"sensations, intuitions, and 
so forth." None of these things, however, is adequate to the ego. The 
ego is always beyond these things and so never fully present to itself. 
But neither is the ego Pure Nothing. In fact, the ego is always 
suspended between its content and Pure Nothing. For this very reason, 
it is constantly restless. 
Those familiar with Jacques Lacan's theory of the subject can 
glimpse it prefigured in Hegel's theory of Pure Quantity. Lacan thought 
the subject was "split" between the realm of the Symbolic the ext^nal 
realm of "being"—and the Real, the obUterative concept of Pure 
Nothing. The Lacanian subject constantly tries to fill in the gaps so that 
it can fiilly "be." This is precisely what "desire" is—the drive to be 
complete and whole. Yet desire must fail. For the subject to be whole 
would be for it to surrender its very essence—Continuity that stays 
forever free from the external realm of "being."" 
Remark 2: The Kantian Antinomy of the Indivisibility and the 
Infinite Divisibility of Time, Space and Matter 
In this long Remark, Hegel makes his famous criticism that there 
are not merely four antinomies, as Kant alleged," but infinitely 
numerous antinomies; every concept is a union of opposites—as 
Becoming implies.^" 
56 Carlson, note 4, at 495. . ,Q,I, 
57 Self-conciousness is the theme of the Subjective Logic, which commences m Hegel s 19th 
58 These thoughts summarize JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, THE VEST^ AND J™ 
HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY, AND THE FEMININE (1998). In this book. Professor Schroeder draws 
rigorous parallels between Laeanian and Hegelian thought. 
59 Kant's antinomies are: 
Thesis Ant'ftesis 
riie world is limited in The world is not limited m 
time and space. j'. . ... 
2. There are simples. Everything is divisible. 
3. Freedom exists. Everythmg is caused. 
4. There is a god. There is no god. 
CRITIGUEOFPUREREASON, iwpranote 14, at241-63. 
60 Figure 1(c) shows Becoming as the contradictory unity of Being and Nothmg. Carlson, 
supra note 4, at 438. 
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Kant's second antinomy is (1) there is a simple that cannot be 
further subdivided, and (2) there are no simples, because everything can 
be further subdivided.®' In Remark 2, Hegel states that it is Figure 11(c) 
that gives rise to this antinomy, which "consists solely in the fact that 
discreteness must be asserted just as much as continuity. The one-sided 
assertion of discreteness gives infinite or absolute dividedness, hence an 
indivisible, for principle; the one-sided assertion of continuity, on the 
other hand, gives infinite divisibility." (190) In other words. 
Discreteness implies an indivisible. Continuity implies divisibility. 
Figure 11(c) shows both to be necessary moments. It diagrams the 
antinomy itself. Kant thought that both sides of the antinomy are false, 
because each can be disproved by apagogic reasoning—that is, reason 
by process of elimination. The Kantian solution to the antinomies, 
Hegel says, was to make the contradiction subjective, where it remained 
unresolved.®^ The genuine solution, however, is to recognize that each 
side of an antinomy is one-sided and hence not valid on its own. "[0]n 
the contrary, they are true only as sublated." (192) 
Before demolishing the antinomies, Hegel praises them as "the 
downfall of previous metaphysics." (190) They helped to produce the 
conviction that finite things are null in content. Nevertheless, they are 
far from perfect. Hegel in effect accuses Kant of choosing these 
antinomies (from the infinite collection that could have been chosen) to 
match his four categories of the understanding, earlier developed in the 
Critique of Pure ReasonP This was done, Hegel remarks, to provide a 
mere "show of completeness." (191)®'' 
61 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, note 14, at 248. • . 
62 Harris states that the understanding holds the two sides of the antinomy "mcommunicado, 
and that the result is "logomachy"—a war on words. HARRIS, supra note 15, at 128. 
63 Here is how the categories of understanding match up with the antinomies: 
Categories Antinomies 
Of the 
I Inderstanding 
Quantity Beginning/No Beginning in Time 
Quality Infmite Divisibility/Simple 
Relation Freedom/Causation 
Modality Absolutely necessary God/No God 
The categories are said to belong a priori to the understanding. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 
supra note 14, at 62. According to Kant, we cannot think any object except by means ot the 
categories. We cannot cognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these 
conceptions. Id. at 94. They are the mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions 
from intuitions. W. at 153. j .• / , 
64 Ironically I will later conclude that Hegel will render his theory of Judgment quadratic ^ot 
triadic) only so'that it conforms with Kant's Table of Logical Functions in Judgement. This 
occurs in Hegel's 20th chapter, in the Subjective Logic. For Kant's table, see CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON, supra note 14, at 56. 
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Hegel provides us with this memorable denunciation of Kant: 
The Kantian antinomies on closer inspection contain nothing more 
than the quite simple categorical assertion of each of the two 
opposed moments of a determination, each being taken on its own in 
isolation from the other. But at the same time this simple 
categorical, or strictly speaking assertoric^^^^ statement is wrapped up 
in a false, twisted scaffolding of reasoning which is intended to 
produce a semblance of proof and to conceal and disguise the merely 
assertoric character of the statement.... (192) 
To make good on this criticism, Hegel paraphrases one side of Kant's 
second antinomy as follows: "Every composite substance in the world 
consists of simple parts, and nowhere does there exist anything but the 
simple or what is compounded from it." (192) In the "thesis," Kant 
opposes the atom to the composite, "a very inferior determination 
compared to the continuous." (192)^6 Yet both the atom and the 
composite have a substrate (or common denominator)—substance. 
The truth of the thesis is to be established by apagogic reason—or 
reasoning by process of elimination. Thus, if Kant can prove that 
infinite divisibility is impossible, he has proved apagogically that a 
"simple" exists. Hegel, however, claims that the apagogic 
demonstration is superfluous. He accuses Kant of bringing forth the 
very presuppositions that Kant introduced into the model, so that 
nothing is achieved. Here is Hegel's appraisal of Kant's real argument 
for proving that the indivisibly simple exists: (1) Assume there is such a 
thing as substance. (2) Now assume that the composites do not have 
simple parts. (3) Now think away all composition. Nothing remains. 
(4) This contradicts the assumption that there is substance. (5) Ergo, 
there must be atoms. This, Hegel complains, does not move the 
argument. Kant could have begun this way: Composition is merely a 
contingent relation of the substance. By "contingent" is meant that the 
relation is externally imposed on substance and therefore not immanent 
to it and of no concern to it. If composition is external, then substance 
is simple. In short, substance is a "thing-in-itself," which, in chapter 2, 
Hegel suggested, was a simplex.^"' 
But this mode of arguing is likewise unsatisfactory, Hegel says. In 
it, the contingency of composition is assumed—not proved. Hence, the 
presence of a simplex is tautological. In other words, the structure of 
Kant's argument is: (1) Assume there is a simplex. (2) That would 
65 That is, dogmatic, merely asserted. 
66 Hegel also complains that to oppose the composite to the simple is tautological, since the 
simple itself might be a ''relatively simple" and hence another composite. (193) Hence, the thesis 
does not exclude the antithesis. 
67 In chapter 2, with regard to Figure 3(h), Hegel suggested that Being-in-itself/Being-for-
other amounted to the thing-in-itself, which had to be taken as a simplex. Carlson, supra note 4, 
at 507-10. 
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imply that composition is external and contingent. (3) Wish away 
composition, since it is only wished for in the first place (i.e., is 
subjective). (4) A simplex remains. 
Composition. Hegel likewise attacks the demonstration that 
everything is infinitely divisible, which he calls "a whole nest (to use an 
expression elsewhere employed by Kant) of faulty procedure. (195)^^ 
To disprove the existence of simplicity, Kant's apagogy proceeds as 
follows; (1) Composites exist in space. (2) Space is infinitely divisible. 
(3) Since a simplex can occupy only one space at a time, it too must be 
equally divisible, to conform to the many spaces it occupies. (4) Ergo, 
simplicity does not exist. 
Hegel complains that this argument assumes that whatever is 
substantial is spatial. It also assumes that space is infinitely divisible, 
which is by no means proven. Indeed, space is Quantity, in Hegel s 
view.®^ As such, it is Continuous and Discrete.'''^ Furthermore, the 
second move ("composites exist in space") suggests that simplicity is 
not spatial. Simplicity, by definition, does not have complexity within 
it. Composition is outside it. If composition is outside the simple, so is 
space. Thus, simplicity is not spatial. Only composition is. Yet, if 
simplicity is not spatial, Kant's demonstration falls apart. 
Hegel accuses Kant of quaternio terminorum: "there is also 
involved here a clash between the continuity of space and composition; 
the two are confused with each other. [Space is] substituted for 
[composition] (which results in a quaternio terminorum in the 
conclusion)." (196) A quaternio terminorum is a syllogism with four 
terms instead of three. A syllogism should have this form. 
A=B 
B=C 
A=C 
A quaternio terminorum has the following form: 
A=B 
C=D 
A=D 
For example, (A) all politicians are (B) managers; (C) all administrators 
are (D) sybarites; therefore all (A) politicians are (D) sybarites." 
How is Kant guilty of quaternio terminorum! The critique seems 
to be that Kant changes the meaning of "space." Earlier in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant said that space is sole and single. It does not have 
68 Hegel refers here to Kant's critique of the cosmological proof of God, which Kant calls a 
"perfect nest of dialectical assumptions." CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 340. 
69 text accompanying notes 54-55. r j 
70 Hegel says that the second antimony, which applies to substance, could have been applied 
to time or space. (192) Hence, it is possible space is not infinitely divisible. 
71 See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 206 (11th ed. 2002). 
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discrete parts.^^ xhere, Kant properly equates space with Continuity, as 
Hegel would do. But in the demonstration with regard to the second 
antimony, this point has been forgotten. Now space has infinite parts 
and is itself a composition of them. Hence, Kanf s proposition is (A) all 
composites are in (B) space (conceived as continuous); (C) space 
(conceived as made up of parts) is (D) infinitely divisible. Therefore, 
(A) composites are (D) infinitely divisible. 
Furthermore, in his discussion of the second antimony, Kant 
reminds his readers that we know only phenomena. Space is a 
condition of possibility for phenomena. Hence, Hegel reasons, it 
"substance" means sensuous material, we are discussing on y 
phenomenal substance, not substance-in-itself. Thus, the disproof of 
simplicity amounts to this: sensual experience shows us only what is 
composite. What is simple is not empirically discoverable. 
When Kanf s argument is liberated from "all pointless redundancy 
and tortousness," (197) the proof of the antithesis ("everything is 
divisible") assumes space is Continuity, because substance is placed m 
space. In the proof of the thesis, however, space is not continuous. 
Rather, "substance are absolute ones.'''' (197) The thesis asserts 
Discreteness. The antithesis asserts Continuity. When substance, 
space, time, etc. are taken as discrete, then principle is the indivisible 
One When they are taken as continuous, division is possible. 
Continuity contains the atom within it, however. If division is 
always a possibility, there must be something to divide the atom. That 
is, a discrete thing must exist before divisibility, with its golden axe, 
cleaves it in twain. Likewise, Discreteness contains Continuity. In it, 
the ones are purely simple and hence identical to each other. The 
sameness of the ones is precisely Continuity. As Figure 11(b) shows, 
"each of the two opposed sides contains its other within itselt and 
neither can be thought without the other." (197) Neither side, taken 
alone, has the truth. The truth lies only in their unity—which is shown 
in Figure 11(c). , . 
In the end, Kant leaves the solution of the antimony to one side. 
According to Hegel, each side of the antinomy should have nullified 
itself (as each is by now a True Infinite). In this activity, each side is 
"in its own self only the transition into its other, the unity of both being 
owanfi/T in which they have their truth." (199)^' 
The Eleatics were "[i]nfinitely more ingenious and profound than 
poor, benighted Kant. (197) Hegel forgoes analyzing them, except to 
criticize the empirical procedure of the notorious Diogenes. Thus, 
when a dialectician pointed out the contradiction in motion, made no 
effort to reason it out but, by silently walking up and down, is 
72 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 23. 
73 This would be the Enriched Quantity of Figure 11(c). 
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supposed to have referred to the evidence of sight for an answer 
Such assertion and refutation is certainly easier to make than to 
engage in thinking and to hold fast and resolve by thought alone the 
complexities originating in thought.... (198) 
Hegel claims that Aristotle was genuinely speculative ^^oiit space, 
time and motion. He opposed divisibility to continuity. Of cour , 
Hegel has said divisibility is continuity. But Aristotle understood t a 
diJsibility implies atoms-there must be something for d^isibility 
divide He saw that discreteness and continuity each imply the other. 
S comtis the condition of possibil.ty for the other. Prerre 
l^^ert did not see this. He assutned Aristoile was ctotngjhat 
everything actually contains infinite parts—one side of the Kant 
antinomy. Aristotle saw that both sides were possibilities. 
B. Continuous and Discrete Magnitude 
We have seen that Continuity "requires the other moment 
discreteness, to complete it.' (199) Yet Continuity is not merely the 
same as but is also distinct from Discreteness. He^ce, we i^st extract 
difference from the middle term and consider it in isolated form. 
Figure 12(a) 
Continuous Magnitude 
74 In the Phenomenology, Hegel states that Diogenes liked hfSs'aTa^ 
and thereby proving h "existed." But all this ^h°wed 
°'f1o°;r389^TtTrrlht^^^ on^fderm that it emphas.zes the negativhy (bemg-for-
note 10, m 389, i/y. sucn dieniiiy f fnr cplf Such an insistence on the/flctum 
or .ho tag onliroly .ohiod.vo and 
brutum—the being-for-us of the P "reality" should have provided for it. 
d»i.s .h. .ock ,h. von, tag,,., ®, ''r • SLdiy. 1 P0«'" " I—"' 
PHILOSOPHY or 22 23,,,,,^ 
economics toward law. ALAN BRUDN , .. . was then the sourcebook for 
(1951). 
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Of Figure 12(a), Hegel writes: 
But quantity is a concrete unity only in so far as it is the unity of 
distinct moments. These are . . . not to be resolved again into 
attraction and repulsion, but are to be taken as . . . remaining in its 
unity with the other, that is, remaining in the whole. (199) 
Here Hegel emphasizes that Figure 12(a) is more advanced than Figure 
10(b), which featured Attraction and Repulsion. Attraction and 
Repulsion exhibited Being-for-self. Each expelled its other so that each 
could be by itself. Now Continuous Magnitude humbly realizes it is 
part of a community, even though it asserts its individuality within that 
community. Posited as Continuous Magnitude, Continuity is no longer 
only a moment but the whole of quantity." (199) The addition of the 
word "magnitude," then, signifies "determinateness in quantity." (201) 
Because this is so. Figure 12(b) will show an advance over Figure 
11(b), where the positedness of the extremes was not yet manifest. This 
justifies the isolation of Figures 12(a) and (b) as separate official steps 
in the Logic.''^ . „ 
Continuous and Discrete Magnitude are '"species of quantity. 
(200) By this Hegel means that each extreme is Quantity as such, and is 
a determinateness in light of its own "moments. (201) The use of the 
phrase "moment" signifies that determinateness is but a memory, 
conjured forth by Dialectical Reason. This determinateness now 
appears within the context of a whole—of Quantum portrayed in Figure 
12(c). , , 
Continuous Magnitude is immediate Quantity—taken as a whole. 
But, of course, immediacy is only a sublated immediacy. Immediacy as 
such was the province of Quality. We are beyond that now. We 
partake of an ideal immediacy. Thus, "immediacy is a determinateness 
the sublatedness of which is quantity itself." (200) In other words, 
quantity as a whole has sublated Determinateness and rendered it ideal. 
When we place the emphasis on this recollected Determinateness, 
we obtain Discrete Magnitude. 
76 There is counter-evidence, however. With regard to Figure 11 (c), Hegel states that space 
and time are represented by the enriched Quantity shown there. See supra notes 52-56, 58 and 
accompanying text. In the Remark now under discussion, he says that space and time are 
Continuous Magnitudes. That space and time are represented by both Figure 11(c) and by Figure 
12(a) suggests that no advance has been made. Nevertheless, Continuous Magnitude brought to 
the fore something not present within mere Continuity—an acknowledged membership in a larger 
community. Furthermore, the middle term will be Quantum (a Quantity). Hence, I have declared 
Continuous and Discrete Magnitude to be official steps. 
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Figure 12(b) 
Discrete Magnitude 
Like Continuous Magnitude, Discrete Magnitude is to be taken as a 
unified whole, with a double moment of Continuity and Discreteness 
within it: 
Quantity is in itself asundemess, and continuous magnitude is this 
asunderness continuing itself without negation as an internally self­
same connectedness. But discrete magnitude is this asunderness as 
discontinuous, as intermpted (200) 
The relations between the extremes are now much more genteel than 
they were in the first three chapters. Each extreme admits to its 
subordinate role within a community, whereas, earlier, the extremes 
selfishly insisted on being "for themselves." 
Hegel emphasizes that, if Continuous Magnitude is "the manifold 
one in general," Discrete Magnitude is "posited as the many of a unity." 
(200) That is, just as [3] in Figure 9(c)^'' was both the Void and the 
Many Ones, and in Figure 10(c) [3] was Repulsion (of each One from 
the other), so Discreteness in Figure 11(b) and Discrete Magnitude in 
Figure 12(b) represent many discrete ones which nevertheless continue 
into each other by virtue of their complete sameness. 
Remark : The Usual Separation of These Magnitudes 
There is a "usual" interpretation of Continuous and Discrete 
Magnitude that Hegel disfavors. It suppresses the fact that each 
extreme contains its fellow inside it."'^ The only proper distinction 
See Carlson, supra note 4, at 569. 
78 Terry Pinkard, who calls for a complete rewriting of Hegel's analysis of Quantity, is guilty 
of this fault. Professor Pinkard denies that Hegel's Continuity is connected to the modem 
mathematical notion. PINKARD, supra note 41, at 44. This is, 1 think, precisely wrong. The 
continuity of a curve (which makes the curve differentiable) is exactly what is at stake here. 
Pinkard attempts to recast Hegel in the language of Bertrand Russell's obsession with set theory. 
Thus, "[c]ontinuity would only be another way of talking of the one, and discreteness would only 
be another way of talking of the many." Id. This misses the main point. Continuity is the 
activity of a thing going outside of itself and into the other while remaining itself. This is the 
hallmark of True Infinity, which is missing from Pinkard's account. 
In an earlier essay, Pinkard called for a reformulation of Hegel's entire theory of quantity, 
but, in this essay, Pinkard betrays a desire to keep the analysis in the realm of self-identity— 
precisely the realm that Hegel's Logic wishes to implode. Thus, he writes: "The least one could 
do is reformulate Hegel's doctrine into saying that the two concepts defining numbers are those 
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between Continuous and Discrete Magnitude is that, in Continuous 
Magnitude, determinateness is merely implicit, while in Discrete 
Magnitude, determinateness is posited. 
Space, time, matter, and so forth are continuous magnitudes in that 
they are repulsions from themselves, a streaming forth out of 
themselves which at the same time is not their transition or relating 
of themselves to a qualitative other. (200) 
Each one of these possesses the possibility that, at any time, the 
One may be posited in them. Thus, time's One would be the present. 
As a Continuous Magnitude, time implies that it can be frozen. (Indeed, 
borrowing from earlier points Hegel makes, since time annuls all 
moments, it must indeed have a moment before it to annul.) Discrete 
Magnitude, on the other hand, expressly posits presence as a necessary 
component of time. 
Hegel finishes this section by saying a few words about genus and 
species. Ordinary thinkers organize species into genera "according to 
some external basis of classification." (201) For example, mammals are 
a genera because we choose to emphasize milk production by females 
as the organizing principle. But Continuous and Discrete Magnitude 
produce their own genus in Quantum, described in Figure 12(c). This is 
equally tme for each stage of Speculative Reason.^^ 
of unity and multiplicity, numbers would then be multiplicities of units which we count." Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel's Philosophy of Mathematics, 41 PHIL. & PHENOMENOGICAL RES. 453, 460 
(1980-81). Thus, numbers are self-identical units which are fused together only subjectively 
through counting. To these units Pinkard denies any inherent continuity or True Infinity: 
He should begin with the notion of units ... as members of classes and then proceed to 
show how construction rules which involve these units can be given for numbers ... 
One could then use the categorial notion of a unit (a member of a class, represented by 
a variable), proceed to counting units (i.e., adopt construction rules), thus introducing 
the concepts of numbers, then defme magnitude in the way mentioned, and then one 
could defme quantity (i.e., that which is capable of relations of quantitative 
equality)... at the end of the series not at the beginning. 
Id. at 460-61. This suggestion repeals the whole notion of the Tme Infmite and is defmitely un-
Hegelian in approach. Hegel is keen to show that Quantity is the activity of the Tme Infmite, and 
so he begins (not ends) with the concept of Pure Quantity. 
''5 Joining Walter Kauffman, who denies the triune stmcture of the Logic, Andrew Haas 
complains that '"Continuous and Discrete Magnitude' has only two moments and not three." 
HAAS, supra note 8, at 79. This is technically accurate. The opening chapter on Quantity has 
principal three sections but only two revolutions. The tmth of Continuous and Discrete 
Magnitude will be revealed in the last section of the chapter. The test, however, should not be 
whether each revolution is honored by a subhead, but whether the revolutions, wherever they 
occur, are driven by a rigorous alternation of the Understanding, Dialectical Reason, and 
Speculative Reason. We have already seen that Hegel does not always dedicate a subsection to a 
single revolution. Several subsections have already had multiple revolutions. Some—such as 
this one- -have less than one full revolution. 
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C. Limitation of Quantity 
As we saw earlier, Discrete Magnitude is One. It is also a plurality 
of Ones which repel each other. But each of these Ones is quite the 
same as any other. Hence, the Ones "continue" from one into the other. 
When we focus on the oneness of Discrete Magnitude, we behold 
an ''''excluding one, a limit in the unity." (201) But Limit has long been 
sublated. Accordingly, Hegel adds. Discrete Magnitude is 
immediately not limited; but as distinguished from continuous 
magnitude [1] it is a determinate being [2, 3], a something, with the 
one [3] as its determinateness and also as its first negation and limit. 
(201) 
Thus, not only is Discrete Magnitude plainly a determinateness, 
considered as [2, 3], but even in its isolated form [3] it is still a 
determinateness, because Discrete Magnitude fully remembers its ideal 
moment of being the Many Ones. Furthermore, even as [3] is posited as 
the Many Ones, still it is One and, as such, is Limit and first negation to 
its own being-in-itself [2]. 
If we take [3], in Figure 12(b), as "enclosing, encompassing limit," 
(201) [3] is self-related and is the negation in Discrete Magnitude [2, 3]. 
[3] is "the negative point itself." (201) But Discrete Magnitude [2] is 
likewise Continuity [1,2], "by virtue of which it passes beyond the limit, 
beyond this one [3], to which it is indifferent. This speculative 
moment leads us to Figure 12(c): 
Figure 12 (c) 
Quantum 
Of Figure 12(c), Hegel writes: "Real discrete quantity is thus a 
quantity, of quantum—quantity as a determinate being and a 
something." (201) Thus, Quantum is to Pure Quantity what Determinate 
Being was to Pure Being,^'' and the second chapter of Quantity is to 
Quantity as a whole what the second chapter of Quality was to Quality 
as a whole—a display of Dialectical Reason. Quantum is, in effect, 
determinate Quantity. 
Has Speculative Reason worked on Figure 12(b) in the same way it 
80 As Hegel specifically emphasizes. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 101 Remark. 
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did in the Quality chapters? Recall that, at first, the extremes modulated 
back and forth.Speculative Reason then named the movement and 
produced the middle term.^^ Later, the extremes turned on themselves 
and self-erased (the Finites). Speculative Reason named this self-
erasure as the True Infinite.^^ Now it appears that Speculative Reason 
has operated on [2, 3] without considering the role of [1]. 
Hegel ends the chapter by correcting this misapprehension. 
Reverting back to [3] for a moment, Hegel holds that this "one which is 
a limit includes within itself the many ones of discrete quantity." But 
these Many Ones are sublated. [3] serves as a limit to Continuity, 
which Continuity leaps over with ease. Since Continuity [1] leaps over 
[2] and enters into [3] with ease, [3] likewise leaps back into [1], which 
is just as much Discrete Magnitude as it was Continuous Magnitude. 
The extremes equally leap out of themselves, and so Speculative 
Reason, like a sportscaster, still names the activity it witnesses in the 
extremes. 
II. FROM NUMBER TO QUANTITATIVE INFINITY 
We now commence what is, by far, the longest, most maddening 
chapter in the Science of Logic—Quantum. 
At the end of the first chapter of Quantity, Hegel had derived 
Quantum. Quantum becomes Number—"quantity with a 
determinateness or limit in general." (202) Quantum/Number will melt, 
thaw, and resolve itself into a pair of terms unfamiliar to the modern 
eye—Extensive and Intensive Quantum, which Hegel also indifferently 
calls Extensive and Intensive Magnitude. Intensive Quantum is also 
called Degree. 
Extensive Quantum stands for the entire set of numbers which a 
single number—say, 10—negates. In terms of natural numbers, it 
stands for 1-9 and 11 and higher. Meanwhile, Intensive Quantum 
(Degree) stands for 10, in the above example. Intensive Quantum will 
resist outside manipulation in a way that Pure Quantity—which had its 
being outside it—could not. Quantum's intensity will quickly yield to 
Quantitative Infinity and the infinitely small or large number, which can 
never be named. When we reach this unnameable thing. Quantum has 
truly recaptured its Being. 
None of this is very helpful at this stage. Suffice it to say that, 
whereas as the middle chapter of Quality saw Being chasing away its 
own content, the middle chapter of Quantity will do the opposite—it 
Carlson, supra note 4, at 445. 
82 Id. at 446-47. 
83 Id. at 538-43. 
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will recapture some measure of its content. 
A. Number 
Hegel starts with the premise that Continuous Magnitude and 
Discrete Magnitude are the same, at this point. Each is Quantum, and 
Quantum has Limit. But Limit exists only in its ideal form: 
The very nature of quantity as sublated being-for-self is ipso facto to 
be indifferent to its limit. But equally, too, quantity is not unaffected 
by the limit or by being quantum; for it contains within itself. . . the 
one, which . . .  is its  l imit. . . .  (202) 
In short, quanta have discreteness. Three is distinct from four. But 
three what? The number three has no content except that it is not two or 
four. In three's insistence upon its independence from two or four we 
witness that three is "not unaffected by the limit" which exists in 
Quantum as an ideal moment. 
Quantum, then, contains within itself the moment of the One.^'^ 
"This one is thus the principle of quantum." (202) But this One is more 
advanced than the One of chapter 3.^^ pji-gt, it is continuous with all the 
other quanta. That is, it is a unity of Continuity and Discreteness. 
Second, it is discrete and hence different from all the other quanta. And 
third. Quantum is a negation of the negation. As such, it has exceeded 
the ideal Limit which Discrete Magnitude represented. It is an ideal 
being that excludes its otherness from itself. "Thus the one [of 
Quantum] is (a) self-relating, (B) enclosing and (p) other-excluding 
limit." (202) 
When completely posited in these three determinations. Quantum 
is Number. Thus, with reference to Figure 12(c), Number includes 
"limit as a plurality" (203)—or [4, 5, 6]. In its analysis of Quantum, the 
Understanding first isolates this plurality as Amount, and so we get: 
^ One commentator goes so far to suggest that the first three chapters of the Science of Logic 
are entirely dedicated to establishing this one proposition. Petry, supra note 11, at 485. 
85 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 558-59. 
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Figure 13 (a) 
Amount 
In Figure 13(a), the Understanding sees Quantum as containing the 
Many Ones. But Quantum "does not contain them in an indeterminate 
manner, for the determinateness of limit falls in[side] them." (203) In 
Amount, Quantum determines itself as unique from other pluralities. In 
short, "three" proudly boasts that it is uniquely "three" and not some 
other number like two or four. 
Amount is a plurality—of what? Units! Hence, "three" is really 
always three units, or 3 = 3-1. Hence, we immediately derive: 
''Amount and unit constitute the moments of number." (203) This brings 
us quickly to Figure 13(c): 
Figure 13 (b) 
Unit 
Figure 13 (c) 
Number 
Hegel says of Figure 13(c), "Quantum is limited generally; its limit 
is an abstract, simple determinateness of it. But in quantum as number. 
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this limit is posited as manifold within itself" (203) The "manifold" is 
Number's Amount. 
Number is a "complete positedness" (203)—that is, a complex 
when the plural limit [4, 5, 6] is considered together with the immediate 
unity [7]. So considered, Number is a Discrete Magnitude, or a Unit. 
That is, in [7] it is unmediated. But [7] just as much continues into [4, 
5, 6]. Because it is continuous, it is a "complete determinateness, for m 
it the limit [4,5,6] is present as a specific plurality which has for its 
principle the one [7], the absolutely determinate." (203)»6 
What is the difference between Number as a complete positedness 
and Number as a complete determinateness? Positedness represents 
what a True Infinite presupposes by self-erasing—that there is an other 
that controls its content. Thus, the number three is simply not four or 
five; it posits its being in all the other numbers. 
Determinateness represents a cruder stage—"being" which admits 
that it is in unity with non-being but which refuses to self-erase. 
In the sphere of determinate being, the relation of the limit to 
[Determinate Being, or, here. Amount] was primarily such that the 
determinate being persisted as the affirmative on this side of its limit, 
while the limit, the negation, was found outside of the border of the 
determinate being.... (203) 
Putting these points together. Number is a True Infinite. It becomes 
something other (positing); its being is determined externally, by all the 
other numbers it is not. Yet it also stays what it is (Determinate Being), 
for this very reason, 100 does not change into 99 or 101.^^ 
Hegel has said that Number is a "complete determinateness' 
because of continuity. How so? Because, just as Attraction fused the 
Many into One,®*^ so Continuity fuses the plurality into One. Hence, 
Number [4-7] is made into One by Continuity. Yet this One refers to 
both being [4, 5] and to nothing [4, 6]. Equally, this One's being might 
be viewed as continuous plurality [4, 5, 6] or the negative unity [7] that 
holds it together. Either way, because it is complex. Number is a 
determinateness. Quantum is beginning to recapture some of the 
content that Being-for-self shed fi-om itself in Repulsion. 
With regard to Amount in Figure 13(c), Hegel asks how the Many 
Ones (of which Amount consists) are present in Number. In effect. 
Amount assumes an external "counter," who breaks off Amount for his 
86 Mure puts it this way: "Any whole number is the 'discerning' of a sum within a continuous 
multiplicity of self-equal units, within an endless flow in which the unit endlessly repeats itself. 
MURE, note 17, at 119. t j j r 
87 Andrew Haas remarks, "The concept of quantum ... is not merely quantitative. Indeed, it 
number can show itself as qualitative, then it is because every quantitative difference (numerical 
e-quality and ine-quality;arithmetic and geometry) is always also a qualitative difference .... 
HAAS, supra note 8, at 117. 
88 Carlson, iwpra note 4, at 571-72. 
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own purposes and isolates it from the many other Amounts that could 
have been isolated.^^ For example, the counter, for reasons of his own, 
counts to 100 and breaks off the counting there. This amount is thus 
isolated from 99 or 101, by some external "counting" force. 
Of counting to 100, Hegel writes; 
In the sphere a number, say a hundred, is conceived in such a manner 
that the hundredth one alone limits the many to make them a hundred 
. . . but none of the hundred ones has precedence over any other for 
they are only equal—each is equally the hundredth; thus they [i.e., 
the units] all belong to the limit which makes the number a hundred 
and the number cannot dispense with any of them for its 
determinateness. (203-04) 
In other words. Unit is Limit to Amount. 100 is simultaneously one 
Unit, but it also implies 100 equal units contained therein, each one of 
which lays equal claim to being the lOOth.^" 
Number has a limiting Unit—the 100th Unit. By this, 100 differs 
from 99 or 101. The distinction, however, is not qualitative. Qualitative 
distinctions are self-generated. Quantitative distinction is externally 
imposed. The units do not count themselves to 100. They require 
"comparing external reflection"—a mathematician—to do the counting. 
(204) 100 is thus externally derived. Once this is accomplished, 100 
"remains returned into itself and indifferent to others." (204) 
Hegel finishes his analysis of Number by emphasizing that it is an 
"absolutely determinate" Unit, "which at the same time has the form of 
simple immediacy and for which, therefore, the relation to other is 
completely external." (204) If some things are numerically determined, 
the things themselves are qualitatively unaffected by Number. Thus, if I 
say I have three things and you say you have four things, our "things" 
have not yet been distinguished in and of themselves.^' They are still 
homogeneous "things" in spite of the numerical difference. Conversely, 
Number is blithely indifferent to the things to which we apply them. 
Within Number is a complete openness to externally imposed content. 
In short, we can use Number to count any qualitative thing. 
Number, then, displays its own immediacy not imposed by the 
outside thing. Besides being this immediacy. Number is also a 
determinateness—a mediation. Its moments are Amount and Unit. 
As Hegel puts it, "the breaking off [of the counting] of the many ones and the exclusion of 
other ones appears as a determination falling outside the enclosed ones." (203). 
A related point was made by Hegel earlier with regard to Attraction. In chapter 3, Hegel 
stated that the Many Ones were fused into One by Attraction. We were not, however, to assume 
that, amidst the Many Ones, a single Caesar had risen to become the imperial One. Rather, each 
of the Many Ones had an equal claim to the crown of One. So it is with the Units in Number. 
See Figure 10(a); Carlson, supra note 4, at 578. 
9' Of course, put just this way, the things are distinguished because some of the things are 
mine and some are yours. But this "quality" of the things is purely external to the things 
themselves. They are utterly indifferent to whom their owners are. 
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This contradiction-Number as an iinmediacy ^nd ^ ^  
determinateness-is said to be "the quality of quantum, (204) which 
will lead to further development. 
Remark 1: The Species of Calculation in Arithmetic; Kant's 
Synthetic Propositions a priori of Intuition 
Geometry. In this long Remark, Hegel distinguishes and also 
relates geometry and arithmetic. Hegel identifies the science of spatia 
magnitude as geometry, which has Continuous Magnitude as its sub^ ^^ ^^  ^
matter. In eontrast, arithmetic trafficks in Discrete Magnitude. Perhaps 
this can be seen in the Cartesian plane. 
10 -
5 - i 1 1 
-10 -5 5 10 
-5 
10x10=100 
-10-
Cartesian Plane 
On the Cartesian plane, 100 is a rectangle and so is con muous 
through its allotted space. But the arithmetical 100 is like valor, the 
better part of discreteness. It is simply neither 99, 101, nor any other 
Hegel emphasizes that geometry does not measure spatial figures. 
It only compares them. When it trafficks m equality of sides or 
equidistance of points from a center, it owes no debt to number. Thus, a 
circle is the set of equidistant points from a given center. But 
geometry wishes to treat of triangles or non-square rectangles, number 
is requisite. Whereas, before geometry was driven solely by the 
external force of the geometer, now the geometry of triangles and 
rectangles relies on Number, which contains a moment of Discreteness 
Where Number appears, mere comparison by the geometer no longe 
has exclusive jurisdiction. 
Spatial geometry nevertheless implies and continues into 
arithmetic. Hegel returns to the "point" that from the geometric pom 
springs the line of its own accord." This is because the Zeus-hke poim 
was the Limit of the Athenian line. Since Limit is a coiielative term 
92 Carlson, supra note 4, at 522-23. 
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requiring two subparts in need of correlation, the minute we designated 
the point as Limit, we had to think of point's correlate—the line. Hegel 
admits that this demonstration indicates that spatial magnitude—i.e., 
geometry free and clear of Number—generates numerical magnitude. 
The One of spatial magnitude immediately sublates itself and continues 
on to become the line of many Ones. Furthermore, to the extent a line is 
limited, the Limit of the line—the spatial point—must be viewed as a 
Number that limits the line of many ones. In the point, the line's self-
determinedness is located. Hence, from the line's perspective, its self-
determinedness is self-external. That is, the line repels from itself its 
Limit. The point seems to be that geometry is never enfeely isolated 
from arithmetic, just as Continuity is never entirely isolated from 
Discreteness. 
Arithmetic. Arithmetic operates with Number (but does not 
speculate as to what Number is). To arithmetic. Number is "the 
determinateness which is indifferent, inert; it must be actuated fro^ 
without and so brought into a relation." (205) This is arithmetic s 
function. Numbers do not add themselves. Arithmetic is the tool of 
some outside will. 
Arithmetic has various modes of relation—addition, multiplication, 
etc. Arithmetic not being a speculative enterprise, the transition from 
one of these modes to another is not made prominent. These modes 
can, however, all be derived from the very concept of Number. 
"Number has for its principle the one and is, therefore, simply an 
aggregate externally put together, a purely analytic figure devoid of any 
inner connectedness." (205) Thus, an external "counter breaks off the 
counting at, say, 100, thereby isolating this Number from the infinite 
others the counter may have preferred. All calculation is essentially 
counting. 
Suppose we have two numbers chosen by the counter. Whatever 
relation these two numbers have must also be supplied by the counter. 
The counter must decide whether to subtract or divide these numbers. 
Number has a qualitative difference within it—Unit and Amount. But 
the identity or difference between two given Numbers is entirely 
external. 
Numbers can be produced in two ways. We can count up the units 
and produce a number. Or we can subdivide from an aggregate already 
given. That is, given 100, we can negate 70 of the Units and isolate 30. 
In both cases, counting is implicated. One is positive counting. The 
other is negative counting. 
Addition and Multiplication. In counting Units, the Amount of the 
Unit is set arbitrarily. We can count five single Units. Then we can 
93 In the Lesser Logic, Hegel refers to the mathematical operations as "telling a tale" about 
numbers. LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 103. 
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decide to count some more—seven more units are added. Hence, we 
get 7+5=12. In "addition," the relation of 7 and 5 is a complete 
contingency. These two Numbers are quite indifferent to each other. 
They were simply put together by the mathematicians for their own 
private purposes—an arranged, not a romantic, marriage. 
We can also count six Units of two (multiplication). Hence, 
multiplication is the same as counting. What counts as a Unit (one, two, 
ten, etc.) is externally decided by the mathematician. All this counting, 
however, is tedious and so, to save time, we learn by rote what the sums 
and products of two numbers are. 
Kantian Arithmetic. The sum 7+5=12 is chosen by Hegel bt.,cause 
Kant used this very sum to demonstrate that arithmetic is a synthetic 
proposition.^5 Hegel denounces this conclusion of synthesis to be 
meaningless: 
The sum of 5 and 7 means the mechanical [begrifflose] conjunction 
of the two numbers, and the counting from seven onwards thus 
mechanically continued until the five units are exhausted can be 
called a putting together, a synthesis, just like counting from one 
onwards; but it is a synthesis wholly analytical in nature, for the 
connection is quite artificial, there is nothing in it or put into it which 
is not quite externally given. (207-08) 
It is not clear to me why Hegel was so heated in denouncing Kant s 
invocation of synthesis with regard to arithmetic. Was Kant not simply 
saying that 5 and 7 do not add themselves? And is not Hegel in 
complete agreement that addition is a matter for the external counter? 
In short, "synthesis" to Kant is what "externality of eontent" is for 
Hegel. . 
Hegel also objects to Kant's conclusion that arithmetic is a a 
priori. By a priori, Kant meant not derived from experience.^ If we 
synthesize our experiences, then our knowledge is merely empirical and 
contingent, or a posteriori.^^ Hegel attacks the very distinction of a 
priori and a posteriori. He asserts that every sense or impulse has in it 
the a priori moment, just as much as space and time, in the shape of 
spatial and temporal existence, is determined a posteriori." (208) This 
plaint is related to Hegel's criticism of the unknowable thing-in-itself. 
94 In analyzing "analysis," Hegel will summarize this point by announcing that arithmetic is 
basically "one"—magnitude as such. If this "one" is rendered plural, or unified into a sum, this is 
done externally. "How numbers are further combined and separated depends solely on the 
positing activity of the cognizing subject." (790) 
95 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 10. 
96 Very much later, Hegel returns to his view that aritmetic is analytic, not synthetic. He will 
say that 5+7 already contains the command to count 7 more beyond 5. The result contains 
nothing more than what was in 5+7—the command to keep counting. Therefore, arithmetic is 
analytic only. Science of Logic at 791-92. 
97 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 60. 
98 Id. at 44. 
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In effect, Hegel believes that our knowledge of objects is always a unity 
of our perception {a posteriori) and the authentic integrity of the object 
(a priori)?^ . 
Hegel praises, after a fashion, Kant's notion of the synthetic a 
priori judgment as belonging "to what is great and imperishable in his 
philosophy " (209) But what he likes about it is the speculative content 
Kant never brought to light. In the synthetic o priori judgment, 
"something differentiated. .. equally is inseparable." (209) Identity is 
"in its own self an inseparable differenee." (209) In other words, if 
arithmetic is a priori synthetic, then 7+5 can be kept apart and also «o/ 
kept apart simultaneously. Difference and identity each have their 
moments in 7+5=12. But this identity of identity and difference is no 
mere property of the a priori synthetic judgment. It is just as much 
present in intuition—a posteriori judgment. Henee, the compliment to 
Kant is, at best, ironieally tendered. 
In any ease, Hegel attacks Kant's assertion that geometry is 
grounded in synthesis. Kant conceded that some of its axioms are 
analytic, but he also held as synthetic the proposition that the shortest 
line between two points is a straight line.'^' In contrast, Hegel has held 
that, at least if "point" is thought together with Limit, the line generates 
itself. This self-generated line is inherently simple. "[l]ts extension 
does not involve any alteration in its determination, or reference to 
another point or line outside itself." (208) Simplicity is the very Quality 
of the line, which springs forth fi-om its Limit in the point. Euclid 
therefore was correct in listing amongst his postulates the purely 
analytical proposition that the shortest line between two points is a 
straight line.i''^ Because this definition includes nothing heterogeneous 
to geometry, Euclid's proposition is analytic, not synthetic. 
99 These demonstrations are made in the early chapters of the Phenomenolo^, supra note 10. 
100 The identity of identity and difference—a key Hegelian slogan—has already bera 
discussed in Remark 2 following "The Unity of Being and Nothing" m chapter 1. It will be 
expressly considered as an important part of the Doctrine of Reflection. 5ee Scence of Logic at 
408-33. 
101 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, ISWPRA note 14, at 10. 
102 Euclid gave these four postulates upon which all geometry is based: 
(1) a straight line segment can be drawn joining any two points. 
(2) Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight line. 
(3) Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the segment as radius 
and one end point as center. 
(4) All right angles are congruent. mni A 
DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH; AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 90 (1979). A 
fifth was added, but it turned out to be subjective, not objective. , , <... 
(5) If two lines are drawn which intersect a third in such a way that the sum ot the 
inner angles on one side is less than two right angles, then the two Imes mevitably must 
intersect each other on that side if extended far enough. 
W. The suspension ofthe fifth postulate leads to non-Euclidean geometry AND 
103 Antonio Moretto, Hegel on Greek Mathematics and the Modem Calculus, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, at 149, 154. 
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Subtraction and Division. Subtraction and division are negative 
counting. In subtraction (i.e., 12-5-7), the Numbers are indifferent or 
"generally unequal" to each other. That is, given a line segrnent of 
units, we could have subdivided the line as 7 and 5, or 9 and 3, or 
and 1, etc. The two Numbers into which a line of 12 units is subdivided 
bear no relation to each other. 
If we make the two Numbers (qualitatively) equal, then we have 
entered the province of division. Suppose we count up a Unit—say, 6. 
The Number 12 now has a Unit of 6 and an Amount of 2. 
Division is different from multiplication, however in 
multiplication, where 6-2=12, it was a matter of indifference whether 6 
counted as Amount or Unit.^o^ Division would ^f^^o operate on 
another principle. After all, if we solve the above for 2 then 2-12/6. 
12/6 is not the same as 6/12. But, remembering that negative 
counting" takes 12 as given, it is likewise immaterial whether the 
divisor (6) or quotient (2) is Unit or Amount. If we say 6 is Unit we 
ask how often 6 is contained in 12. If we say that the quotient (2) is 
Unit, then "the problem is to divide a number [12] into a amount 
of equal parts [here, 6] and to find the magnitude of such part. (21U) 
Exponents. In multiplication and division, the two Numbers are 
related to each other as Unit and Amount. Yet Unit and /^ount are 
likewise "still immediate with respect to each other and therefore 
simply unequal (210) If we insist that Unit and Amount be equal, we 
will complete the determinations immanent within Number. This last 
mode of counting is the raising of a Number to a power. 
Take 6^=36. Here, "the several numbers to be added are tne 
same " (210) Should not Hegel have said the two numbers [6 and 6] to 
be multiplied are the same? No. Hegel has already said that 
multiplication is counting, just like addition. Hence, we shall count six 
units. Each unit has six in it. In short, we count from 1 to 6^ Next we 
count from 7 to 12, and so forth. Eventually we reach 36. The point is 
that in squaring 6, Amount equals Unit. 
If we advance from 6^-36 to 6'=216, "inequaiity enters again. 
The new factor (6), is equal to the former Unit (6) and Amount (6)- But 
this "new factor" must now be taken as Unit. The prior square (6 ) is 
now Amount. Hence, Unit and Amount are now not equal. But, at 
least if we stick with squares: 
fwle have here in principle those determinations of amount and unit 
which, as the essential difference of the Notion, have to be equalized 
104 Qualitative equality means that Unit and Amount have a kind of discreteness to them. Of 
course we e^mal reflLors must decide which of the two numbers ts Unit and which ,s 
Amount. These numbers do not yet determine themselves. u • u a - Ar, 
105 This is the "commutative" property of multiplication, according to which ab - ba. 
106 Of course, we could likewise say that 36 is Unit and 6 is Amount. 
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before number as a going-out-of-itself has completely returned into 
self. . . [T]he arithmetical square alone contains an immanent 
absolute determinedness .... (211) 
Here we have a preview of what, in the last chapter of Quantity, will be 
called the "Ratio of Powers.""^"' The premise is that if we insist that 
Unit equals Amount, the number shows resistance to outside 
manipulation. The Ratio of Powers will represent the last stage of 
Quantity. It is here that Quantum recaptures its integrity and wins its 
independence from the counters who have so tyrannized it prior to that 
point. 
The self-integrity that squares enjoy explains various mathematical 
phenomena, according to Hegel. Thus, "higher equations"—equations 
involving powers higher than two'®^—must be reduced to quadratic 
equations, which only involve squares.'"' This also explains why 
"equations with odd exponents can only be formally determined." (211) 
By this Hegel seems to mean as follows: if I consider a higher equation 
involving an odd exponent, I can calculate the "root""" only by the use 
of imaginary numbers, such as -\/l."' This route to the root is taken to 
be a bit of a mathematical imperialism, from which mere squares are 
immune."^ 
A last example of the dominance of the square is that, in geometry, 
only "right" triangles have immanent integrity. In a right triangle, 
where c is the hypotenuse, a^+b^ = c^—Pythagoras's theorem. Only in 
this figure is there "absolute determinedness." (211) For this reason, all 
geometric figures must be reduced to right triangles for their complete 
determination. 
'07 See infra notes 246-63 and accompanying text. 
108 example: 
ax^ + bx^ + cx + d = 0 
where 0. 
109 A quadratic equation has this form: 
ax^ + hx + c = 0 
where 0. 
110 In quadratic equations, there are always two different solutions, or roots, though 
occasionally the roots are equal to each other (when = 4ac). 
111 The entire sentence I am interpreting asserts: 
[E]quations with odd exponents can only be formally determined and, just when roots 
are rational they cannot be found otherwise than by an imaginary expression, that is, 
by the opposite of that which the roots are and express. (211) 
On solutions to the cubic equation, see CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 284-86 
(rev. ed. 1991) [hereinafter BOYER, MATHEMATICS]. 
112 Later, Hegel will say that the solution to the higher equations is synthetic, not analytic, 
because the relevance of imaginary numbers must be proven and is not simply analytic 
"counting," as arithmetic is. Science of Logic at 792-93. 
2002] HEGEL'S THEORY OF QUANTITY T06T 
Hegel has a mysterious paragraph on "graded instruction." <212) 
By this he presumably means ordinary high 
Hegel states instructors teach about powers before ^ey t^h 
-proportions." 1 take "proportion" to 
nmbers-fiactions. Proportions are connected with 
between Unit and Amount. That is, 6/2 is not the same as 2'^ '' 
Itters which is the dividend and which the d,visor. The study of 
-proportions" thus goes beyond immediate olntll'm In 
Amount are mere moments. Any such study is external to (Juantum. to 
Quantitative Ratio—to be considered in the final chapter of Quan i y 
Number is also no longer immediate quantum. Rather, ratio possesses a 
determinateness of its own.''"' frnm the 
Hegel has spent considerable time deriving addition, etc., from the 
very concept of Number. But, he warns; 
It cannot be said that the progressive determination of the species of 
cakuTatton here given is a philosophy of them or lhat it exhibits, 
possibly, their inner significance. (212) 
Rather Hegel suggests that we must distinguish what is self-external to 
Numb;r Wlienle identify what is external to Number, then we know 
that what the Notion accomplishes happens in an external manner^ 
Thus any idea of equality or inequality of Numbers is external to the 
concept of Number as such. 
Hegel concludes the Remark with this observation. 
I, is an essential requiremenl when philosophising about real ^Kts 
to distinguish those spheres to which a specific form of the Notion 
belongs . . [OJtherwise the peculiar nature of a subject matter w ic 
is external and contingent will he distorted by Ideas, and similarly 
these Ideas will he distorted and made into something merely forma . 
(212) 
Presumably this warning means that speculative Philosophy has its 
spSre and higher mathematics has its sphere. Each should be wary of 
permitting the other field from unduly interfering the project at hand. 
Remark 2: The Employment of Numerical Distinction for 
Expressing Philosophical Notions 
Hegel has already shown that Number is the "absolute 
determinateness of quantity, and its element is the difference which has 
.nnntinB. Pcrhaos this is truc only from - nedanomcal nomt of view. 
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become indifferent." (212) The indifference of Number implies that 
Number finds its content imposed upon it from the outside. Thus, 
arithmetic is an analytical science. It does not contain the Notion. 
Arithmetic combinations are not intrinsic to the concept of Number "but 
are effected on it in a wholly external manner." (212) It is therefore "no 
problem for speculative thought, but is the antithesis of the Notion." 
(212) When thought engages in arithmetic, it is involved in activity 
which is the 
extreme extemalization of itself, an activity in which it is forced to 
move in a realm of thoughtlessness and to combine elements which 
are incapable of any necessary relationships. (213) 
Mathematics is "the abstract thought of externality itself." (213) For this 
very reason. Number is the abstract version of sense (also external to 
thought). In Number, "sense is brought closest to thought: number is 
the pure thought of thought's own extemalization." (213) 
Hegel relates the Many Ones to sensual material. The Many "is in 
its own self external and so proper to sense." (213)''^ When thought— 
"what is most alive and most active"—is translated to Number, then 
what is concrete turns into what is abstract—"dead, inert 
determinations." (214) The ancients knew that Number stands midway 
between sense and thought. They knew that philosophy was not fit for 
mere numbers—something Hegel's contemporaries had forgotten. 
Numbers are supposed to be educational for students, but Hegel 
thinks this is over-rated. 
Number is a non-sensuous object, and occupation with it and its 
combinations is a non-sensuous business; in it mind is held to 
communing with itself. .. a matter of great though one-sided 
importance. (216) 
But occupation with numbers "is an unthinking, mechanical one. The 
effort consists mainly in holding fast what is devoid of the Notion and 
in combining it purely mechanically." (216) Calculation dulls the mind 
and empties it of substance. It is so thoroughly debased, Hegel notes, 
"that it has been possible to construct machines which perform 
arithmetical operations with complete accuracy." (216; see also 791) 
B. Extensive and Intensive Quantum 
(a) Their Difference 
In Figure 13(c), Number can be interpreted as a having its 
'15 Presumably this means that the Many Ones were expelled from the One in Figure 9(b) and 
therefore became other to thought. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 560-61. 
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determinateness isolated in Amount [4, 5, 6]."® [7] is 
which can be taken, in its Discreteness, as a plurality, since Amoun 
continues right through it. Number is nothing but Limit-five is 
nothing but not six or four. .. 
Quantum "with its limit, which [Limit] is in its own self a plurality, 
is extensive magnitude^ (217) 
Figure 14(a) 
Extensive Magnitude 
(Extensive Quantum) 
Extensive Magnitude represents the Understanding's realization that a 
number is nothing but not all the other 
Understanding proposes that Number is a meton^,' with all its Bemg 
outside of itself. Thus, If our number is three. Extensive Magnitude 
_oo->{2.999 ...} and {3.000 ... 001}-> 0°. 
Extensive Magnitude is to be distinguished from the earlier stage 
of Continuous Magnitude in Figure 12(a). Continuous Magitude was a 
component part of Quantum. It was derived by ''.f' 
Quantity, as Enriched by the development of Continuity and 
Discreteness. In Continuous Magnitude, Quantum was conceived as 
identical with its Limit [4, 5,6]. "Continuous mapiitude ^ 
determined as being for itself because it lacks the one [7] (m which 
S^for-selfness is implied) and number." (217) Magnitude does not 
receive this "one" until Dialectical Reason arrives to bring out the 
merely implicit idea of Discrete Magnitude. Continuous Magnitude 
116 [6] is beyond Amount proper. But, since Unit is just as much Amount as Amount, [6] can 
MlxTmizatioi 1999 Wis. L. REV. 687, 763 ("In metonymy, the signified always remams hidden, 
and negative."). 
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therefore represents "only one of the two sides which together make 
quantum fully determined and a number.'''' (217) 
Discrete Magnitude was more advanced. It brought out what was 
merely implicit in Continuous Magnitude, but it also suffered from the 
same fault. In Discrete Magnitude, there was a discreteness [3] which 
did not expressly admit its unity with Continuous Magnitude. 
What was merely in-itself in these earlier stages is now made 
express. "Extensive and intensive magnitudes are determinatenesses of 
the quantitative limit itself." (217) That is. Extensive Magnitude is a 
more adequate interpretation of what Number is—mere Limit fending 
off all the other numbers. The unity of Extensive Magnitude "has the 
moment of continuity present within itself," (217) but Extensive 
Magnitude presents itself as one. Referring to Figure 14(a), Hegel 
states that Number "is immediately an extensive quantum—the simple 
determinateness which is essentially an amount, but an amount of one 
and the same wnfr." (217) The difference between Extensive Magnitude 
and Number is only this: "in number the determinateness is expressly 
posited as a plurality." (218) Now the unity of Number comes to the 
fore. But the unity presented is the unity of what Number is not—all 
the other numbers that metonymically described what Number is. 
Dialectical Reason comes forward to complain that Extensive 
Magnitude suppresses [7]—the truly internal "quality" of Number. 
Thus, the number three is -0° -»{2.999 ...} and {3.000 ... 001}-^ 
(its Extensive Magnitude), but it is also three. In other words. Number 
is not just a metonym but also an affumative being. 
This "intensive" quality of Number is Intensive Magnitude or 
Degree: 
Of Figure 14(b), Hegel writes, "the limit of quantum, which as 
extensive had its real determinateness in the self-external amount, 
passes over into simple determinateness.'''' (218) Here, I think, we have 
self-erasure. Extensive Magnitude says, in effect, "I am not a unity." 
Unity therefore flees the precinct of Extensive Magnitude and takes 
sanctuary in Intensive Magnitude."^ 
118 Much later, in mediating between Kant and Moses Mendelssohn on the immortality of the 
soul, Hegel states that, if the soul is viewed as purely simple, it has no "extensive magnitude." 
(779) Extensive Magnitude will represent "parts" in the dialectic of whole and parts. 
Figure 14 (b) 
Intensive Magnitude (Degree) 
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Earlier, Number was Amount—a plurality made into one. Within 
Amount, each of the Many Ones was the same as any other. None was 
primus inter pares. If Amount is 100, each One could claim to be the 
determining 100th. Hence, Amount did not exhibit determinateness as 
such (Limit). Amount thus collapsed into Unit. 
Degree, in contrast, is a specific magnitude. For example, it is the 
100th One. As such, it "is not an aggregate or plural within itself' 
(218) Rather, it is a "plurality only in principle." (218) In Degree, 
"determinate being has returned into being-for-self. (218) 
The determinateness of Degree must be expressed by a number. It 
must be, for example, the 100th One. In this expression, 100 is not 
Amount. It is only unitary (or a degree). Now, a single One emerges as 
primus inter pares over all the other Ones."^ 
Degree enjoys Being-for-self. It resists continuity in a way that, in 
the earlier stages of Quantity, the Many Ones could not. But, at the 
same time. Degree's content is external to itself. If it is the 100th, the 
"100" is outside of it. It is Extensive Magnitude that owns plurality 
the externality of Degree.Yet this plurality is likewise One. In 
effect. Extensive Magnitude has already turned itself into One, when it 
said, "1 am plurality itself." In this posture. Extensive Magnitude, by 
announcing itself not a unity, unified the plurality in [1] of Figure 14(a). 
Hence, Degree and Extensive Magnitude are doing the same thing-
expelling their own content, which we can now interpret as [2].'^' A 
plurality [1,2] external to the degree [3] constitutes the determinateness 
119 Perhaps some of this is missed by Justus Hartnack in his description of Extensive 
Magnitude: . • • ui 
To say about a quantum that it is an extensive magnitude is to say that it is raeasurame. 
If I say about a quantum that its length is ten yards, this means that yard follows upon 
yard until one reaches the end, the tenth yard (ten being the limiting number).... By 
performing the act of counting, I treat the quantum as an extensive quantum. 
JUSTUS HARTNACK, AN INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S LOGIC 32 (Lars Aagaard-Mogensen trans 
1998) My problem with this account is that it does not quite capture Extensive Magnitude s role 
in making Degree coherent. Thus, if we think of the tenth yard. Extensive Magnitude is the 
plurality of numbers which are not tenth. Hence, Extensive Magnitude is the first nine yards and 
the eleventh yard and beyond. Extensive Magnitude is therefore not a Quantum on which we 
focus but rather the background which makes Degree coherent. 
Hartnack goes on to say; , , .u mo 
If we talk about... a room temperature of 20° C, then the degrees below the 20 never 
formed an extensive magnitude that was absorbed in that degree of temperature • • • 
The degree cannot be verified by adding the degrees below 20° as we can add the 
Id. nhink this is absolutely wrong. The Extensive Magnitude of 20° is precisely all the degrees 
that 20° excludes. 
120 See HAAS, supra note 8, at 118 ("Multiplicity ... is interior to extensive quantum . . . . 
Here number reveals the quality of quantum: determinate indifference ... to is own multiplicity 
(within or without)."). . j 
121 See id at 118-19 ("Although extensive and intensive quanta are differentiated according to 
the ways in which they express the multiplicity that forms their other, they are identical insofar as 
they both are characterized by qualitative indifference. ). 
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of a simple limit which the degree is for itself." (219) 
This expulsion of [2] produces a middle term, of which Hegel 
writes: 
Number as a one, being posited as self-relation reflected into itself, 
excludes from itself the indifference and extemality of the amount 
[i.e., the plurality] and is self-relation as relation through itself to an 
extemality. (219) 
Notice the return of self-erasure. In Figures 13(a) and 13(b), the left 
extreme announced an immediacy (Amount). The right extreme 
brought out the ideal moment (Unit) that the immediacy did not fully 
emphasize. Now, in Figure 14(a), Extensive Magnitude [1] sheds its 
unity and insists on being plural as such (and in so doing unifies the 
plural). Meanwhile the unity it shed [2] was seeretly plural [1, 2]. On 
the other side. Degree does the same. It sheds its plurality [2] and 
insists on being One [3]. The middle term names this self-relation. 
( Quality of \ 
[ Quantum I 
I Extensive | 2 ) Intensive | 
YytagnitudeV /Magnitude 
Figure 14 (c) 
The Quality of Quantum 
In this middle term, "quantum as a reality [is] conformable to its 
Notion." (219) The word "reality," perhaps, connotes "being" in 
conjunction with its non-being,'22 although, since reality has long since 
given way to ideality, "reality" must be taken in the sublated sense. But 
non-being here must be understood as containing all the content that 
Quantity has shed into the external realm. 
Speculative reason, in picking up [2] from Figure 14(h), 
emphasizes a determinateness that is indifferent to its extremes. That is 
to say, [2] consists of material shed by the extremes in their 
indifference. This indifferent determinateness is precisely the quality of 
Quantity—^that Quantity is indifferent to its content.'" 
Hegel concludes this section by dropping back and describing 
Degree as different from Extensive Magnitude. Degree is a unitary 
determinateness [3]. But it is unitary by grace of a self-extemal 
122 "Reality" is reflected in Figure 2(b)—quality as opposed to negation of quality. It 
represents a one-sided view of Being as it exists prior to thought. Carlson, supra note 4, at 479-
82 
123 HAAS, supra note 8, at 123 ("In other words, the qualitative aspect of quantity means 
qualitative opposition, that is, having determinateness in another, by means of its non-being, 
having its being by virtue of its nothing ... ."). 
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plurality [1, 2], A Degree differs from every other Degree, but the 
Degrees are likewise "essentially interrelated so that each has its 
determinateness in this continuity with the others." (219) There is a 
continuity running through the Degrees, which makes possible an 
ascent and descent in the scale of degrees of a continuous progress, a 
flux, which is an uninterrupted, indivisible alteration; none of the 
various distinct degrees is separate from the others but each is 
determined only through them. (219) 
Degree is what it is because of what is external to it. It is therefore not 
indifferent to its content—even though it actually shed this same 
content in an act of indifference. As always, by showing indifference to 
its content. Degree demonstrates how absolutely dependent it is on its 
Extensive'Magnitude. This very contradiction is the Quality of 
Quantum, as shown in Figure 14(c). 
(b) Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude 
The last section discussed the difference between Extensive and 
Intensive Magnitude. Ironically, difference was gathered together in a 
middle term; the very Quality of Quantum is indifference to content. 
Now we shall explore this Quality/indifference and discover the identity 
lurking within Figure 14(c)—as if that were not already plainly visible 
there. 
Our next move is as follows: 
Figure 15(a) 
Intensive Magnitude (Degree) 
The Understanding now takes up one side of the middle term. But it 
fully sees that it takes up the one side. Hence, it moves the whole of the 
middle term, even as it isolates Degree. 
With regard to Intensive Magnitude taken positively, we learn that 
"Degree is not external to itself within itself." (220) That is, [1] is taken 
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as a simple immediacy. It is, however, more advanced than the 
'"indeterminate one, the principle of number as such," (220) i.e.. 
Discreteness. Degree is also to be distinguished from its ancestor. 
Amount, "save in the negative sense of not being any particular 
amount." (220) Rather, Degree is 
primarily a unitary one of a plurality; there are many degrees, but 
they are determined neither as a simple one nor as a plurality, but 
only in the relation of this self-extemality ... If, therefore, the many 
as such are indeed outside the simple unitary degree, nevertheless the 
determinateness of the degree consists in its relation to them; it thus 
contains amount. (220) 
In other words. Degree [1,2] sheds its content [2]—^plurality—^but, by 
shedding [2], it contains [2]. 
What it sheds, of course, is other degrees, with which it is 
continuous. Thus, the twentieth degree sheds all the other degrees, even 
while it retains for itself the "twenty"—which uniquely distinguishes 
the twentieth degree from all others. These excluded degrees can be 
called, collectively. Extensive Magnitude (or Extensive Quantum)—this 
time taken negatively. 
Thanks to this exploration of the Quality of Quantum, we can see 
clearly that 
[ejxtensive and intensive magnitude are thus one and the same 
determinateness of quantum; they are only distinguished by the one 
having amount within itself and the other having amount outside 
itself. (220) 
Similarly, we previously saw that Unit and Amount were the same— 
also Continuous and Discrete Magnitude. Throughout Quantity, the 
extremes end up being each other—here expressly, as Intensive and 
Extensive Magnitude have literally swapped places. 
The middle term between the obversely charged extremes is: 
Figure 15(b) 
Extensive Magnitude 
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Figure 15 (c) 
Qualitative Something 
This unity is an "identity . .. which is self-related through the negation 
of its differencesr (221) In short, it is the stanaard move of Speculative 
Reason, as developed in and after the Tx-ue Infinite. It names the very 
act of the extremes in erasing themselves and stating what they are not. 
"Something" was the name of Figure 2(c)—a unity between 
Determinate Being (or Quality) and Negation.'^^ Furthermore, 
"Quality" has long since been sublated. Why does Hegel use the phrase 
Qualitative Something here?i25 . , , , • x 
The answer is that Degree (in both its forms of plural and unique) 
still has its content outside itself. The Qualitative Something is 
precisely that content—but taken negatively as simply the opposite ot 
Quantum. Degree depends on that Qualitative Something to define what 
it is. Meanwhile, as Degree changes, the Qualitative Something remains 
what it is. Such a Something is indifferent to its quantitative limit. 
To be sure, the Qualitative Something is a Quantum. But it is 
Quantum that is indifferent to Quantum. It is substrate to the more 
primitive quanta. 
Quantum, number as such, and so forth could be spoken of without 
any mention of its having a something as substrate. But the 
something now confronts... its determinations, through the 
negation of which it is mediated itself, as existing for itselj ana, 
since it has a quantum, as something which has an extensive and an 
intensive quantum. (221) 
As Quantum, the Qualitative Something is subsistent, wh^eas the 
original Something of Figure 2(c) was not.i26 Quantum is, after all, a 
True Infinite, which stays what it is even as it becomes something 
different. In the Quantitative Something, we have a something that 
positively resists the transgression of its Limit—which the original 
Something could not achieve. 
124 Carlson, supra note 4, at 495. ^ 
125 "With this identity, the qualitative something makes its appearance. (22 ) 
126 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 494-500. 
127 See Haas, supra note 8, at 119-20 ("a quantum is mfimte self-negation, productwn, 
creation, self-expulsion, a coming-out of itself as increase/decrease, that is, the movmg, growing, 
living limit. . . that determines quantity insofar as it infmitely supersedes, determines and takes 
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Remark 1: Example of This Identity 
All quanta have both Extensive and Intensive Magnitude. Yet, 
Hegel complains, these are sometimes treated as separate, so that one 
thing is Extensive and another thing is Intensive. Density, for example, 
should not be treated merely as Extensive, as in so many atoms per 
cubic centimeter. It is also Intensive. As such it is dynamic—"wot a 
certain aggregate and amount of material parts in a quantum of space, 
but as a certain degree of the space-filling/orce of matter." (221) 
It is not clear what Hegel means by this.'^^ Perhaps the point is 
that density is not a just plurality of units in space but is itself a force-
mass. "The mass of a body is its inertia or resistance to change of 
motion. More precisely, it is a property of the body that determines the 
body's acceleration under the influence of a given force."'^^ The 
mechanical point of view, Hegel says, leaves density as the concept of 
separately existing, independent parts, "which are only externally 
combined into a whole." (222) But the dynamic point of view holds 
density to be a space-filling force. These consideration of (mechanical) 
whole and parts or of (dynamic) force and expression are too advanced 
for Quantum and will be considered later on, Hegel assures us. 
Nevertheless, it can be said now that the relation of force and its 
expression corresponds to Intensive and Extensive Magnitude 
respectively. In other words, like Degree, which cannot be considered 
separately from Extensive Magnitude, Force is one-sided and cannot be 
considered separately from its expression. 
With regard to Intensive Magnitude, Hegel gives the example of 
the circle with its 360 degrees. The determinateness of any one degree 
"derives essentially from the many parts outside it." (222) One degree 
of the circle depends on its relation with the other 359. 
More concrete objects exhibit the dual aspect of being both 
extensive and intensive. Extensive Magnitude represents the outer 
being of such an object. Intensive Magnitude represents the inwardness 
of it. Hegel gives the example of mass as weight. It is an Extensive 
Magnitude in so far as it constitutes an amount of pounds. It is an 
Intensive Magnitude in so far as it exerts a certain pressure. Pressure is 
care of itself."). _ , , , . . j . 
128 He could mean that bodies generate gravitational force, which can be observed whm 
second body with gravitational force comes within its field. He could mean that, when one body 
exerts force on another, the second body likewise exerts foree on the first. In other words for 
every action there is a reaetion—Newton's third law of motion. Finally, if a second body exerts a 
force on a first body, the first body aceelerates and aequires a velocity which contmues until some 
third object slows it down. 
129 Mass, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 177 (1967).  
130 This will occur in chapter 15. 
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expressed as a degree on a scale. 
As exerting pressure, mass is manifested as a being-within-self, as 
a subject to which belongs a difference of intensive magnitude. 
Conversely, that which exerts this degree of pressure is capable of 
displacing a certain amount of pounds, etc., and its magnitude is 
measured by this. (223) 
Heat famously has a Degree. But it also has Extensive 
Magnitude—the expansion of mercury in a thermometer or the 
expansion of air. Musical notes have a Degree—pitch—and Extensive 
Magnitude—the number of vibrations. 
Meanwhile, in the sphere of spirit, "high intensity of character, of 
talent or genius, is bound up with a correspondingly far-reaching reality 
in the outer world." (223) In short, there is no such thing as talent or 
genius unless it is actually manifested—i.e., becomes "extensive." 
Remark 2: The determination of degree as applied by Kant to 
the soul 
Kant applied Intensive Magnitude to the metaphysical 
determination of the soul, Hegel says. Kant considers the inference of 
the soul's immortality from the soul's simplicity, an inference Kant 
opposes.'^' Kant proceeds as follows: Admit the soul is simple. It thus 
has no Extensive Magnitude—no plurality to it. Nevertheless, the soul 
has Intensive Magnitude—a Degree of reality. This degree can 
diminish gradually and eventually vanish. Hence, the soul is not 
immortal, just because it is simple. 
Kant's mistake is to consider the soul a "thing." If it were so, then 
to it could be attributed Quantum. But, Hegel, protests, the soul is 
Spirit, and Spirit forever exceeds the bounds of mere thinghood.'^^ 
(c) Alteration of Quantum 
Middle terms have proved to be names for activities. Accordingly 
the Qualitative Something names the self-erasure of Extensive and 
Intensive Magnitude. It is the "difference" between them. This 
"difference"—the Something—is indifferent to Quantum. Quantum has 
negated itself and is ineffectual against the Qualitative Something. 
The Qualitative Something of Figure 15(c) is self-contradictory. It 
'31 See CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 221. 
132 According to Marcuse, "The 'existing thing,' for example, can never be Idea in the 
Hegelian sense, for its particularities still appear as relatively independent and separable 
properties. It does not exist in continuous 'sameness with itself" MARCUSE, supra note 38, at 
151. 
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is "posited as being the simple, self-related determinateness which is the 
negation of itself, having its determinateness not within itself but in 
another quantum." (225) In other words. Extensive Magnitude in Figure 
15(b) erased itself, and a new Quantum was produced. Taken as 
Quantum, the Qualitative Something [7] has its entire determinateness 
[4-6] outside of itself—in Degree and Extensive Magnitude. Yet it is 
simultaneously quite immune from these determinatenesses. 
If we focus on the fact that the Qualitative Something has its entire 
determinateness outside of itself, we can say in fairness that it is "in 
absolute continuity with its externality, with its otherness." (225) From 
this perspective (even while admitting that the Qualitative Something is 
immune from other quanta), the Qualitative Something can both 
"transcend every quantitative determinateness" and be altered. (225) In 
fact, Hegel says it must alter. 
In the Qualitative Something, Quantum reveals the "express 
character" (225) of impelling itself beyond itself into its external 
character, thereby becoming an other. That is, the Qualitative 
Something is quantitative determinateness. As such, it consists in 
undergoing increase or decrease: 
The quantitative determinateness continues itself into its otherness in 
such a manner that the determination has its being only in this 
continuity with an other; it is not a simply affirmative limit, but a 
limit which becomes. (225) 
When Quantum impels itself beyond itself, it becomes another 
Quantum. But this new Quantum is "a limit which does not stay." (225) 
The new Quantum becomes yet another Quantum, ''and so on to 
infinity.'" (225)'^^ With this we are ready to move onto Hegel's 
monumental treatment of Quantitative Infinity, an untravelled country 
from whose bourne few travelers have ever returned. 
133 Professor Alan Paterson complains that the "successor function" and "induction 
principle" arc not accounted for in Hegel's logic. Alan L.T. Paterson, The Successor Function 
and Induction Principle in a Hegelian Philosophy of Mathematics, 30 IDEALISTIC STUD. 25 
(2002). But are not these very ideas the stuff of the Qualitative Something? (The successor 
function is "the function that sends a natural number to its successor. . . . The induction principle 
(roughly) says that we can assert a fact about all natural numbers if we know that it is true for the 
first one (0) and that its truth is preserved when we go from a number to its successor." Id. at 26). 
Does Hegel have an account of ordinality in his theory of number? Paterson suggests the 
answer is no, and he may be right. Perhaps the concept of "more or less" is simply supplied by 
external reflection of the counter. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
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C. Quantitative Infinity 
(a) Its Notion 
The nature of Quantum is to alter itself into another Quantum ad 
infinitum. As it alters, it conveys to its other 
"Quantum-ness." "[T]he other is thus also a quantum. (225) Yet, it is 
simultaneously the very negation of Quantum-ness, "the negative o 
quantum as limited." (225)'^'' 
The Understanding now isolates the very act of Quantum going 
outside itself: 
Figure 16 (a) 
Quantitative Infinity 
Hegel writes that Quantitative Infinity 
is an ought-to-be; it is by implication determined as being for itself, 
and this being-determined-for-itself is rather the bemg-determmed-
in-an-other, and, conversely, it is the sublation of being-determined-
in-an-other, is an indifferent subsisting for itself. (226) 
Are all of these things true? Yes. Recall that the Ought was the self-
erasure of the Finite.135 Now Quantum erases itself and becomes Other 
This was the quintessential move of Being-for-self. Being-for-se 
turned itself into Quantity, which was total being-determmed-m-an-
other. But now Quantum, as Quantitative Infinity, sublates {i.e., 
includes) all the other quanta. It is all the quanta. As such, it is 
indifferent to externality, because it has swallowed every Number. It is 
therefore indifferently subsisting for itself and no other. 
134 Errol Harris puts it this way: "The contradiction of Quantum is that interna 
ictcrmination rests in a limit which in its very nature posits an external other on whichjhe 
irecise magnitude of the quantum is as much dependent as it is on what precedes the lim . 
dARRlS, supra note 15, at 138. 
135 Carlson, supra note 4, at 527-28. 
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Hegel now compares Quantitative Infinity to the Quantum of 
earlier stages. The Quantum was finite but impelled beyond itself. In 
contrast, Quantitative Infinity is "unlimitedness" and also "retumedness 
into itself, its indifferent being-for-self. . . [l]n the infinite, quantum 
possesses its final determinateness." (226) 
Yet this Infinity likewise is the "impulse to go beyond itself to an 
other in which its determination lies." (226y^^ Therefore, Quantitative 
Infinity is a Spurious Infinite—a Finite that propels itself to yet another 
Finite, which in turn propels itself to yet another Finite.'" 
The upshot of these contradictions is that Quantum has both 
Finitude and Quantitative Infinity in it at the same time. "[I]n other 
words, the concept of quantitative infinity thinks the process through 
which the finite finds its other (the infinite) in itself 
What is the difference between Qualitative and Quantitative 
Infinity? In Qualitative Infinity, the extremes—[1] and [3]—stood 
"abstractly opposed" to each other. Their unity was only "in-itself— 
implicit. This relation of the Finites was their transition (self-erasure) 
outside themselves. Quantity, in contrast is "sublated determinateness, 
it is posited as being unlike itself and indifferent to itself, consequently 
as alterable." (226) The Quantitative Infinite expressly continues itself 
into its other. In short, the in-itself has become for-itself. 
(b) The Quantitative Infinite Progress 
Our next stage is drawn as follows: 
136 Id. at 136. ("And as the continuity of quantum expresses itself equally in endless extensity 
and in endless diminution, the progression is interminable either way, though neither the 
infinitesimal nor the infmite is ever attainable."). 
137 The return trip is not to the original Number but to some larger or smaller Number ad 
infinitum. This conclusion is compelled by the lesson learned in the One and the Many. See 
Carlson, supra note 4, at 560-69. There, the entity out of which the new entity springs does not 
go out of existence. Rather, the new entity springs out of itself and into yet another entity, 
creating infmitely Many Ones. The same result happens in Quantitative Infmity, though Hegel 
nowhere says so explicitly. 
138 HAAS, IWPRA note 8, at 120-21. 
139 It is possible to quibble with Errol Harris's remark that, to resolve Quantum's 
contradiction, "the externality of the other must somehow be internalized to produce a true 
infmity." HARRIS, supra note 15, at 138. At this stage, the extremes each have long since been 
True Infinites. Precisely what Quantum must express is that it is as much its other as it is its own 
self. Hence, Harris is right that the external must be internalized, but the external must also stay 
external as it becomes internal. Furthermore, it is already a True Infinite and therefore need not, 
at this late stage, become one. 
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Figure 16 (b) 
Quantitative Infinite Progress 
In this stage of Dialectical Reason, the extremes fall into a 
Spurious Infinity—a senseless modulation back and forth, but this time 
with a quantitative flavor. Hegel describes this flavor as follows: 
[I]n the sphere of quantity the limit in its own self dispatches and 
continues itself into its beyond and hence, conversely, the 
quantitative infinite too is posited as having quantum within it; for 
quantum in its self-extemality is also its own self, its externality 
belongs to its determination. (227) 
In other words, at the level of Quantity, the Infinite self-consciously 
goes beyond itself and stays within itself as it travels into this beyond. 
Hegel says the "progress to infinity" is implicit in "quantum as 
such," its "expression of contradiction." (227)'"'® This progress, 
however, is not the resolution of the contradiction. (This must await the 
middle term in Figure 16(c).) There is, however, a mere show of 
resolution, which Hegel blames on Continuity of one extreme into the 
other. 
As Hegel sees it, the Quantitative Infinite Progress promises the 
infinite but never delivers. "[I]t does not get beyond quantum, nor does 
the infinite become positively present." (227) The problem is that 
Quantum, by its nature, always has a beyond and is never fully present. 
This beyond, considered on its own, is the non-being of Quantum. 
By its own act. Quantum vanishes into this beyond. Nevertheless, 
Quantum contains a qualitative moment in which it does not vanish into 
its beyond. But, simultaneously. Quantum continues into the beyond— 
its quantitative moment. Thus, "quantum consists precisely in being the 
other of itself, in being external to itself; this [beyond] is, therefore, no 
more an other than quantum itself." (227) In short, this beyond is itself 
another Quantum. "In this way, the beyond is recalled from its flight 
and the infinite is attained." (227) But such an infinite is spurious. (228) 
It is just another Quantum. "[W]hat has been posited is only a fresh 
limit." (227) This generates the familiar modulation back and forth 
between extremes. 
The presence of spurious infinity in number will become vividly apparent in the Maclaurin 
series, where a fixed number is expanded into an uncompletable infinite series. See infra text 
accompanying note 213. 
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The two extremes are unified in the expression "infinitely great or 
infinitely small." (227) The infinitely Great/Small are precisely what the 
extremes are not. Any fixed notion (or "absolute determinateness") of 
the infinitely Great/Small is not attained. Each extreme is thus posited 
as self-external. There is always a "more" or "less." This beyond to 
any given expression of the infinitely small or great is a moment of 
qualitative opposition in every Quantum. This means that a decrease of 
the infinitely small  or an increase of the infinitely large brings us no 
closer to infinity. Infinity is thus a liar. The infinitely great "is 
supposed to be great, that is, a quantum, and infiinite, that is, not a 
quantum." (228) Infinity, however, is Quantum only. 
Accordingly, Quantitative Infinity is spurious: 
Like the qualitative spurious infinite, it is the perpetual movement to 
and fro from one term of the lasting contradiction to the other, from 
the limit to its non-being, and from this back again to the limit. (228) 
There is nevertheless a progressive aspect of Quantitative Infinity, 
compared to the qualitative infinite. In the Spurious Infinite, the 
movement was towards "an abstract other in general." (228) Now it is 
towards "an explicitly different quantum." (228) But a qualitative 
moment prevents Quantitative Infinity from reaching completion, 
Hence, the Quantitative Infinite Progress is 
not a real advance but a repetition of one and the same thing, a 
positing, a sublating, and then again a positing and again a sublating, 
an impotence of the negative, for what it sublates is continuous with 
it, and in the very act of being sublated returns to it. (228) 
What is the bond between the two extremes of Figure 16(b)? 
Simply that each flees from the other, "and in fleeing from each other 
they cannot become separated but are joined together even in their 
flight." (228) 
Remark 1: The High Repute of the Progress to Infinity 
Hegel is no admirer of Quantitative Infinity. No doubt it is held to 
be sublime, and "in philosophy it has been regarded as ultimate." (228) 
With Kant obviously in mind, Hegel remarks: 
[T]his modern sublimity does not magnify the object—^rather does 
this take flight—^but only the subject which assimilates such vast 
quantities. (229) 
In The Critique of Judgment, Kant defined sublimity as a subjective 
feeling that one could actually know the thing-in-itself (which is 
141 Lacanians will recognize this qualitative moment as structurally similar to trauma—a 
stumbling block, or piece of the Real, which prevents the patient from completing his fantasy. 
See BRUCE FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 26 (1995). 
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impossible). "*2 Hence, the sublime definitely does exalt the subject (and 
not the object) in Kant's work. 
What makes thought succumb to the awe of the Quantitative 
Infinite Progress, Hegel remarks, 
is nothing else but the wearisome repetition which makes a limit 
vanish, reappear, and then vanish again .. . giving only the feeling of 
the impotence of this infinite or this ought-to-be, which would be 
master of the finite and cannot. (229) 
Kant compares the sublime to the withdrawal of the individual into 
his ego, where the individual opposes his absolute freedom to all the 
terrors of tyranny and fate. At this moment, Kant says, the individual 
knows himself to be equal to himself. 
Of this withdrawn ego, Hegel agrees that it is "the reached beyond; 
it has come to itself, is with itself, here and now." (230) This highly 
negative thing—^the ego—has "determinate reality... confi-onting it as 
a beyond." (231) In this withdrawal of the ego, 
[w]e are faced with that same contradiction which lies at the base of 
the infinite progress, namely a retumedness-into-self which is at the 
same time immediately an out-of-selfness, a relation to its other as to 
its non-being... (231) 
How is this so? It will be recalled that Quantitative Infinity stayed 
within itself, but this "in-itself had no content. All the content was in 
the beyond. Simultaneous with its being-for-self. Quantitative Infinity 
was pure flight into the beyond and hence a constant modulation 
between these moments of flight and return. Now Hegel says that the 
ego is the same thing. Here we have the Lacanian view of the subject as 
suspended between the realm of the Symbolic {i.e., "being") and the 
Real {i.e., nothing). 
That the subject finds part of its selfhood in its beyond is the 
structure of desire itself. The subject seeks wholeness but cannot 
142 IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 100-01 (J.H. Bemhard trans., 1951) 
[hereinafter CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT]; see also IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL 
REASON 142 (T.K. Abbott trans., 1996) [hereinafter CRITIQUE QF PRACTICAL REASON]. 
143 Carl Sagan, the telegenic Cornell astronomer, produced a popular TV program on 
astronomy in which he fi'equently advertised his astonishment at the "billions and billions of 
stars" in the universe. Hegel reserves special scorn on such astronomers. 
The shallow astonishment to which they surrender themselves, the absurd hopes of 
wandering in another life from one star to another . . . this they declare to be a cardinal 
factor in the excellence of their science .... (230) 
See also LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 94 Remark ("the infmity of [space] has formed the 
theme of barren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification"). 
144 This is probably a reference to CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 142, at 191. 
145 FINK, supra note 109, at 59 ("[t]he subject is nothing but this very split"). Kant, in turn, 
describes the "I"—the pure universal aspect of personality, which Lacanians insist is nol the 
subject. Mladen Dolar, The Cogito as the Subject of the Unconscious, in SlC 2: COGITO AND THE 
UNCONSCIOUS 11,12 (Slavoj Zizek ed., 1998). 
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achieve it. This is what Lacanians called sjTnbolic castration.'''® Hegel, 
however, sees this precisely some 150 years before Lacan. Thus, Hegel 
writes that the relation of the subject to its non-being {i.e., the Symbolic 
realm, where the subject is accorded the privilege of "being"), 
remains a longing, because on the one side is the unsubstantial, 
untenable void of the ego fixed as such by the ego itself, and on the 
other, the fulness which though negated remains present, but is fixed 
by the ego as its beyond. (231) 
Hegel specially complains that morality has been equated with 
Quantitative Infinity, and once again the target is Kant. The antithesis 
just described—ego v. reality—^was a qualitative opposition. In this 
opposition, the ego determines nature by distinguishing itself. That is, 
ego announces, "I am not that.'' That ends up being nature in general— 
that which opposes the ego. In this opposition, the ego is singular. 
External reality, however, is "manifold and quantitative." (231) But the 
relation between qualitative ego and quantitative nature is itself 
quantitative. This relation is morality itself—in Kantian terms the 
power of the universal "I" over nature (over what Kant would tend to 
call "inclination" or "pathology"). Thus: 
the power of the ego over the non-ego, over sense and outer nature, 
is consequently so conceived that morality can and ought continually 
to increase, and the power of sense continually to diminish. But the 
perfect adequacy of the will to the moral law is placed in the 
unending progress to infinity, that is, is represented as an absolutely 
unattainable beyond, and this unattainableness is supposed to be the 
true sheet-anchor and fitting consolation; for morality is supposed to 
be a struggle, but such it can be only if the will is inadequate to the 
moral law which thus becomes a sheer beyond for it. (231) 
Here is a concise critique of Kant's doctrine of "radical evil."'''^ 
According to Kant, the ego is forever tainted with pathology. It can 
never fmally purge itself of pathology but can only struggle for moral 
'4® Slavoj Ziiek describes symbolic castration as follows: 
by means of the Word, the subject fmally finds himself, comes to himself: he is no 
longer a mere obscure longing for himself since, in the Word, he directly attains 
himself, posits himself as sueh. The price, however, is the irretrievable loss of the 
subject's self-identity: the verbal sign that stands for the subject—in which the subject 
posits himself as self-identical—^bears the mark of an irreducible dissonance; it never 
fits the subject. This paradoxical necessity on account of which the act of retuming-to-
oneself, of fmding oneself, immediately, in its very actualization, assumes the form of 
its opposite, of the radical loss of one's self-identity, displays the structure of what 
Lacan calls "symbolic castration." This castration involved in the passage to the Word 
can also be formulated as the redoubling, the splitting, of an element into itself and its 
place in the structure. 
SLAVOJ Z I Z E K ,  THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND RELATED 
MATTERS 46-47 (1996). 
'"V For a description of Kant's theory of radical evil, see Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray 
Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAE. L. REV. 653 (2000). 
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Duritv Kant even goes so far as to deduce the immortality of the soul 
Lm the very fact that all eternity is required for the soul ^ re^h the 
state of perfection.'48 Hence, Kant is quite guilty as charged. He has 
mture-sensuousness-inclination, Hegel complains 
as "completely self-subsistent and mutually indifferent. (231) At tne 
same time, however, both are moments of one and the same being, t e 
ego." (232) Hence, the very constitution of the Kantian subject is 
Lacanian split This contradiction is never resolved in the infinite 
progTesT "fo]n the contrary, it is represented and affirmed as 
unresolved^andu^ standpoint is "powerless to overcome 
opposition between the finite and infinite and to grasp the of the 
tme will which is substantial freedom." (232) Instead, this standpo 
uses quantity to mediate. Quantity (sublated quality) is the difference 
which has become indifferent." (232) Hence, the qualitative moments of 
pure ego and nature are quite indifferent to the alteration of their quanta^ 
In other words, the subject counts it as nothing that it has progressed 
toward the perfection of pure morality.'^" 
"That all opposition is only quantitative was for some tim 
cardinal thesis of recent philosophy," Hegel complains (233) 
Oppositions were in effect reduced to polarities. In these polarities, 
the opposed determinations have the same nature, same content; 
they are real sides of the opposition m so far as each of them 
within it both determinations, both factors of the opposition, only 
that on one side one of the iacXors preponderates, on the other side 
the other ... is present in as greater quantity or m an mtenser 
desree But in so far as substances or activities are presupposed, 
the quantitative difference rather confirms and completes their 
externality and indifference to each other and to their unity. (233) 
In other words, at the base of any claimed polarity is a self-identical 
qualitative moment that Hegel finds to be an unjustified V^^'^'P^ositim^ 
Polarity is only the "first negation'; (^mlectical Reas^ 
"negation of the negation"—(Speculative Reason). (233) In fixed polar 
oppositions, being and thought "become completely external to each 
other and unrelated." (233) In short, fixed polarity is a species of 
148 rciTinTiF OF PRACTICAL REASON, IMPRA note 142, at 148, 155. 
Z SX LX.. gi.. K.n, to 'to- ^ 
Ex rr ::;ss x-rxr 'XX: 
Infinity, in which the beyond remains forever beyond. 
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atomism, much criticized in chapter 3 of Quality.'^i In polarity, "[i]t is 
a third, an external reflection, which abstracts from their difference and 
recognizes their unity, but a unity which is inner, implicit only, not for 
itself'' (233) What is needed is an immanent sublation of the extremes 
by Speculative Reason. 
Remark 2: The Kantian Antinomy of the Limitation and Non-
limitation of the World in Time and Space 
We have seen that Hegel has small regard for the four antinomies 
of reason that Kant presents in the Critique of Pure Reason}^^ Now he 
repeats his conclusion "that the Kantian antinomies are expositions of 
the opposition of finite and infinite in a more concrete shape, applied to 
more specific substrata of conception." (234) That is, the antinomies are 
spurious qualitative infinities. Each side of a given antinomy is merely 
a one-sided view of the truth. By "specific substrata of conception" 
Hegel means that Kant has taken his four categories of understanding 
and developed four antinomies with regard to them in order to produce 
the illusion that the antinomies are complete. 
The antinomy Hegel now discusses is Kant's first one—^whether 
the world is limited in time and space. antinomy is the one Kant 
associated with the category of quantity(which is why Hegel 
discusses it here). According to Kant's thesis: (1) The world has a 
beginning in time and is limited in space. According to the antithesis: 
(2) The world has no beginning in time and no limit in space. 
In terms of time, Kant proves the thesis (the world has a beginning) 
by showing that the antithesis is impossible. If time has no beginning, 
then at any given point of time, an "eternity"—an infinite series of 
temporal measures—has lapsed. But an infinite series already lapsed is 
impossible. Therefore, time must have a beginning. In terms of space, 
Kant proves the thesis by showing that, if the universe was unlimited in 
space, then it would consist of infinite co-existing things. We cannot 
think of an infinite quantity of things.^" Rather, there must be a finite 
151 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 564-66. 
152 This will occur in chapter 11, when Hegel explains why oppositions must cancel each other 
out and fall to the ground. 
153 See Carlson, supra note 4, at 465-66, 478, 554-56; see also text accompanying notes 59-74. 
154 Of this antimony, Henry Allsion remarks, "These are the most widely criticized of Kant's 
arguments . . . ." HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: AN 
INTERPRETATION AND DEFENSE 36 (1983). Allison offers a tepid defense and suggests that 
Kant's point is, in effect, a warning against the inductive fallacy. Id. at 42-43. 
155 See supra note 62. Kant called time and space "the two primitive quanta of all intuition." 
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 233. 
156 Id. at 241-45. 
152 If we think of the "whole thing," we are in effect assuming space is limited and does not 
surpass this "whole." 
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number of things. 
The antithesis is also proved by ruling out the opposite. In terms 
of time, suppose the world has a beginning. Before the beginning, the 
world does not exist. An existing thing, however, cannot originate from 
nothing. Nothing comes from nothing, as King Lear and Spinoza 
discovered. In terms of space, suppose the world is finite. Space, 
however, has no limit. Hence, there must be a "void space." We thus 
have a relation of the finite world to void space. But this is a relation of 
things to no object. A thing cannot have a relation to nothing. 
Consequently the world is not limited in space—nothing is not a thing. 
Hegel's first proposition about this antinomy is that the "world" 
could have been left out of the discussion. Kant could have addressed 
time as such and space as such.^^^ 
Hegel's second proposition is that Kant could have restated his 
antinomy as follows: (1) there is a limit, and (2) limit must be 
transcended—two things Hegel says are true of Quantity generally. 
The Thesis. Hegel next proposes that Kant's entire proof of the 
thesis was unnecessary. The proof is itself only the direct assertion of 
what was to be proved. With regard to the thesis about time (it has a 
beginning), the very assertion that time has points introduces the idea 
that time is already limited. "In the proof therefore, a limit of time is 
presupposed as actual; but that is just what was to be proved." (235) 
One point in time is, of course, "now." It designates an end of the 
past and is also the beginning of the future. With regard to limiting the 
past, "now" represents a qualitative limit. But why, Hegel implicitly 
asks, should "now" be a qualitative limit? Suppose, however, we say 
that "now" is a quantitative limit. Time would then continue on from 
the past, over the "now," and into the future, because Quantitative 
Infinity always leaps o'er the vaunts and fu"stlings of any limit. 
Quantitative Infinity "not only must be transcended but is only as the 
transcending of itself." (235) If time is a Quantitative Infinity, "then the 
infinite time series would not have passed away in it, but would 
continue to flow on." (235) A switch from qualitative to quantitative 
limit would therefore destroy Kant's argument. 
But, Hegel continues, let us concede the qualitative nature of 
"now" as a limit to the past. In such a case it is also the beginning of 
the future. But this is precisely the thesis to be proved—^that time has a 
beginning. What if this begirming was preceded by a deceased past? 
This does not affect the argument. The past is conceived as radically 
separate from the future. Hence, the very introduction of "now"—a 
point in time—^presupposes that time has a beginning. 
Suppose we say the past is related to the future through the "now." 
158 Professor Allison disagrees and thinks that synthesis of a world out of infinite moments is 
central to Kant's argument. ALLISON, supra note 154, at 39. 
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In this case, "now" is a mere quantitative limit. "[T]he infinite time 
series would continue itself in what was called future and would not be, 
as was assumed, completed." (236) 
Hegel now repeats his own theory of time. It is Pure Quantity. A 
point in time which supposedly interrupts time "is really only the self-
sublating being-for-self of the now." (236) This harkens back to Hegel's 
description of time as "an absolute coming-out-of-itself." (189) Time 
constantly generates the "now" but then simultaneously annihilates it.'^^ 
The antithesis. Hegel sees Kant's argument for the thesis as 
merely asserting that the "now" is a qualitative limit to time—the very 
thesis to be proved. The antithesis fares no better, in Hegel's opinion. 
It likewise merely asserts what must be proved. 
In order to prove the antithesis (time has no beginning), Kant 
considers and dismisses the thesis. Assume a null, empty time (prior to 
the beginning). Kant insists upon the continuance of the world into this 
empty time, "with the result that the existence of the world is continued 
into infinity." (236) As this continuance (into void time) is impossible— 
i.e., nothing can come from nothing—Kant rejects the thesis and proves 
the antithesis. Because time can continue back forever, there must be 
no beginning. 
According to Hegel, this argument presupposes that, just because 
the world exists, it must have "an antecedent condition which is in 
time." (236) But this is the very antithesis to be proved. Furthermore, 
when Kant insists that nothing can come from nothing—^when "the 
condition is sought in empty time"—this means that the world is taken 
as temporal and hence limited. (236) Something always precedes the 
"now" of the world. There is always a yesterday. All of this, Hegel 
charges, is presupposed. It is the antithesis itself. 
Kant's demonstration of the antithesis in terms of space is likewise 
rejected. For purposes of the antithesis, Kant assumed that space was 
no object and was unlimited. If the world were finite (and space 
infinite), space would exceed it. The world (an object) would have a 
relation with the void space beyond the world. But how could an object 
have a relation with no object? 
Hegel finds again that Kant has merely restated the proposition— 
not proved it. Kant assumes that space is not an object, and that, in 
order to prevent the impossible relation of object to non-object, the 
object must continue itself as far as space does. This means that Kant 
thinks space must never be empty—the world must continue into it. Yet 
this is precisely the antithesis restated. 
Hegel concludes this remark by criticizing Kant for 
"subjectivizing" contradiction.That is, the four antinomies do not 
See supra text accompanying notes 54-55. 
160 See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Hegel's Appropriation of Kant's Account of Teleology in Nature, 
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occur in nature. Rather, they occur in consciousness. (Tune and space, 
Kant says, are the very conditions of possibility for subjective 
intuitions).'®' Of this subjectivization of the first antinomy, Hegel 
It shows an excessive tenderness for the world to remove 
contradiction from it and then to transfer the contradiction to spirit, 
to reason, where it is allowed to remain unresolved. In point of fact 
it is spirit which is so strong that it can endure contradiction, but it is 
spirit, too, that knows how to resolve it. (237-38) 
The "so-called world" is contradictory, Hegel insists. (238) The world 
"is unable to endure it and is, therefore, subject to coming-to-be and 
ceasing-to-be." (238) 
The middle term between Quantitative Infinity and the 
Quantitative Infinite Progress is the Infinitely Great and/or Infinitely 
Small. The Infinitely Small, at least, is what mathematicians would call 
the differential—6x in the derivative 6y/5x. 
The Infinitely Great/Small is the destination that the Quantitative 
Infinite Progress implies. It is a Quantum, but 
at the same time it is the non-being of quantum. The infinitely great 
and infinitely small are therefore pictorial conceptions which, when 
looked at more closely, tum out to be nebulous shadowy nullities. 
(238) 
This should be clear to even the non-speculative readers who have 
survived this far into this text. In the Quantitative Infinite Progress, the 
counting mathematician is aiming to reach infinity. That infinity has 
"being" is thus presupposed by the counter who is aiming to reach this 
end. Yet this end will never be reached. It is a non-bemg. 
This contradiction—^the non-being of infinity is now explicitly 
present, and so is the very nature of Quantum. When Quantum reached 
writes: 
(c) The Infinity of Quantum 
Figure 16 (c) 
Infinitely Great and Infinitely Small 
167,176, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998). 
161 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 23-24,32-33,85,279. 
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Intensive Magnitude (Degree), Quantum "attained its reality." (238) But 
now the very notion of Quantum manifests itself. 
As Degree, Quantum was "unitary, self-related and determinate 
within itself." (238) As unitary. Degree sublated {i.e., negated) its 
otherness and its determinateness. These were now external to Degree. 
This self-externality was the '''"abstract non-being of quantum generally, 
the spurious infinity." (238) In other words. Degree in Figure 15(a) 
yielded the Qualitative Something which in turn yielded Quantitative 
Infinity in Figure 16(a). If we now examine Figure 16(b), we witness 
each of the extremes—Quantitative Infinity and the Quantitative Infinite 
Progress—erasing itself and establishing its non-being in the other, 
while expressly continuing itself in the other, so that each was a 
Quantum as well as not a Quantum. Hence, "this non-being of 
quantum, infinity, is thus limited, that is, this beyond is sublated, is 
itself determined as quantum which, therefore, in its negation is with 
itself." (238) 
The in-itself of Quantum is therefore to be external to itself. 
externality determines what Quantum is. The Infinitely Great/Small 
thus illustrates the very notion of Quantum. It is "not there" and yet 
treated as if it is there. Hegel writes, "In the infinite progress, therefore, 
the Notion of quantum is posited." (238) This must be taken to mean 
that the Quantitative Infinite Progress of Figure 16(b) shows what its 
content is—to be external to itself. The Infinitely Great/Small is the 
very beyond of the Quantitative Infinite Progress. 
Figure 16(c) claims; 
In the infinite progress as such, the only reflection usually made is 
that every quantum, however, great or small, must be capable of 
vanishing, of being surpassed; but not that this self-sublating of 
quantum, the beyond, the spurious infinite itself also vanishes. (239) 
How is this claim justified? Why has the spurious infinite 
vanished? Consider what the Infinitely Great/Small is: the end that the 
Quantitative Infinite Progress could never reaeh. If we have that end 
before us, then we do not have the Quantitative Infinite Progress before 
us. In short, we can take Figure 16(c) in terms of [7]—which is isolated 
from the vanished Quantitative Infinite Progress. This isolation is a 
sign that Quantity is beginning to recapture its Quality. 
Quantum summarized. Hegel next reflects upon Quantum 
generally. Quantum (via Quantity) is the negation/sublation of Quality. 
Considered immediately by the Understanding, as in, say, Figure 11(a) 
or Figure 13(a), it is already the first negation—inpositivizedform. But 
Quantum is only the first negation in principle. It is posited as a 
"being," and "its negation is fixed as the infinite, as the beyond of 
I® Cf. the Ought in Figure 5(c), where the in-itself of the Finite was that it must cease to be 
and become other. Carlson, supra note 4, at 526-29. 
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quantum, which remains on this side as an immediate." (239) In this 
guise, it is the "beyond" that is overtly the first negation, as shown in 
Figure 16(b). Now, in the Infinitely Great/Small, we have "quantum 
determined in conformity with its Notion, which is different from 
quantum determined in its immediacy." (239) The Infinitely 
Great/Small is externality itself, brought inward as a moment of 
Quantity. For this reason, Hegel can say that 
extemality is now the opposite of itself, posited as a moment of 
quantity itself—quantum is posited as having its determinateness in 
another quantum by means of its non-being, of infinity. (239) 
Because Quantum has brought its externality inward, "it is qualitatively 
[what] it is." (239) But, Hegel warns, to the extent we compare 
Quantum's recaptured quality to its Notion, this charaeterization is "for 
us." It "belongs more to our reflection, to a relationship which is not 
yet present here." (239) (Notion as such is strictly the province of the 
Subjective Logic, which Hegel alternatively names the Doctrine of the 
Notion). 
For itself, however, "quantum has reverted to quality [and] is from 
now on qualitatively determined." (239) Its quality (or, to use Hegel's 
term, its "peculiarity") is that its determinateness (or content) is 
external. Quantum in Figure 16(c) is "indifferent" to its 
determinateness. But the outside is now in. Thus, "Quantum has 
infinity, self-determinedness, no longer outside it but within itself." 
(239) 
In Figure 16(c), Quantum is "posited as repelled from itself, with 
the result that there are two quanta which, however, are sublated, are 
only as moments of one unity." (240) In the final chapter of Quantity, 
Quantum will now appear as a double—as Quantitative Ratio. In 
Quantitative Ratio, the content of Quantum will be external to itself (yet 
within itself). This externality will itself be a relation of quanta, "each 
of which is as such a unity." (240) This unity is not a mere 
"comparison" by an external reflection. Rather, this unity is Quantity's 
own qualitative determination. In Quantitative Ratio, Quality comes 
back into partnership with Quantity. The middle term between this 
partnership is Measure. 
Charles Taylor expresses his dissatisfaction with Hegel's entire discussion of Quantum, 
and we are now in a position to answer his queries. Taylor writes: 
But one might think that Hegel is a little cavalier in his transitions here. Granted that 
Quantity is the realm in which things are indifferent to their limit, how does that show 
that quanta must go beyond themselves, and change? (whatever that means). And 
even if they do so endlessly, even granted Hegel's dislike for the "bad" infinity of the 
endless progress, does this show a contradiction requiring resolution by a higher 
category? 
TAYLOR, supra note 10, at 248. The answer to the first question is, since quanta are True 
Infmites, their very function is to go beyond their limit (while staying what they are). This very 
act is the Quality of the Quantum. But this does not necessarily mean that numbers change and 
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Before we can move on to Quantity's final chapter, however, we 
must suffer through three long Remarks, the first two of which are by 
far the longest Remarks Hegel will include in the Science of Logic. 
Both cover the subject of calculus, which endlessly fascinated Hegel, 
because the "differential"—the Infinitely Small—embodied his slogan 
that nothing is something. 
Undoubtedly, Hegel will criticize nineteenth century calculus for 
its lingering dependence on geometrical ideas, and for the quantification 
of 6x, which Hegel views as an undefined quality.Future generations 
of mathematicians would tend to agree with this estimate. 
The calculus remarks are usually dismissed as "digression," at 
best.Undoubtedly, this is a fair observation. I have found few 
that arithmetic is promiscuous and subjective. Quanta have limits within themselves. Three does 
not melt into two. If the limit external to a quantum is exceeded, it is exceeded spiritually, not 
empirically. The answer to the second question is that the bad infinity's modulation between 
quanta is itself the higher category. As always, Speculative Reason names the autistic modulation 
of Dialectical Reason and underwrites progress to a higher level. 
Taylor's own response to his inquiries is to interpret the entire chapter on Quantum as an 
attack on atomism. Taking atomism to its extreme, Taylor sees it as the assertion that all things 
are mere aggregates of indistinguishable units. But if so, then how do atomists determine that one 
aggregate has 50 units but another has 100 units? Some non-quantitative criteria must operate, 
Taylor opines, and therefore the atomists are defeated. Taylor writes, "what drives the quantum 
on to its endless alterations is the search for an adequate specification in purely quantitative 
terms, a search whose object always eludes it, and which for this reason is endless." Id. at 250. 
While these are good arguments against atomism, it is hard to draw this moral from Hegel's 
discussion of Quantum. What seems to drive the progress on is the act of the True Infinite to 
erase itself while remaining within itself. It is the very erasure of quantitativity that produces the 
Infinitely Great/Small—the qualitative beyond of Quantum. 
The differential fix stands for change in the variable x. As such, it is indefinable, because it 
is supposed to be infinitely close to (but distinguishable from) zero. Yet fix given fiy (or fiy/fix) is 
fully determinate. This point is important in understanding why the Infmitely Great/Small is a 
ratio. It has its being in fiy, and vice versa. The two become visible only when brought in 
conjunction. 
>65 In this regard, one recalls Hegel's early remark that mathematical necessity is inadequate. 
Mathematicians do nothing, he says, but ward off heterogeneous elements—an effort that is itself 
"tainted" with heterogeneity. (40) Perhaps the heterogeneous element warded off by 
mathematicans is the qualitative nature of fix. 
An astute commentator views the point of the calculus discussion as follows: Calculus 
cannot "yield the 'mathematics of nature which Hegel was looking for. [Sjuch a mathematics can 
only take over what is qualitative from experience, it cannot develop it out of itself." 
Borzeszkowski, supra note 53, at 76. 
166 MURE, supra note 17, at 118. Those inclined to accept scorn as substitute for thought will 
interest themselves in the sentiments of Bertrand Russell: 
Hegel (especially in his Greater Logic) made a quite different use of mathematics . .. 
Hegel fastened upon the obscurities in the foundations of mathematics, turned them 
into dialectical contradictions, and resolved them by nonsensical syntheses. It is 
interesting that some of his worst absurdities in this field were repeated by Engels in 
the Antidiiring, and that, in consequence, if you live in the Soviet Union and take 
account of what has been done on the principles of mathematics during the last one 
hundred years, you run a grave risk of being liquidated. 
Bertrand Russell, Logical Positivism, in LOGIC AND KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS 1902-1950, at 368-69 
(Robert Charles Marsh ed., 1950). 
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references to Hegel's views on the ealculus, which nevertheless seem 
prescient for his day. Readers are invited at this point to skip to Part III 
of this Article, as virtually all Hegelians have done for generations.'^'' 
Nothing great will be lost if this is done. However, for the intrepid 
reader who wishes a "scorched earth" understanding of Hegel's Science 
of Logic, I summarize and simplify as best I ean the thrust of Hegel's 
lengthy critique of the calculus. 
Remark 1: The Specific Nature of the Notion of the 
Mathematical Infinite 
Mathematics exploits the mathematical infinite for pragmatic 
reasons. Calculus works. But Hegel denounces the utilitarian attitude 
of mathematicians as unscientific. At least as of his time, "mathematics 
has not yet succeeded in justifying its use of this infinite by the Notion." 
(240)'^^ Unless the matter is eorreeted, mathematics will be "unable to 
determine the scope of its application and to secure itself against the 
misuse of it." (241)'®^ 
Often mathematicians defend themselves by denying the 
competence of metaphysies to eomment on mathematical notions. They 
assert that, so long as mathematieal concepts operate consistently in 
See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 20, at 110-11 ("suspecting Hegel of wishing in part to 
demonstrate his mastery of mathematics and science to contemporaries and colleagues .. 
'68 Or, as Hegel will put it later, "mathematics to this day has never succeeded in justifying by 
its own means, that is, mathematically, the operations that rest on that transition, because the 
transition is not of a mathematical nature." (793) 
'69 Hegel memorably condemns the illusion that mathematics owns the fee simple of academic 
rigor, in a passage that the law-and-economic movement in American law schools should take to 
heart. 
If quantity is not reached through the action of thought, but taken uncritically from our 
generalized image of it, we are liable to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to 
raise it to the height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see 
when the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the objects of which can 
be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we have another trace of the bad 
metaphysics . . . which replace the concrete idea by partial and inadequate categories of 
understanding. Our knowledge would be in a very awkward predicament if such 
objects as freedom, law, morality, or even God himself, because they cannot be 
measured or calculated, or expressed in a mathematical formula, were to be reckoned 
beyond the reach of exact knowledge . . . And this mere mathematical view, which 
identifies with the Idea one of its special stages ... is no other than the principle of 
Materialism . . . Matter... is just what. . . has that form only as an indifferent and 
external attribute. 
LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 99 Remark. Also, from the Phenomenology, the following 
complaint about dogmatism: 
The evident character of this defective condition of which mathematics is proud, and 
on which it plumes itself before philosophy, rests solely on the poverty of its purpose 
and the defectiveness of its stuff, and is therefore of a kind that philosophy must spurn. 
Its purpose or Notion is magnitude. It is just this relationship that is unessential, 
lacking the Notion. 
PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 10, H 45. 
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their own sphere, they need not concern themselves with metaphysics. 
Hegel paraphrases the attitude of the mathematicians: "Metaphysics, 
though disagreeing with the use of the mathematical infinite, cannot 
d e n y  o r  i n v a l i d a t e  t h e  b r i l l i a n t  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  i t . "  ( 2 4 1 ) i ™  
If the difficulty were solely with the Notion as such, mathematics 
could dispense with it, because math's project is not to generate the very 
being of the objects which interest it. The problem is that the calculus is 
contradictory. The Notion of a concept is much more than a precise 
determination of it. But the calculus poses a special challenge to precise 
definition. 
[T]he infinitesimal calculus permits and requires modes of procedure 
which mathematics must wholly reject when operating with finite 
quantities, and at the same time it treats these infinite quantities as if 
they were finite and insists on applying to [the Infinitely 
Great/Small] the same modes of operation which are valid for [finite 
quanta]. (241-42) 
In other words, mathematics does not condone dividing by zero, but it 
condones dividing by non-numbers that are infinitely close to zero 
(limx_>o 5y/5x). And, once it condones this, such differentials can be 
multiplied or subtracted as if they really were finite numbers. 
Hegel states that the track record of the Infinitely Small is 
mixed.Hegel finds the calculus is 
burdened with a seeming inexactitude, namely, having increased 
finite magnitudes by an infinitely small quantity, this quantity is in 
the subsequent operation in part retained and in part ignored. The 
pculiarity of this procedure is that in spite of the admitted 
inexactitude, a result is obtained which is not merely fairly close and 
such that the difference can be ignored, but is perfectly exact. (242) 
If I may intercede with an example that illustrates this last passage, 
suppose Ax represents a given change in x—not necessarily an 
infinitesimally small change. Suppose further that y is a function of x 
(or y = f(x)). If xo represents x at a particular value, and if xi = f(xo + 
Ax), then Ay = f(xi) - f(xo) = f(xo + Ax) - f(xo). We can define the 
difference quotient" by dividing each side of the equation by Ax to 
obtain 
^ = fffXn) + Ax) - ffXnl 
Ax Ax 
Michael John Petry reads this passage as meaning that "in this context it is metaphysics 
which has a lesson or two to learn from mathematics, not vice versa." Petry, supra note 11, at 
486. But the thrust of Hegel's remarks is that it is the mathematicians who have not done their 
homework. 
171 Terry Pinkard rightfully criticizes Bertrand Russell who saw Hegel as wedded to the 
Infinitely Small as the basis of calculus. PiNKARD, supra note 41, at 41. The entire point here is 
to attack any reliance by the calculus on such a notion. 
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This difference quotient illustrates Hegel's assertion that the calculus 
exists by inexactitude. Let us apply this "difference quotient" to a 
concrete example. Suppose y = 3x - 4. We can write; 
Ay = 3(xn + Ax) ^ ^ 6 xnAx + 3(Ax] ^  ^ 6 xo + 3Ax 
Ax Ax Ax 
Thus, if X = 2, and if Ax = 3, then, as x changes from 2 to 5, y changes 
from 8 to 71 (or 21 units of y per unit of x). 
Where Ax is infinitesimally small, the calculus feels licensed 
simply to ignore Ax in the above calculation. Thus, the derivative of 
3x^ - 4 is supposed to be 6x, not 6x + 36x.'''2 The remainder 35x is 
simply dropped. This erasure shows that the calculus, as Hegel charges, 
is burdened with inexactitude. 
Hegel remarks: 
In the operation itself, however, which precedes the result, one 
cannot dispense with the conception that a quantity is not equal to 
nothing, yet is so inconsiderable that it can be left out of the account. 
(242) 
In other words, in the expression Ay/Ax, one can see that Ax is not 
zero, because one cannot divide by zero. Yet simultaneously Ax is "left 
out" as //it were zero. 
In modem times, mathematicians would deny that 35x is simply 
erased. Rather, they would say that 6x is the limit past which they may 
not go, when 
lim & 
"-OSy 
On this view, 35x does not vanish. It is simply unnecessary to refer to it 
when identifying 6x as a limit. In fact, the limit is never reached, 
because 5x never does reach zero.'^^ This is a procedure of which 
Hegel would have approved. The "limit" of 6x is the qualitative 
"beyond" of Quantum.''''^ 
Infinitesimals. Hegel next considers the nature of the Infinitely 
Great/Small according to the mathematical point of view: 
The usual definition of the mathematical infinite is that it is a 
magnitude than which there is no greater (when it is defined as the 
172 According to the familiar "power rule," 5x"/6x = nx" '. 
'73 See Borzeszkowski, supra note 53, at 76; see A.W. Moore, The Method of Exhaustion as a 
Model for the Calculus, in HEGEL AND NEWTONl ANISM, supra note 11. at 147-48. 
174 See Kosok, supra note 12, at 254 ("the very notion of a mathematical limit entails the 
negative presence of that which is limited . . . 
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infinitely large), or no smaller (when it is defined as the infinitely 
small). (243) 
Meanwhile, mathematics defines "magnitude" as that which can be 
increased or diminished. Since the Infinitely Great/Small cannot be 
increased/diminished, then the Infinitely Great/Small is no longer a 
Quantum as such. This is so on mathematical terms. 
What mathematics cannot comprehend is that the mathematical 
infinite is simultaneously Quantum and not Quantum. It is "something 
which is not a quantum but yet retains its quantitative character." 
(243)'" 
What mathematics cannot comprehend is that the mathematical 
infinite is simultaneously Quanmm and not Quantum. It is "something 
which is not a quantum but yet retains its quantitative character." (243) 
An Attack on Kant. Hegel returns to his criticism of Kant. Kant 
says of the mathematical infinite that it is a magnitude beyond which 
none is greater. We can never name this amount. Some other 
magnitude could always be named that is greater, defeating our 
pretensions. But to say "infinite," we do not invoke the concept of a 
maximum. Rather we express only a beyond of any given, named 
magnitude. The infinite is therefore always a relation to a fixed 
number—a beyond of it. 
Thus, Kant declines to regard the infinite whole as a maximum. 
The maximum would be a mere quantum, which can always be 
exceeded. Rather, Kant sees that the mathematical infinite is beyond 
Quantum. Hegel complains that Kant thinks the mathematical infinite 
can never be completed. This, he finds, is "nothing but an expression of 
the progress to infinity." (243) It is represented as transcendental, by 
which Kant means (says Hegel) psychologically subjective. That is, 
subjective opinion burdens any given magnitude with an unreachable 
beyond—a species of the thing-in-itself. 
Here, therefore, there is no advance beyond the contradiction 
contained in quantity; but the contradiction is distributed between the 
object and the subject, limitedness being ascribed to the [object], and 
to the [subject] the progress to infinity, in its spurious sense, beyond 
every assigned determinateness. (243) 
That is, in Kant's critique, the proposed maximum is objective. The 
burden of the beyond is subjective. By subjective, Hegel seems to 
invoke the presupposition that we can never know the infinite; it is 
always beyond our experience. Hegel, however, believes the nature of 
Carl Boyer has suggested that the infinitesimally small was "atomic" in nature—a self-
identity that could not be further subdivided. CARL B. BOYER, THE HISTORY OF THE CALCULUS 
AND ITS CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 12 (1949) [hereinafter BOYER, CALCULUS]. If so, 
Hegel—a virulent opponent of atomism—^would also oppose any use of the infinitesimal in the 
calculus. 
D6 CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, supra note 14, at 243-44. 
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the Infinitely Great/Small can be known precisely. 
Mathematical v. Speculative Notions. Returning to the 
mathematical notion of infinity, Hegel says that, for mathematicians, the 
mathematical infinite is not a Quantum but a beyond of Quantum—a 
conclusion Hegel endorses (but only as a one-sided view, since the 
Infinitely Great/Small is just as much Quantum). Hegel compares this 
attitude to the "speculative" point of view. 
According to Hegel, the Infinitely Great/Small is "/« its own self 
infinite." (244) That is, the Infinitely Great/Small of Figure 16(c) has 
sublated/negated both the quantum and its beyond. In the Infinitely 
Great/Small, the entire spurious infinity has vanished. The Infinitely 
Great/Small, viewed as [7] in Figure 16(c), is a simple unity. 
Extensive Quantum in Figure 14(a) was also a simple unity, but the 
Infinitely Great/Small is an advance over this more primitive unity. 
Extensive Quantum erased itself and became Intensive Quantum. In 
this act, it determined itself only implicitly. Extensive Quantum saw 
itself as entirely separate and isolated from Intensive Quantum—the 
usual delusion of the Understanding. The Infinitely Great/Small, 
however, expressly sees itself as the beyond of the Quantitative Infinite 
Progress. It expressly says, "I am not that, and that is what I am.'" It 
sees that it is simultaneously a unity of opposites. It is both Quantum 
and not Quantum—something the Understanding cannot grasp. 
The Infinitely Great/Small is no longer finite Quantum. Finite 
Quantum is determined by all the other quanta. In comparison, the 
Infinitely Great/Small is simple. As simplicity is the very hallmark of 
"being," the Infinitely Great/Small is "quantitative determinateness in 
qualitative form." (245) What it expresses is "its essential unity with its 
other." (245) By "essential" Hegel means that "it has meaning solely 
with reference to that which stands in relation to it. Apart from this 
relation it is a nullity.'''' Quantum as such is indifferent to the 
relation expressed in Figure 16(c). That is, if I propose one trillion as a 
candidate for the Infinitely Great, that number is indifferent to the fact 
that it has a beyond—an even larger number. Yet the Infinitely Great is 
nothing but the beyond of any given number. Hence, it is a nullity 
without the idea of a fixed, inert number. 
But the Infinitely Great/Small is only a moment. If number is 
indifferent to it, the Infinitely Great/Small is not likewise indifferent to 
number. Hence, "the quantum in its infinity is a being-for-self" (245) 
In other words, it is qualitative, but has its content outside itself. But it 
is also a Being-for-one. 
Why is the Infinitely Great/Small a Being-for-one? It will be 
recalled that Being-for-one "expresses the manner in which the finite is 
Essence, as we shall see, is always correlative. See LESSER LOGIC, supra note 29, § 112. 
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present in its unity with the infinite." (159)'78 That is, Being-for-one is a 
memory embedded within a unity that once there was disunity. Hence, 
the Infinitely Great/Small is a unity that likewise appreciates its 
history—it was generated when the Quantitative Infinite Progress 
vanished, leaving only the bare idea of a beyond. 
Fractions and Infinite Series. Hegel provides an example of 
Quantitative Infinity. Quantum, he reminds us, is covertly a ratio. 
Thus, Number was the unity of Amount and Unit, as shown in Figure 
13(c). Also, in the next chapter, ratio will become further developed as 
the qualitative moment of Quantity. 
Hegel proposes to analyze the fraction 2/7. This fraction does not 
appear even superficially to be a unity, like a whole number does. 
Rather, it "is directly determined by two other numbers which are 
related to each other as amount and unit, the unit itself being a specific 
amount." (245)'***' But consider the extremes of the ratio—2 and 7. 
These are indifferent to being in the ratio (which Hegel here calls the 
"exponent").This exponent is a third to the extremes of 2 and 7. 
Once 2 and 7 are in the relation, however, they no longer count as 2 and 
7 but they count according to the fraction in which they participate. 
Relation is now paramount. To prove this, Hegel points out that 4 and 
14 or 6 and 21 could serve just as well to express the exponent. The 
ratio of 2 and 7 therefore has a qualitative character, separate and apart 
from the sides of the ratio. 
This qualitative character, Hegel says, is "a moment of infinity. 
(246) This qualitative moment survives quantitative change, as when 
2/7 becomes 4/14. If the ratio has this qualitative "infinite" moment, it 
is only imperfectly expressed. The 2 and the 7 can be removed from the 
ratio, in which case they revert back to ordinary quanta. "[Tjheir 
connection as moments of the ratio is an external circumstance which 
does not directly concern them." (246) Furthermore, the ratio of 2/7 is 
likewise an ordinary Quantum. 
That the fraction is an ordinary Quanmm can be seen if we express 
2/7 as 0.285714 ... So expressed, 2/7 generates an infinite series. 
178 See CARLSON, supra note 4, at 551-53. 
179 See infra notes 246-63 and accompanying text. 
180 Earlier, Hegel stated that, in Number, what is deemed unit and what is deemed amount is 
arbitrary. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94. Tlius, with regard to 2/7, we have either 
two units of 1/7 or 1/7 units of two. 
181 Hegel's usage is unusual. The exponent is usually defined as measure of power of a base. 
But in 6" the exponent is 4, and it raises 6 to the fourth power. Thus, it would be an error to 
assume Hegel that the exponent of 2 and 7 is logz'. Rather the exponent of 2 and 7 seems to 
mean the quotient of unit and amount. Andrew Haas, one of the few commentators to focus on 
Hegel's analysis of calculus, manages to miss this point. HAAS, INPRA note 8, at 129-30. 
182 Hegel also states that l/(l-a) can be expressed as 1 + a + a + a etc. This, however, is true 
only if a < 1. More generally, if |r| < 1, the geometric series 
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The quotient of 0.285714 ... (which Hegel calls the "sum") is the finite 
expression of the ratio. This Hegel characterizes as "an aggregate of 
units added together, as an amount." (247) True, the magnitudes of 
which this expression consists (2, 8, 5 etc.) are each a decimal fraction 
and hence each is a ratio, but this is irrelevant, "for this circumstance 
concerns the particular kind of unit of these magnitudes, not the 
magnitudes as constituting an amount." (247) In other words, 8 (in 
0.285714 . .. ) is really 8/100. The "particular unit" of the amount 8 is 
1/100. Any such consideration isolates the 8 from the entire expression 
of 0.285714 . .. This last expression can be viewed as an aggregate of 
indifferent parts in the sense that it is 2/10 + 8/100 + 5/1000, etc. 
The infinite series contains Spurious Infinity, ' because what the 
series is meant to express remains an ought-to-be and what it does 
express is burdened with a beyond which does not vanish and differs 
from what was meant to be expressed." (248) The series is actually only 
something finite—"something which is not what it ought to be." (248) 
In the infinite series, the negative is outside its terms. That is, if 2/7 is 
expressed as 0.2857, the defect of the expression is that (0.000014 . ..) 
is left out. In comparison, in the expression 2/7, the negative is 
"immanent as the reciprocal determining of the sides of the ratio and 
this is an accomplished return-into-self." (248) That is to say, both sides 
of 2/7 are merely moments of the quantum expressed. As a mere 
moment, each side (2 and 7, taken immediately) is the negative of the 
ratio. The "self-related unity" that 2/7 represents is "a negation of the 
negation" and "consequently has within it the determination of infinity." 
(248) The fraction 2/7 is therefore notionally superior to the infinite 
series, because the qualitative moment of 2/7 survives the quantitative 
increase to 4/14 or 6/21. This internalization of infinity is a sign that 
Quantity is beginning to recapture its own substance, which has been 
imposed on it by an other. Thus, "the so-called/imfe expression [2/7] is 
the truly infinite expression." In 0.285714 . .. , however, the infinite is 
expressly missing.(it is what the ellipsis tries to capture.) As a taunt 
at the infinite series, Hegel remarks; 
The word infinite even as used in infinite series, is commonly 
fancied to be something lofty and exalted; this is a kind of 
superstition, the superstition of the understanding; we have seen 
how, on the contrary, it indicates only a deficiency. (249) 
Hegel next calls attention to the fact that "the existence of the finite 
a + ar + ar^. . . ar""' . . . 
converges to a sum a/(l-r). u » "*i, i • i 
183 The usually astute Professor Mure thus gets it wrong when he comments that The logical 
principle of the convergent infinite series" is the True Infmite. MURE, supra note 17, at . 
Rather, the True Infmite lies in the rational expression of the number, not m the infmite series m 
which any number can be expressed, as Mure recognizes elsewhere. Id. at 120. 
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series which cannot be summed is an external 
circumstance with respect to the form of the series as such. (249) That 
is if the ordinary division of 2 into 7 generates an mfinite series, the 
division of 1 into 4 (1/4) does not. Nevertheless, the infinite series 
expresses "a higher kind of infinity than do those which can be 
summed" i.e., 1/4 can be summed and hence is speculatively interior. 
(249) 0.285714 ... at least expresses "an incommensurability, or the 
impossibility of representing the quantitative ratio contained in them as 
a quantum " (249) This incommensurability is even more pronounced m 
irrational numbers—numbers that cannot even be expressed as fractions 
(i.e., V5). In any case, a series capable of summation (such as 1/4) 
likewise contains the same spurious infinity that an inexpressible series 
contains. Hegel claims that a similar terminological inversion occurs 
in the work of an unnamed philosopher, who designates the 
mathematical infinite—in the sense of the True Infinite as the relative 
infinite. This philosopher gives the name "absolute" to the Spurious 
Infinite. "But in point of fact it is this metaphysical [i.e., absolute] 
infinite which is merely relative, because the negation which it 
expresses is opposed to a limit only in such a manner that this limit 
persists outside it." (249) In other words. Spurious Infinity is always a 
Finite facing another Finite which is its beyond. The True Infinite 
encompasses both the fmites, as Figure 7(c) showed m chapter 2 of 
Quality.The mathematical infinite, properly viewed, is a true 
Infinite.It "has within itself truly sublated the finite limit because the 
beyond of the latter is united with it." (249) 
Spinoza. Spinoza recognized the True Infinite and profitably 
compared it to the Spurious Infinite. According to Spinoza, the infinite 
is "the absolute affirmation of any kind of natural existence. ^49) 
Absolute affirmation "is to be taken as its relation to itself, its not being 
dependent on an other.- (250) The mere finite, for Spmoza, is a 
determinateness, as a negation... a ceasing-to-be in the form ot a 
re/ario« to an o//ier which begins owte/i/e it." (250) 
These are sentiments with which Hegel is in accord, but Hegel also 
t h i n k s  t h a t  " t h e  a b s o l u t e  a f f i r m a t i o n  o f  a n  e x i s t e n c e  d o e s  n o t . . .  
exhaust the notion of infinity." (250) An infinity is not merely an 
immediacy. Rather, it is "restored by the reflection of the other into 
itself, or as negation of the negative." (250) In short, the True Infinite is 
184 Thus, 1/4 can be expressed as (1 + a + a' + a\ . .)/8, where a = .5. This is on the formula 
x= 1 /(1 -a), where a < 1. See supra note 182. 
185 See CARLSON, IUPRA note 4, at 538-43. j 
186 Justus Hartnack, who admits that he struggles with Measure, sees that more advanced state 
as showing "why the alleged bad [mathematreal] infimty is a true infimty." 
note 119 at 35. But it must be recognized that the concepts here have been Tme Infinites ever 
since the'end of Chapter 2. What Measure will do is to show the sublation of both Quality an 
Quantity, and the establishment of a true self-subsistence of things. 
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a middle term. With Spinoza, however, substance is an inert unity—"a 
fixity or rigidity in which the Notion of the negative unity of the self, i.e 
subjectivity, is still lacking." (250) Nevertheless, Spinoza at least 
recognized that the True Infinite (Spinoza's "infinite of thought") was 
"complete and present within itself." (250) The Spurious Infinite 
(Spinoza's "infinite of the imagination") "definitely lacks something." 
(251) Thus, according to Hegel's reading of Spinoza, 2/7 is what the 
infinite series (0.285714 .. .) ought to be. Meanwhile, imagination, in 
contemplating the Spurious Infinite, "stops short at quantum as such and 
does not reflect on the qualitative relation which constitutes the ground 
of the existing incommensurability." (251) In other words. Speculative 
Reason sees that the Infinitely Great/Small cannot be named as such and 
so it is both qualitative—independent of outside manipulation—and a 
relation between the alternating finites of the Spurious Infinite. As the 
name of the alternating activity, the Infinitely Great/Small is thus 
incommensurate with the finites it unites. 
Arithmetic v. Calculus. Hegel next wishes to consider the 
incommensurability between arithmetic and calculus, which manifests 
itself in functions of curved lines {e.g., y^ = ax). Such a function is said 
to involve variables. These variables are different in character than the 
variability of 2 in 2/7, which equally can be 4 or 8, if the denominator 
becomes 14 or 28. In contemplating y = ax, x and y can be any 
magnitude. Hegel complains, "The expression 'variable magnitudes' is 
therefore very vague and ill-chosen for those determinations of 
magnitude whose interest and manner of treatment lie in something 
quite distinct from their mere variability." (251-52) Hegel's basic 
complaint is that, because the same terminology ("variable") is used in 
both arithmetic and calculus, a qualitative metaphysical difference 
between the two practices remains hidden. 
What is our interest in x and y, as these appear in the function y = 
ax? Recall that, in 2/7 or y/x, the numerator is an independent quantum 
with regard to the denominator. The relation of numerator to 
denominator is not essential to the quanta that are made to participate in 
the ratio. But 2/7 and y/x are also "a fixed quantum, a quotient." (252) 
This observation does not hold if we consider the function y^/x = a. 
This function has a determinate quotient, to be sure, but, within y^/x = a, 
y/x has no fixed relation with y^/x. In other words, y/x is irrelevant and 
indifferent (or, as Hegel puts it, "variable") to the ratio //x. Thus, in 
y^/x, X has a relation to y^, but not to y. This leads Hegel to observe 
that "[t]he relation of a magnitude to a power is not a quantum, but 
essentially a qualitative relation." (252). 
What does Hegel mean by this? If we map ylx=ll2 on a Cartesian 
plane, a straight line is generated. On this straight line, the quotient 
never changes. This is no longer true with regard to y^/x. 7^/2 is not the 
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same as 14^/4; y^/x enjoys a qualitative moment a complete 
independent "variability" from y/x. In comparison, y/x is "only 
formally a function of variable magnitudes." (252) In the ratio y/x, y 
and X are "not in that determination in which the differential and the 
integral calculus considers them." (252)'8^ Presumably, what Hegel 
means by this is that, in y/x, the ratio is dependent on otherness—y and 
X are in an indifferent relation. But calculus trafficks in 5y/5x. Where 
5y or 6x are the infinitely small changes in y or x, these entities are not 
even quanta, as Hegel is about to emphasize. 
Given the qualitative moment in y^/x, which is not present in y/x, 
"it would have been fitting to have introduced both a special name for 
them." (252) There is "an essential difference between those 
magnitudes and such quanta which are merely unknown, but are m 
themselves completely determined or are a definite range of determinate 
quanta." (252-53) Mathematics should have seen what a radical break 
calculus is, compared to the "equation of the straight line. (253)^^® A 
great deal of formalism would, indeed, have been avoided if it had been 
perceived that the calculus is concerned not with variable magnitudes as 
such but with relations ofpowers" (253)"'' 
The Differential Calculus. Suppose x and y are in a power 
relation, such as y^/x. In this relation, x and y still signify quanta. But 
"this significance is altogether and completely lost in the so-called 
infinitesimal differences." (253) Take the expression 6x/6y, where 5x 
stands for some change in x and hence some fixed change m y. In this 
187 If differential calculus studies 5y given 5x, integral calculus goes backwards. It 
contemplates x as a differential, and it derives the primitive formula of which x is the differential. 
For example, if differential calculus states that the derivative of y = 5x ts 5, mtegral calculus 
contemplates 5 and deduces that it is the derivative of y = 5x + c. , .. A 
188 Hegel elsewhere emphasizes that the Infinitely Great/Small is simultaneously Quantum arid 
the beyond of Quantum. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66. Here Hegel obvious y 
means a more primitive Quantum. That is, the calculus of Hegel's time viewed 5x and 8y as 
Numbers, not qualitative entities. 
189 According to one commentator: 
Mathematics is essentially the science of operating with finite quantities. Calculation 
in respect of the infinite requires procedures that are clearly at odds with this. At one 
and the same time, procedures relevant to computation in respect of fmite quantities are 
being used in connection with infinite quantities. This notionless procedure apparent 
in the differential calculus, shows that this kind of mathematics is incapable of dealmg 
with qualitative differences, and such a calculus is therefore quite unsuitable for 
physics. 
Borzeszkowski, supra note 53, at 76. , , ,• c ,• 
190 Modem textbooks reflect this notion that application of the calculus to linear functus 
masks the tme qualitative significance of the practice and even take the pomt ferther. One 
exemplar refers to the "degenerate case of a function of one variable," and states Tlie notion of 
the differential of a function does not appear in its tme light in the theory of functions of one 
variable " R. CREIGHTON BUCK, ADVANCED CALCULUS 243 (2d ed. 1965). In considermg 2x as 
the derivative of y = x^ this textbook advises: "one must draw the subtle distinction between a 
number c [i.e., 2x] and the 1-by-I matrix [c]." Id. These remarks are entirely Hegelian m their 
thmst. 
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expression 5x and 5y "are no longer quanta, nor are they supposed to 
signify quanta; it is solely in their relation to each other that they have 
any meaning, a meaning merely as moments." (253) Hegel states that 5x 
and 6y "are no longer something (something taken as a quantum), not 
finite differences; but neither are they nothing-, not empty nullities. 
(253) Apart from their relation to each other, they are nullities, but as 
moments of5x/6y, each is highly significant. , ^ , 
In 5x/6y, Hegel says. Quantum is "genuinely completed into a 
qualitative reality; it is posited as actually infinite; it 
merely as this or that quantum but as quanmm generally. (253) In other 
words, neither 5x nor 6y is a quantum on its own. Rather each is a 
"vanishing magnitude" and hence no particular quantum. (254) What 
we have is pure ratio, no longer a Quantity determined by outside 
forces The ratio posits (announces) itself as infinite. It is a negation of 
the negation. It has sublated its finite parts and has genuine being-for-
self. Because 5x/6y exceeds finite quanta, it stands for Quanhim 
generally, just as the True Infinite stood for all the Fijites. 
Nevertheless, 6x/6y is still a determinateness. Mathematics takes 6x/6y 
as "not nothing" but as "an intermediate state . . . between being and 
nothing." (254) This state does not exist, however, just as Becoming 
does not exist. It is erroneous to think of Becoming or 5x/5y as a state. 
The nature of Quantum is that "it is supposed to have a completely 
indifferent existence apart from its ratio." (254) That is, 2 and 7 have 
meaning on their own apart from 2/7. But 5x/6y "has being solely in the 
ratio" (254) and hence is not even a Quantum. 
The True Infinite nature of 5x/6y has been a target, even for 
mathematicians, Hegel says. But these attacks come from an inability 
to digest the Notion. Nevertheless, anyone wishing to practice the 
calculus—^which converts curved into straight lines and the like must 
come to grips with the fact that the practice exceeds "the nature of 
merely finite determinations." (254) 
Newton. Hegel undertakes to show how the originators of the 
calculus did not adequately grasped the nature of the True Infinite. As a 
result, they "found it necessary in the application to resort again to 
expedients which conflict with their better cause. (255) 
Newton correctly saw a differential as, not an indivisible, but as a 
vanishing divisible—not as a sum and a ratio but as the limit of a sum 
and ratio. For Newton there are no indivisibles. Indivisibles would 
imply "a leap again from the abstract ratio to its sides as supposedly 
having an independent value of their own as indivisibles outside their 
relation." (256) »/T C C  
Hegel quotes Newton's reference to 6x/6y as a final ratio. (25 J, 
256) Is this attribution of finality fair, when the ratio itself is in t e 
business of vanishing—i.e., approaching zero? Hegel thinks so. 
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because the "ratio of vanishing magnitudes is to be understood not [as] 
the ratio before which and after which they vanish, but with which they 
vanish." (255) In other words, the ratio is "final" only in this odd, 
contradictory state of ceasing-to-be. The phrase 6x/6y is therefore a 
species of Becoming. 
Newton saw that this final ratio (6x/5y) is not to be taken as a ratio 
of final magnitudes, but as a limit to whieh the ratio of the "magnitudes 
decreasing without limit are nearer than any given . . . difference." (256) 
If Newton had been attentive to the Notion, however, "there would have 
been no need for the decreasing without limit into which Newton 
converts the quantum and which only expresses the progress to 
infinity." (256) . 
The ratio 5x/6y is therefore in a state of continuity between bemg 
and vanishing. Hegel approves of the phrase continuity, "if the 
continuity of the quantum is not understood to be the continuity which it 
has in the finite progress where the quantum is eontinued in its 
vanishing." (257) This is only Spurious Infinity. But where transition is 
made, not to another finite quantum, but to the True Infinite, the usage 
is appropriate: 
so continuous is it, so completely is it preserved, that the transition 
may be said to consist solely in throwing into relief the pure ratio and 
causing the non-relational determination—i.e., that a quantum which 
is a side of the ratio is still a quantum outside this relation—to 
vanish. (257) 
This purification of the quantitative ratio—the loss of indifferent quanta 
as the determining sides—"is thus analogous to grasping an empirical 
reality in terms of its Notion." (257) Still, the very expression 5x is 
the fundamental vice in these methods—the permanent obstacle to 
disengaging the determination of the qualitative moment of quantity 
in its purity from the conception of the ordinary quantum. (258) 
That is, the very reference to x—a fixed quantum in 6x leads away 
from proper appreciation of the Notion inherent in the obviously 
fascinating concept of the derivative. 
Hegel dislikes the word "infinitesimal." "The nature of these 
magnitudes is supposed to be such that they may be neglected. (258) 
This neglect, "along with a gain in facility," gives the calculus "the 
appearance of inexactitude and express ineorreetness in its method of 
procedure." (258) Hegel criticizes Christian Wolff for comparing the 
191 For example, where ffx) = 3x^ - 4, it is said that 5y/8x = 6x. In truth, it equals 6x + 38x. 
But since 8x approaches zero, the calculus feels entitled to treat 38x as if it has vanished See, 
e.g.. ALPHA CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 129 (3d ed., 
192^ Christian Wolff (1679-1754) was professor of Mathematics and Philosophy at Marburg and 
a "popularizer and systematizer of Liebniz." See Andre Mense, Hegel S Library: Hie IVorh on 
M a t h e m a t i c s ,  M e c h a n i c s ,  O p t i c s  a n d  C h e m i s t r y ,  i n  H E G E L  A N D  N E W T O N I A N I S M ,  s u p r a  n o t e  I I ,  
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calculus to a surveyor "who, in measuring the height of a mountain is 
no less accurate if meanwhile the wind has blown away a grain of sand 
from the top."''^ (258) Hegel rejects a common sense tolerance of such 
inexactitude. "[I]n the science of mathematics there cannot be any 
question of such empirical accuracy." (258) 
Euler. Leonhard Euler,'^" Hegel says, "insists that the differential 
calculus considers the ratios of the increments of a magnitude, but that 
the infinite difference as such is to be considered as wholly nil." (259) 
In truth, Hegel responds, the infinite difference is a nil "only of 
quantum, not a qualitative nil." (259) The infinitesimal is perhaps not a 
quantitative difference. For this reason, it is wrong, in Hegel's opinion, 
to speak of these moments as "increments or decrements and as 
differences." (259) Such terms imply that "something is added to or 
subtracted from the initially given finite magnitude." (259) Such 
arithmetical operations are quite external to the essence of the calculus. 
"[Tjhe transition of the variable magnitude into its differential is of 
quite a different nature." (259) Rather than reducing a quantum through 
subtraction, 5y/6x "is to be considered as a reduction of the finite 
function to the qualitative relation of its quantitative determinations." 
(259) 
In any case, we must not reduce 6x or 6y to zero, "for a zero no 
longer has any determinateness at all." (259) True, zero negates the 
quantum, which is useful, since 5x and 5y are not quanta. But zero fails 
to capture the positive significance of the negation of quantum. 
The calculus as practiced, then, neglects the True Infinite and 
transforms 5y and 6x into the "finite determinateness of quantity and the 
operation cannot dispense with the conception of a quantum which is 
merely relatively small." (260) These quanta are then subject to 
ordinary arithmetical operations, as if they were finite magnitudes. 
Vanishing magnitudes. How does mathematics justify the 
transformation of the True Infinite into mere magnitudes? The 
at 670, 690. At a time when he was considered Germany's leading philosopher, he was 
discharged for heresy from the University of Halle. PINKARD, supra note 113, at 90. According 
to Michael Inwood, Wolff was "Hegel's stock example of an arid metaphysician of the pre-
Kantian sort." M.J. INWOOD, HEGEL 528 n.26 (1983). 
193 According to one commentator the point is that Wolff 
combines empirical and analytical argumentation and therefore is not conclusive. 
Wolffs analogy is inadequate and inconsistent because it identifies two logically 
different arguments: mathematical inference and measurement. The limited accuracy 
of measurement is not a mathematical proof. 
Wolfgang Neuser, The Difference Between Begrifflicher Spekulation and Mathematics in Hegel's 
Philosophy of Nature, 226,236, in HEGEL AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY (David Lamb ed., 1987). 
Leonhard Euler (1707-83) was a Swiss mathematieian who lived mostly in St. Petersburg. 
He worked heavily on infmite series, but his chief legacy is the designation of the mysterious 
e=2.71828.. . , a concept important to economists. Hegel calls him "[t]he great Euler, who 
displayed an infinitely fertile and acute mind in seizing and combining the deeper relations of 
algebraic magnitudes." (616) 
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precursors of calculus (Fcrmat and Barrow)"frankly believed that 
they were entitled to omit the products of infinitesimal differences and 
their higher powers, solely on the ground that they vanish relatively to 
the lower order." (262) For example, x^, by definition, is always greater 
than 5x^. The differential therefore vanishes "relatively" to the variable 
X. 
The attitude toward curves demonstrates a like methodology of 
omitting that which is taken as insignificant.'®^ In effect, where xi and 
X2 are points on the curve that are infinitely close together, calculus 
assumes that the two points are connected by a straight line. Area exists 
between the straight line and the curve, but this space is ignored. 
Hegel presents a demonstration by Newton as an example of the 
inexactitude from which calculus suffers.'®'' This involves Newton's 
derivation of the "product rule" of the differential calculus. According 
to this rule, where y = f(x), 5xy/6x = x5y + y5x.'®^ 
Newton derived the product rule as follows. Take the product xy. 
First, reduce each element by half its infinitesimal difference (x - 5x/2 
and y - 6y/2). Second, multiply these reduced quanta together. Thus, (x 
- 5x/2)(y - 5y/2) = xy - x5y/2 - y5x/2 + 6x6y/4. Now do the opposite: 
increase each element by half its infinitesimal difference, to obtain xy + 
x6y/2 + y5x/2 + 5x5y/4. Now subtract one result from the other: 
(xy + x6y/2 + y5x/2 + 6x6y/4) - (xy - x6y/2 - y6x/2 + 6x5y/4) = y6x + x5y. 
This last formulation (y6x + x5y) is, of course, the product rule. This 
product rule is the surplus when the first product was subtracted from 
the second. The surplus, Hegel says, is "the difference between the two 
products" and "therefore the differential of xy." (263) 
Hegel retorts, "in spite of the name of Newton it must be said that 
such an operation although very elementary, is incorrect." (263) Hegel 
Pierre de Fermat (1601-65) was a lawyer and amateur number theorist who worked in 
Provence. He is chiefly famous for Fermat's last theorem—his claim to a proof that, where x to 
the n + y to the n = z to the n, n=2 (the Pythagorean theorem) but no number higher than 2. 
Fermat never set forth the proof, but it was apparently proven recently by a Princeton 
mathematician, Andrew Wiles. On Fermat, see W.W. ROUSE BALL, A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE 
HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 311-12 (4th ed. 1960) (1908). Isaac Barrow was Newton's teacher 
at Oxford and vacated his professorship so that Newton could have it in 1669. Id. at 310. 
'96 Calculus holds that 8y/8x = y/a, where x is distance on the abscissa, y is the distance on the 
ordinate between the tangent and the abscissa, and a is the subtangent (i.e., the line segment on 
the abscissa between the tangent point and the place where the tangent (as hypotenuse) meets the 
ordinate.) In particular, this describes the technique of Isaac Barrow, Newton's teacher. See id. -, 
see also infra text accompanying notes 229-32. 
'92 Apparently, Hegel "had no very high opinion of Newton's ability to deal with thoughts." 
Renate Wahsner, The Philosophical Background to Hegel's Criticism of Newton, in HEGEL AND 
NEWTONIANISM, jwpra note II, at 81. 
'98 For example, if x = 2a + 3, and y = 3a^, then 8x/8a = 2 and 8y/8a = 6a. According to the 
product rule, 8xy/8x = (2)(3a^) + (2a + 3)6a = I8(a^ + a). 
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thinks Newton's proof of y6x + x5y fairly implies the following. 
(x + 5x)(y + 5y) - xy 
That is, Newton's procedure was to increase x by 5x and y by 5y and 
multiply them. Then Newton subtracted xy and was supposedly left 
with the product rule. Yet, if the above expression is expanded (or 
multiplied out), we obtain 
(x + 6x)(y + 5y) - xy = y5x + x5y + 5x6y 
Hence, the product rule (by which we calculate the derivative of 6xy/5x) 
leaves out the product of the differentials (6x6y)—the usual imprecision 
of which 18th century calculus was guilty. "It can only have been toe 
need to establish the all-important fluxional calculus which could bring 
Newton to deceive himself with such a proof," Hegel remarks. (263) 
Many of Newton's proofs, Hegel complains, involve the infinite 
series. His equations can only be solved by approximations. These 
omissions, Hegel says, "gave his opponents the occasion of a triumph of 
their method over his." (263) Thus, in mechanics,2oo the function of 
motion is developed from a series. The series is given a specific 
meaning The first term refers to the moment of velocity. The second 
refers to accelerating force. The third refers to the resistance of forces. 
The terms of these series are not to be regarded as parts of a whole, but 
are rather ^'qualitative moments of a whole determined by the concept. 
(264) Thus, Hegel says, 
the omission of the rest of the terms belonging to the spuriously 
infinite series acquires an altogether different meaning from 
omission on the ground of their relative smallness. The error m the 
Newtonian solution arose, not because terms of the series were 
neglected only as parts of a sum, but because the term containing the 
qualitative determination, which is the essential point, was ignored. 
(264) 
In other words, Newtonian physics omits the True Infinite, which was 
expelled from the analysis when the Spurious Infinite was transformed 
into a fixed sum. 
In a lengthy footnote, Hegel, quotes Lagrange as demonstrating 
how parts of infinite series are left out in Newton's demonstrations. In 
199 Newton called 5x or 6y "fluxions." Fluxions were "evanescent quantities" and had a 
significance separate and apart from the ratio 5y/5x, BOYER, CALCULUS, supra note 175, at 255. 
MO Hegel elsewhere accuses Newton of having "flooded mechanics with monstrous 
metaphysics." HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE § 270 Remark (A.V. Miller trans., 1970). 
201 Joseph Louis Lagrange was the foremost mathematician m the eighteenth century. He 
worked in Turin until Frederick the Great offered him a position in Berlin in 1766. BALL, supra 
note 195, at 404. 
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this demonstration, space traversed is considered as a function of time 
elapsed (x = ft). When developed as f(t + 6t), an infinite series is 
developed: ft + 5ft + 52f't/2 ... Motion is therefore said to be 
"composed"—a Hegelian swear word^®^—of various partial motions. 
(264 n.l) Each part is likewise expressed by the same infinite series. 
In the infinite series, the first derivative is associated with velocity. 
The second derivative is associated with acceleration.The third 
derivative and the rest are simply ignored.^o^ 
Newtonian procedure, Hegel remarks, "is made to depend on the 
qualitative meaning.'''' (265) By this, Hegel probably means that, since 
the procedure is exact, it is not entirely quantitative and hence is 
therefore qualitative. Thus, Newton and his followers suppose they 
omit the tail end of the series because it is an insignificant sum, "while 
the reason for omitting them is made to consist in the relativity of their 
quantum." (266) The relativity in question justifies the belief that the 
omissions are based on a quantitative insignificance, not a qualitative 
one. 
What physics should do, then, is to state the qualitative meaning 
and make the procedure depend on it. This would displace the 
formalism of Newtonian method. Speculative Reason has no difficulty 
in ending the series with the first derivative (ft), because Speculative 
Reason names this the True Infinite. 
Thus the omission of the rest of the terms is not on account of their 
relative smallness; and so there is no assumption of an inexactitude, » 
an error or mistake which could be compensated or rectified by 
another error.... (265) 
If Speculative Reason were in control of physics, it would recognize the 
fust derivative as a relation, not a sum. Physics would be saved from 
the Spurious Infinite. 
Limit. The mathematical notion of limit, Hegel says, is qualitative 
in nature. It implies "the true category of the qualitatively determined 
relation of variable magnitudes." (266) Thus 5x and 5y, which represent 
the infinitesimally small changes of x and y, "are supposed to be taken 
simply and solely as moments of 5y/5x." (266-67) Indeed, the ratio 
5y/5x is to be taken as indivisible. Indivisibility {i.e., simplicity) is the 
hallmark of Quality. 
202 Composed things—!.e., 211—are brought together by an outside finite will and are 
therefore doomed to de-compose. 
203 See, e.g., GEORGE B. THOMAS, JR., CALCULUS AND ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 60 (3d ed. 
1962). 
204 In other words, "negligibility of terms of order three and higher in the Taylor-development 
of the path as a function of time, is an empirical, not a mathematical fact." Louik Fleischhacker, 
Hegel on Mathematics and Experimental Science, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, 
at 207, 211. 
205 See HAAS, supra note 8, at 123 ("inseparability . . . marks the quality of the quantitative 
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Limit here is the limit of a given function. For example, given y = 
3x^ 
x'! l?iy=3 
In mathematics, the limit of y = 3x^ bears no relation to y = 3x^ as such. 
But the very use of the phrase "limit" suggests "limit of something.'''' 
(267) "It is supposed to be the limit of the ratio between the two 
increments by which the two variable magnitudes connected in an 
equation are supposed to have been increased." (267) In short, it is 
supposed to be the limit of 6y/6x. Limit need not entail the use of the 
infinitely small. Even so, the "way in which the limit is found involves 
the same inconsistencies as are contained in the other methods." (267) 
Hegel gives this example: suppose y = f(x). Consider y+k= f(x+h). 
Any constant (k, to be taken here as Ax)) can be expressed as an infinite 
series. Hence, k = ph + qh^ ... ; and y + k = f(x) + ph + qh^. . . If we 
divide both sides of this equation by h, we get k/h = p + qh + rh^. . .  If  k 
and h vanish, because of their' insignificance, the right side of this 
equation also vanishes, with the exception of p. This p is the limit of 
the ratio of the two increments (k/h). In short, for "vanishing" purposes, 
h = 0. Here h is a quantum. Yet k/h cannot equal 0/0. It must remain a 
ratio, so, for this purpose, h > 0. 
The idea of limit (p) was to avoid the inconsistency in which h is 
implicated. This limit is not 0/0, but only an infinite approximation. 
This limit (the infinitely small) is no longer a quantitative difference. 
But we have not gotten away from 6y/6x = 0. If 5y/5x = p—a 
quantitative ratio—then how could h = 0—an indispensable assumption 
if p = 5y/5x? 
To this there is at once an obvious answer, the simple, meagre 
answer that it is a coefficient derived in such and such a way—the 
first function, derived in a certain specific manner, of an original 
function. (268) 
If this suffices as an answer, the theory of limits would be rid of the 
troublesome increments. But what meaning, then, does p have—"apart 
from the meagre definition, quite adequate for this theory, that it is 
simply a function derived from the expansion of a binomial"? (269) 
Limit should have a more than merely formal significance, which only 
philosophy can supply. 
Hegel next addresses the "confusion which the concept of 
approximation.. . has occasioned in the understanding of the true, 
qualitative determinateness" of 6y/5x. (269) The "so-called 
ratio . . . ."). 
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infinitesimals express the vanishing of the sides of the ratio as quanta. 
[W]hat remains is their quantitative relation solely as qualitatively 
determined." (269) There is no loss of the qualitative relation here. On 
the contrary, "it is just this relation which results from the conversion of 
finite into infinite magnitudes." (269) 
Hegel complains that the ordinate and abscissa each vanish into a 
yet smaller ordinate or abscissa. But the abscissa never seems to 
convert itself into the ordinate or vice versa. This is evidence of 
qualitative determinations of 5y or 5x. 
The calculus, however, insists that 5y, for example, is a quantum— 
an "element of the ordinate." (270) In fact, "the limit here does not have 
the meaning of ratio; it counts only as the final value to which another 
magnitude of a similar kind continually approximates in such a manner 
that it can differ from it by as little as we please." (270) In truth, 5x or 
6y are not even quanta, and, because of this, it makes no sense to speak 
of 6x or 5y expressing a distance between two quanta. For this reason, 
the phrase ''approximation of a magnitude to its limit" is rankly abused. 
(270) 6x is in fact incommensurable with xo or xi .  
Calculus and the physical world. Hegel accuses physics of 
extrapolating forces of nature from calculus instead of vice versa: 
It is announced as a triumph of science that by means of the calculus 
alone, laws are found transcending experience, that is, proposition 
about existence which have no existence. (272) 
Of this practice, Hegel remarks, "I do not hesitate to regard this 
affectation as nothing more than mere jugglery and window-dressing." 
(273) Newton is expressly named as guilty of jugglery. 
Mathematics is proclaimed "altogether incapable of proving 
determinations of the physical world in so far as they are laws based on 
the qualitative nature of the moments [of the subject matter]." (270) 
Hence, science is less than philosophy, because it "does not start from 
the Notion." (273) In science, the "qualitative element, in so far as it is 
206 One commentator opines: 
Treating one of the greatest minds ever to have devoted itself to the natural sciences in 
this manner, naturally led many of Hegel's contemporaries, just as it has led so many 
of his later interpreters, into thinking that [Hegel's] manner of philosophizing was 
fundamentally at odds with Newton's mathematico-mechanical approach .. . Since 
Newton's dynamics have proved themselves in the course of time to be immensely 
superior to the competing approaches of Descartes and Leibniz, the conclusion has 
been drawn that there is really no point in paying any attention to Hegel's arguments. 
Karl-Norbert Ihmig, Hegel's Rejection of the Concept of Force, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, 
supra note 11, at 399, 399-400. But Borzeszkowski proclaims Hegel "quite right" on this score. 
"One has to agree with him completely when he objects to basing the ealculus on, 'an increment 
from the force of gravity,' or the argument of the 'unimportance of the difference.'" 
Borzeszkowski, supra note 53, at 76 (footnotes omitted) (eiting Science of Logic at 272, 259, 
262). Cauchy, Heine and Weierstrass, among others, would, more or less contemporaneously 
with Hegel's time, put calculus on the firmer footing of "limit." Id\ Moore, supra note 173; 
Moretto, srrpra notel03, at 160. 
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not taken lemmatically'^^''''^ from experience, lies outside its sphere." 
(270) Science has a desire to "uphold the honour of mathematics" and 
so it forgets its limits. "[T]hus it seemed against its honour to 
acknowledge simply experience as the course and sole proof of 
empirical propositions." (270) In Hegel's view, experience is a poor 
source for truth. 
Hegel predicts the downfall of Newton: "Without doubt, however, 
the same justice will be done to that framework of Newtonian proof as 
was done to another baseless and artificial Newtonian structure of 
optical experiments." (270) Here, Hegel refers to the alleged rejection of 
Newton's optical theories.^"^ 
Remark 2: The Purpose of the Differential Calculus Deduced 
from its Application 
Hegel moves from the nature of the infinitesimal in the calculus to 
its applications, a subject he finds more difficult. 
Hegel states that "the whole method of the differential calculus is 
complete in the proposition 6x" = nx""'5x, or [f(x + i) - fx]/i = P." (274) 
The former expression denotes the power rule. The latter is the 
difference quotient presented (by me) at the beginning of the last remark 
to illustrate Hegel's comment that calculus is burdened with 
inexactitude.210 In both these formulae, where a binomial formula has 
the form of (x + d), 5x is the coefficient of the first term (e.g., where y = 
5x + c, 6y/5x = 5). Of calculus, Hegel sniffs, "[tjhere is no need to 
learn anything further." (274) The product rule^'' or the power rule of 
calculus follows mechanically from this. It takes a half hour to leam 
calculus, Hegel claims: 
What takes longer is simply the effort to understand. . . how it is 
that, after so easily. . . finding the differential, analytically, i.e. 
purely arithmetieally, by the expansion of the function of the variable 
after this has received the form of a binomial by the addition of an 
increment;^^^^^ how it is that the second stage can be correct, namely 
the omission of all the terms except the first, of the [infinite] series 
arising from the expansion. (274)^'^ 
207 le., deductively. 
208 To paraphrase Kant, experience has insufficient vouchers for the truth. CRITIQUE OF 
JUDGMENT, supra note 142, at 74. 
209 These remarks perhaps reflect Hegel's partisanship for Goethe's polar theory of color as a 
mixture of light and darkness—views discredited today. See PINKARD, supra note 86, at 560. 
210 See supra text accompanying notes 169-73. In Hegel's formulation, P = Ay/Ax. The letter 
i stands for "increment." 
211 8xy/6x = x5y + ySx. 
212 In the difference quotient, this expansion consists in f(x + i). 
213 Such an omission can be witnessed in the Maclaurin series and the Taylor series, developed 
in the fust half of the eighteenth century. The Maclaurin series ean be described as follows: 
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Calculus, Hegel claims, was not invented for its own sake. Only 
after it was invented did mathematicians reflect on the nature of the 
practice. In the previous Remark, Hegel showed how the differential 
(5x) was qualitative in nature. Hegel's interest in this demonstration 
was to show the Notion present in the practice. Now it is time to 
consider the transition from this origin to its application. 
Relation of Powers. Calculus has its spiritual significance when it 
deals with the relations of powers. As emphasized in the prior Remark, 
5y/5x = 5, where y = 5x + c, but this is not particularly interesting to 
speculative philosophy. On the other hand, 6y/5x = 3x^, which implies 
y = x^ + c—this is spiritually significant, in Hegel's view.^"* In the next 
chapter, Hegel will show how, in the relation of powers {e.g., if = y). 
Quantity recaptures its Quality. 
To be sure, mere algebra deals with the higher powers, as when the 
roots of quadratie formulae are "extracted"^'^ or when logarithms^'^ are 
Suppose y = f(x) = ao + aix + a2X^. . . + a„x°. Where f(x) passes through the origin, x = 0 when y 
= 0. Hence, f(x) = ao, or f(0) = ao. Furthermore 
f(x) = ai + 2a2X + Sasx^. . . + na„x°'' 
f'(x) = 2a2 + 6a3X + 12a4X^ . . . + na„x"'^ 
f"(x) =6a3 + 24a4X + hOasx^. . . + nanx" 
Where x = 0, "all the terms except the first" vanish, as Hegel says. On this assumption 
f„'°'(x) = n!a„ 
where (!) stands for l-2'3 . . . n. In other words, the nth derivative of f(x), where x = 0, is an 
multiplied by the factorial of n. 
Setting X at zero (1(0)) and solving all the above formulae for a, we obtain 
ai = f(x) 
a2 = f'(x)/2! 
a3 = f"(x)/3! 
a„ = fn'°'(x)/n! 
Substituting these values back into y = ao + aix + a2X^.. . + a„x°, we obtain 
y = 1(0) + f(0)x + f'(0)x^/2! + f"(0)x^/3! . . . + f„'"\0)x°/n! 
This is Maclaurin's series. It calculates a power series for values of x near zero. Taylor's series 
works for values of x that are not near zero. 
214 Hegel remarks: "the express qualitative nature of quantity is essentially connected with the 
forms of powers, and ... the specific interest of the differential calculus is to operate with 
qualitative forms of magnitude." (276) Only when calculus deals with the higher powers does 
calculus operate overtly with "qualitative forms of magnitude." 
215 A quadratic equation { i .e., one with a "square" in it), has the form of ax^ + bx + c = 0. The 
"root" is X, and it is the privilege of a quadratic equation to have two different roots (where b^ * 
4c). Thus, in x^ = 25 (or, to use the quadratic form, in x^ + Ox + 25 = 0), x is either 5 or -5. 
Hegel, in the text, is saying that solving quadratic equations is spiritually unrewarding, compared 
to the operation of calculus on the relation of powers. 
216 A logarithm is the exponent that ties two known quanta together. Thus, in 4' = 16, t is the 
logarithm and, of course, t = 2. Logarithms are subject to their own strictly mathematical laws. 
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used. But "which of the various relations in which the determinations 
of powers can be put is the peculiar interest and subject matter of the 
differential calculus." (276) 
The previous Remark showed "the futility of the search for 
principles which would. .. solve the contradiction revealed by the 
method instead of excusing it or covering up merely by the 
insignificance of what is here to be omitted. (276) But perhaps from 
applications adequate prineiples could be derived. 
In his search for the speculative truth, Hegel examines two kinds of 
subject matter—(a) second degree equations and (b) infinite series 
(which Hegel calls functions of potentiation).^'^ 
(a) Second degree equations. Hegel mentions equations in the 
form of y^ = x.^'^ Such an equation is indeterminate. If, however, one 
of the variables is assigned a fixed value, then the other has one also. 
Thus, one is a function of the other. When such formulae are rendered 
determinate in this way, such formulas are "simple, unimportant, easy 
determinations." (278) They are made difficult, however, "by importing 
into them what they do not contain in order that this may then be 
derived from them—namely, the specific determination of the 
differential calculus." (278) By this Hegel presumably means that / = x 
is qualitatively different from its derivative function and, in that sense, 
the primitive does not "contain" the derivative. 
Hegel considers the relation of constants to variables. Of these 
constants, Hegel writes, "it is . . . an indifferent empirical magnitude 
determining the variables only with respect to their empirical quantum 
as limit of their minimum and maximum." (278) Thus, to change 
Hegel's principal example a bit, take x^ + 2 = y. The constant 
determines the minimum of the parabola. Or, if -x^ - 2 = y, 2 becomes 
the maximum of the parabola.^'^ No matter what values y or x take, 2 is 
217 Hegel's text subdivides the Remark into paragraph (a) and paragraph (b), which I have 
followed in my own text. ^ 
218 This is in fact a quadratic equation, and can be expressed as y +0y - x = 0. 
219 These parabolas can be drawn as follows: 
Constant as Maximum/ 
Minimum of Paraboia 
I have changed Hegel's standard example of x = y^ because such a parabola does not properly 
yield a function at all and simultaneously has a minimum and a maximum. This parabola is not a 
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unaffected. Yet 2 itself is related to / by calculus. For instance, a 
straight line (e.g., x = 2y) is made into a parabola (x - r + c) by 
integration.220 jhe "expansion of the binomial generally" shows the 
constant to be related to the roots (278).22i Hegel also writes, "Where, 
in the integral calculus, the constant is determined from the given 
formula, it is to that extent treated as a function of this." (278) "This" 
refers to the "root." Presumably this is illustrated by the fact that the 
"primitive" of the constant 2 is 2x + c, thereby showing that the 
constant 2 is related to the root x (not to mention the additional constant 
c). This indifferent empirical magnitude is actually a relation to what is 
otherwise taken as diverse and unrelated. 
Calculus, Hegel thinks, is most significant for speculative purposes 
when applied to equations of higher powers. The significance of this 
has to do with the major point of Hegel's third chapter of Quantity 
("The Quantitative Relation or Quantitative Ratio"). According to that 
chapter. Quantum recaptures its integrity in this kind of relationship: x-x 
= 16. In such a "ratio" of x to x, no outside mathematician can 
manipulate the value of x, so long as 16 holds fast. The variable x thus 
function because each value of X yields more than one value of y. ^ 
220 Or in other words, 8y/5x = 2x, where y = xl 2x is a straight line, and y - x is a parabolic 
curve. Ttie exact phrase Hegel writes here is "a straight line, for example, has the meanmg of 
being the parameter of a parabola." (278) It is also possible that Hegel has m mmd the directrix 
of a parabola. A parabola is defined is the points equidistant from a straight line (directnx) and a 
y 
Focus 
Pix,y) 
o 
y«-p 
Parabola, Focus and Directrix 
In any case, both these ideas relate the line to the parabolic curve. 
221 Specifically Hegel states, "the coefficient of the first term of the development is the suin of 
the roots, the coefficient of the second is the sum of the products, in pairs." (278) Presumably, 
this remark is explained as follows. In a quadratic equation in the form ax + bx + c 0, x has 
two solutions which are the "roots." Thus, if we have x - 8x + 15 -- 0, x - {3 5}. The above 
formula also can be expressed as (x - 5)(x - 3) = 0. In more general terms, if 3 - r, and^5 - ra, 
then (X - r,)(x - r^) = 0. If we convert (x - r,)(x - rz) = 0 to the quadratic form, we obtam x - nx -
r X + nrj = 0, or x^ - (r, + r2)x + r,r2 = 0. Substituting 3 and 5 back m, (x - 5)(x - 3) x - (3 + 5)x 
+ (3-5) In this last formulation, one can see that, if "the development" of the expansion of the 
binomial excludes x' and includes only (ri + r2)x + rir2, then the coefficient of the first term is fee 
sum of the roots. The second term (which, however, is not a ftmction of x) is a number (or 
"sum") that is the product of the roots. Hence, the constants (a, b, c) are related to the roots (fee 
two magnitudes of x). This, at least, is what I think Hegel is driving at. In any case, Hegel is 
right that the constants are related to the roots. 
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has "being-for-self," and Quantum has recaptured Quality.222 
These moves from Quantity's final chapter explain why Hegel 
emphasizes the significance of variables when they are in a relation of 
powers (as x is in x-x = 16). In such a relation "[t]he altera,tion of 
variables is ... qualitatively determined, and hence continuous." (278) 
By "continuous" Hegel means that x remains what it is (hence 
qualitatively determined) even as it influences the other x. 
In this relationship, it is very important, Hegel says, that what he 
calls the "exponent" x (what we would call the variable) be^ in a 
relationship with itself. The variable "raised" to the first power (x = x) 
may have significance in relation with other, higher powers, but on its 
own, "x is merely any indeterminate quantum." (279) Calculus is 
(spiritually) pointless when applied to equations of the first order (as in 
y = ax' + c). To be sure, we can write 5y/6x = a, but nothing is gained 
from this, in terms of developing the Notion of Quantum. 
(b) Infinite series. In equations of the second order or higher (e.g., 
f = x), "the power is taken as being within itself a relation or a system 
of relations.'' (279) Hegel defines power as "number which has reached 
the stage where it determines its own alteration." (279) In such a 
relation, the "moments of unit and amount are identical." (280) 
Power is always a number. Thus, when 4 is raised to the second 
power, the result is 16, or when cubed, 4 becomes 64. These "powers" 
(16 or 64) could itself be "analysed into an arbitrary amount of numbers 
which have no further determination relatively to one another or then-
sum, other than that together they are equal to the sum." (280) If we 
take 16, these can be split into indifferent parts: 15 + 1 = 16, or 7 + 9-
16. Such a procedure has no philosophic significance. But the power 
could likewise be "split into a sum of differences which are determined 
by the form of the power." (280) That is, if x-x = 16, x has a certain 
qualitative integrity of its own, comparatively immune from outside 
manipulation. _ • u 1 
As Hegel is interested in quadratic formulas at this point, Hegel 
suggests that 16 should be viewed as a sum, or (y + z) — y^ + 2yz + z 
16. Thus, each "radical root" is a binomial (y + z). "[Gjenuine 
universality" is on full display with the binomial. (280) The roots could 
be taken as polynomial, but such "further increase in the number of 
terms is a mere repetition of the same determination and therefore 
meaningless." (280) Once we have a binomial "the law is found.'' (280 
n.l)  The law in question, presumably,  is  the "-qualitative 
determinateness of the terms resulting from the raising to a power of 
the root taken as a sum." (280) 
Hegel says, "This determinateness lies solely in the alteration 
222 Even here, x={4,-4}, so that x is not completely immune from subjectivity. 
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which the potentiation is." (280) Potentiation may be defined as "the 
state of being rendered rnore potent, or more active." (280) Hegel uses 
the phrase "flmetion of potentiation" to deseribe the following series; x° 
= (y + z)" = y" + ny""'z + n(n-l)y"'^z^/2 + n(n-l)(n-2)y"^z /3!... 
Thus, "potentiation" reveals any Quantum to he qualitative at heart—a 
power to some binomial. 
If X (whieh stands for some magnitude) is rendered into a series, x 
ean be shown to eontain within it a power relation. 
But in this connexion it is essential to distinguish another object of 
interest, namely the relation of the fundamental magnitude itself 
(whose determinateness, since it is a complex, i.e. here an equation, 
includes within itself a power) to the functions of potentiation. This 
relation, taken in complete abstraction from the previously 
mentioned interest of the sum, will show itself to be the sole 
standpoint yielded by the practical aspect of the science. (280-81) 
To translate, the "fundamental magnitude" would be the power (16 in 
the expression x^ = 16). The function of potentiation reveals the 
qualitative eore (x) at the heart of any Quantum. Divorced from mere 
arithmetic, the qualitative nature of the relation of powers thus emerges 
from a "spiritual" study of calculus. 
Before this qualitative relation is considered, Hegel wishes to 
dispel a possible implication of what has been said. The variable that is 
self-determined in the power relation (x in x^ = 16) is in fact a system of 
terms. Thus, x" = (y + z)" = / + ny""'z + n(n-l)y""^zV2 + n(n-l)(n-2)y°" 
3zV3! What matters here, Hegel asserts, is not the sum as such, but 
the power relation revealed in the above series. The power relation as 
such can be isolated or abstracted from the "plus" signs of the above 
series. 
But every power likewise has an express "plus sign" in it as the 
preceding power series reveals. This "plus sign" stands for 
indeterminacy, or quantitative difference. Or, in other words, the power 
relation may be an advance over simpler Quantum, but not that much of 
an advance such that it is entirely immune from outside manipulation. 
Even the power relation has (some of its) quality outside itself, as the 
chapters on Measure will emphasize. For this reason, Hegel remarks: 
To treat an equation of the powers of its variables as a relation of the 
functions developed by potentiation can, in the first place, be said to 
223 This is the binomial theorem discovered by Isaac Newton. See BOYER, MATHEMATICS, 
supra note 111, at 393-96; Niccolo Guicciardini, Newton and British Newtonians on the 
Foundation of the Calculus, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, at 167, 170. The text 
reflects a slight change and extrapolation from the Miller translation on which this commentary is 
largely based. According to that source, x° = (y + z)° = y + ny" 'z ... (281) In other words, the 
exponent n is left off the y variable, which is incorrect. The Johnston-Struthers translation does 
not make this error. HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 298 (W.H. Johnston & L.G. Struthers trans., 
1929). 
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be just a matter of choice or a possibility, the utility of such a 
transformation has to be indicated by some further purpose or 
use. .  . (281) 
In other words, quanta do not transform themselves to power 
series. Some outside force must make it happen. The Hegelian motive 
to do so, of course, would be to push in the Logic beyond Quantity into 
Measure. Objective progress in the Logic still depends so far on 
subjective intervention—the so-called "silent fourth" discussed in 
connection with Determinate Being.224 
In the function of potentiation given by Hegel, x" = (y + z)" = y + 
ny" 'z + n(n-l)y" ^ z^/2 + n(n-l)(n-2)y""^z^/3!.... , every term beyond y 
is the derivative of (y + z)" multiplied by z and divided by n! Because 
the derivative is involved in this expansion, the increment (z = 6x) is 
added to the original variable y. According to the mathematicians, 5x 
"is supposed to be not a quantum but only a form, the whole value of 
which is that it assists the development." (282)22^ Euler and Lagrange 
admit that the expansion is intended to produce the coefficients of the 
variables.226 But setting z at 1 instead of an increment would likewise 
preserve coefficients, if that is all that is required.227 Meanwhile, the 
use of 5x = z is to be criticized because 6x "is burdened with the false 
idea of a quantitative difference" which must later be "removed and left 
out." (282) In any case, "the essential point of interest" is the revelation 
of the power relation inherent in any Quantum. (282) This ''power 
determination is immediateF (282) That is, it resists officious 
intermeddling by the mathematician and shows a moment of integrity 
within any Quantum. 
Nor should this "power determination" be defined as the 
coefficient of the first term.228 Apparently, this "quantifies" 6x 
illegitimately. Instead the series should be described as a "derived 
224 Carlson, supra note 4, at 485-88. 
225 In general, Hegel accuses mathematics of quantifying 8x instead of leaving it an 
unnameable quality. Here he perhaps suggests that the practice of mathematics is inconsistent; it 
justifies the addition of the increment because the increment is pure form (qualitative, not 
quantitative). 
226 Hegel's exact sentence: "it is admitted—most categorically by Euler and Lagrange and in 
the previously mentioned concept of limit—that what is wanted is only the resulting power 
determinations of the variables, the so-called coefficients, namely, of the increment and its 
powers, according to which the series is ordered and to which the different coefficients belong " 
(282) 
227 Hegel seems to suggest that Euler and Lagrange hold that y = x - 6x, and that z = 8x, but in 
fact the formula works for any value of z. Hegel also states in this regard: "In order to retain the 
form of a series expanded on the basis of powers, the designations of the exponents as indices 
could equally well be attached to the one." (282) 1 take this remark to mean the following: In the 
power series x" = (y + z)' = y + ny-'z' + n(n-l)y"-V/2 n(n-l)(n-2)y"-^z73! .... the exponent to 
z indexes the terms of the expansion—the amount added to y. If z = 1, Hegel is saying, the 
exponent to z would still effectively index the terms of the expansion. 
228 This can be discerned supra in note 213. 
f 
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function of a power." (283) Presumably, this would signal the 
qualitative nature of 5x. 
Hegel asks, what is to be made of the power relation revealed in 
the function of potentiation? He observes that the series involves a 
decrease in the magnitude of the exponent: thus, n-1 yields to n-2, 
which in turn yields to n-3, as we travel from the fust, second and third 
derivative. This series reflects the nature of space. Thus, x^ describes a 
cube, with height, space and width. The first derivative (3x^) reduces 
the cube to a plane. The second derivative (6x) reduces the plane to a 
line. The calculus amounts to a relation between these various 
dimensions. "The straight line [y = 6x] has an empirical quantum," 
Hegel writes (283). But the plane [3x^] is qualitative; it contains a 
power relation. 
Similarly, with regard to motion, the function of space traversed to 
time elapsed is a quantitative relation—that is, a straight line with no 
power relation. But accelerating or decelerating speed involves a power 
relation and hence is qualitative. 
The differential calculus as applied to these relations appears 
arbitrary, but this would not be the case if one is aware of "the nature of 
the spheres in which its application is permissible." (284) Hegel implies 
that some consideration of a higher order equation to its derivative will 
reveal something on this score. 
Hegel invokes "the simplest example from curves determined by 
an equation of the second degree." (284) For instance, f(x) = x^ + c. 
The fu-st derivative of such a formula produces the slope of the line 
tangent to this curve (2x). Other relevant lines to this curve are the 
"normal," which is perpendicular to the tangent^^^ and the subtangent.^^" 
"The problem," Hegel writes, "consists in finding the connection 
between the relation of these lines and the equation of the curve."(285) 
Tangents. Hegel then launches into a history of the relationship 
between the parabolic curve and the straight line. At first, this relation 
was discovered empirically. Newton's teacher Isaac Barrow set forth a 
method for finding the slope of lines tangent to curves that was distinct 
from Newton's calculus. Barrow would consider a point on a curve— 
say a parabolic curve described as y^ = x, to use Hegel's favorite 
example. He then would take a second point on the curve very close to 
this point. This second point, if below y = x, could be described as (y -
6y)^ = (x - 6x).23i If y^ = X is subtracted from (y - hyf = (x - 6x), the 
229 The normal has a slope that is the negative reciprocal of the slope of the tangent line. 
Thus, if the slope of the tangent is f(x), the slope of the normal is -l/f(x). 
230 The subtangent is the distance on the abscissa, as measured from the line that proceeds 
directly downward from the intersection of the normal and the tangent, to the point where the 
tangent line meets the abscissa. In short, it is the horizontal base of a right triangle. It will 
become important in the pre-calculus method of Isaac Barrow, which is about to be discussed. 
231 These are "the tiny little lines afterwards known as increments in the characteristic triangle 
t m 
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result is 2(6y)(y) - 5y^ = 5x. Since 6y is an infinitesimal, 5y^ is 
infinitely smaller. Therefore, Barrow "gives the instruction, in the form 
of a mere rule, to reject as superfluous the terms which, as a result of 
the expansion of the equations, appears as powers of the said increments 
or as products." (285) 5y^ is the increment to the second power and is 
also the product of increments. If we choose to ignore 6y , then 
2(5y)(y) = Sx. Dividing both sides of this last equation by 5y, we 
obtain 6x/5y = 2y. 
Consider the following diagram: 
O T N M X 
Barrow's Method 
Hegel writes that, in Barrow's method, "for the increments of the 
ordinate and abscissa, the ordinate itself and the subtangent respectively 
are to be substituted." (285) In other words, PR is the increment of the 
ordinate and QR is the increment of the abscissa. The ratio PR/QR is 
equal to the ratio of the "ordinate itself (285) (PM, or / in the above 
formulation) and the subtangent (TM). Or, PR/QR = y^/TM. 
Of this method, Hegel writes: 
The procedure, if one may say so, can hardly be set forth in a more 
schoolmasterlike manner; the latter substitution [PR/QR = //TM] is 
the assumption of the proportionality of the increments of the 
ordinate and the abscissa with the ordinate and the subtangent, an 
assumption on which is based the determination of [the slope of] the 
tangent in the ordinary differential method; in Barrow's rule this 
assumption appears in all its naive nakedness. (285-86) 
In the pre-calculus days of Barrow and Fermat, "[i]t was a mathematical 
craze of those times to find so-called methods, i.e. rules of that kind and 
to make a secret of them." (286) Indeed, Barrow's technique was not 
even a method. Nothing was derived from established principles. 
"[T]he inventors had found only a empirical external rules, not a 
method." (286) Leibniz and Newton generalized the form of such 
empirical rules and thereby "opened up new paths for the sciences." 
(286)"2 
U i a V / U i v c .  ^  J  *  1 1  
232 Leibniz, however, is singled out as having made the transition from magnitude to calculus 
"in the most inadequate manner possible, a manner that is as completely unphilosophical... as it 
was unmathematical." (793) 
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The more genuine way of proeeeding (compared to Barrow's 
method) is as follows. First, "the power forms (of the variables of 
course) contained in the equation are reduced to their first functions." 
(286) The value of the terms of the equation, however, is altered. The 
two functions do not equal each other. Rather, they are simply in a 
relation. 233 The "primitive" function is a curve; the derivative is a line. 
'^But with all this nothing is as yet known" Hegel insists. (286) Even the 
ancients understood Barrow's seventeenth-century method of finding 
the slope of the tangent line by taking the ratio of the ordinate (y) to the 
subtangent. What the moderns added is the direct mode of producing 
the derivative from the primitive function. Nevertheless: 
the imaginary increments of the eo-ordinates and an imaginary 
characteristic triangle formed by them and by an equally imaginary 
increment of the tangent, have been invented in order that the 
proportionality of the ratio found by lowering the degree of the 
equation to the ratio formed by the ordinate and subtangent, may be 
represented, not as something only empirically accepted as an 
already familiar fact, but as something demonstrated. (287) 
In other words, 5y/6x is designed to look familiar and comfortable to 
those familiar with Barrow's method. 
Lagrange rejected "this pretence and took the genuinely scientific 
course." (287) He dispensed with "infinitely small ares, ordinates and 
abscissae" and hence with 6y/6x.234 with regard to 6y/6x, however, 
the line derived "is determined only in so far as it forms the side of a 
triangle." (287) The unique point that conjoins the line and the curve 
also forms a part of the triangle. The tangent line thus has the form p = 
aq. This "determination does not require the additional term, + b which 
is added only on account of the fondness for generality." (288)235 Hegel 
also draws attention to the fact that a = p/q, and the coefficient of a 
(here, 1) is the derivative of dp/dq. Thus, a is "the essential 
determination of the straight line which is applied as tangent to the 
curve."(288) 
233 Hegel writes: "Instead of px - we have p:2y." (286) This is so on the rules of imphcit 
differentiation (a version of the "chain rule"). According to this method, we take the derivative of 
both sides of the equation in terms of x. Hence, dpx/8x = (5y^/8y)(5y/5x), or p = 2y8y/8x. 
Hence, 8y/8x = p/2y. Hegei also poses 2ax - x^ = y^ and suggests that the derivative is a - x:y. 
This must be read as (a - x)/y. That is: 
d2ax/8x - 8x^/8x = (8y^/8y)(8y/8x) 
2a - 2x = 2y(8y/8x) 
8y/8x = (a - x)/y 
234 Cf. BOYER, CALCULUS, supra note 175, at 13 ("The calculus has therefore been gradually 
emancipated from geometry and has been made dependent through the definitions of the 
derivative and the integral, on the notion of the natural numbers "). 
235 Thus, if X = y^, or if x = y^ + b, the derivative is 2y regardless. The "+ b," Hegel charges, is 
added for sentimental reasons. 
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Descartes. In order to show that the straight line produced by 
derivation is the same straight line as the tangent, Descartes (who lived 
more than a century before Lagrange) had recourse to increments of the 
ordinate and the abscissa. "Thus here, too, the objectionable increment 
also makes its appearance." (288) But Descartes must be acquitted of 
the sins of calculus. Descartes was justified because he was acting as a 
geometer, when he asserted that a point on a curve has a unique tangent 
line. "For, as thus determined, the quality of tangent or not-tangent is 
reduced to a quantitative difference." (289) The tangent line is simply 
the smallest line (perhaps in terms of its difference between itself and 
the parabolic curve, which the derived line is supposed to represent). 
Such a relative smallness "contains no empirical element whatever" and 
nothing dependent on a quantum as such." (289) Yet, although reduced 
to quantitative difference, the line is qualitative, if the line is derived 
from a "difference in powers." (289) Apparently referring to the type of 
expansion associated with Isaac Barrow,^^^ Hegel observes that the 
tangent line (when expanded to discover the slope of the line) reveals a 
difference of i and i^ (in Cartesian terms)^^'' or 6y and 6y^ (in Leibnizian 
terms). That i^ is comparatively smaller than i is logically true—a 
qualitative relation. Hence, any attribution of a quantum to i is 
"superfluous and in fact out of place." (289) Hegel thus acquits 
Descartes of relying on infinitesimals in his analysis of the "greater 
smallness" of the tangent line (compared to the parabolic curve). 
Hegel regrets that the Cartesian tangential method is "nowadays 
mostly forgotten." (289) Hegel quotes Descartes as stating that this 
method is "the most useful and most general problem that I know but 
even that I ever desired to know in geometry. Hegel rather 
cryptically describes Descartes' method of finding the slope of the 
tangent. Here is an example of how it worked, with regard to the 
tangent of a given parabolic formula, say y^ = px, to use a formula 
Hegel favors. Descartes first imagined an unknown point on that 
curve—some value of x and y. For ease of illustration, suppose {x, y} 
= p. Descartes then imagined a circle whose center was on the abscissa 
with a distance of h from the origin. If the circle has "equal roots,"^^^ 
236 It will be recalled that Barrow started with = x and expanded both x and y by an 
increment: (y - 5y)^ = x - 5x. The original formula, y^ = x, was subtracted from (y - 5y) = x - 8x, 
and the result was 2(5y)(y) - 6y^ = 8x. Since 6y is an infinitesimal, 8y^ is infinitely smaller. This 
authorized Barrow to simply ignore 8y^. See supra text accompanying notes 229-32. 
237 Here i stands for an increment. 
238 Miller leaves this quoted in untranslated French. The translation provided follows BOYER, 
MATHEMATICS, supra note 111, at 166. 
239 The roots of a quadratic equation are equal when the "discriminant" is equal to zero. The 
discriminant is h^ - 4ac in the standard solution to quadratic equations: 
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the radius of this circle is the "normal," which is perpendicular to the 
tangent. If we know the slope of the normal, we know the slope of the 
tangent, which is merely its inverse reciprocal. 
The slope of the normal is defined as the ratio of the ordinate (y = 
p) and the "subnormal" (h - Hence, h is the unknown that must be 
calculated to solve the problem. 
The general formula for a circle whose center is not at the origin is 
+ y^ - 2hx - 2ky + k^ + h^ - r^ = Because the center of this circle 
on the abscissa, k = 0, thereby simplifying the formula. Meanwhile, r^ = 
(x - h)^ + (y - k)^, by the Pythagorean theorem. Since {x, y} = p, then r^ 
= (h - p)^ + p^. Substituting this expression of r^, we obtain x^ + y^ - 2hx 
+ h^ - [(h - p)^ + p^] = 0, or, more simply, x^ + y^ - 2hx + 2ph - 2p^ = 0. 
From the given parabola, we know that y^ = px. Substituting, we have 
x^ + px - 2hx + 2ph - 2p^ = 0. Rearranged in the form of a quadratic, we 
have x^ + (p - 2h)x + (2ph - 2p^) = 0. Where h = 3p/2,2''2 the quadratic 
equation just given has equal roots (p, p). Therefore the slope of the 
normal is -p/(h-p) = -p/(1.5p)-p = Since the slope of the tangent is 
-b+V - 4ac 
2a 
Quadratic Equation 
For instance, given (x - 3)^ = 0, the two roots are obviously 3. The discriminant is zero, because h 
= 6, a = 1, and c = 9. 
240 Just as the subtangent is space on the abscissa underneath the tangent line, so the 
subnormal is like space under the normal. 
241 The formula for a circle whose center is the origin is the Pythagorean theorem: r^ = 
where x and y are points on the circle. If the center is not the origin, the formula becomes (x - h)^ 
+ (y - k)^ = r^, where h is the distance from the center to the ordinate and k is the distance from 
the center to the abscissa. Multiplied out, the formula becomes x^ + / - 2hx - 2hx - 2ky + k^ + h^ 
= r^. Subtracting both sides of the formula by r^, we obtain the "standard form" of the circle's 
formula: x^ + y^ - 2hx - 2hx - 2ky + k^ + h^ - r^ = 0. 
242 This conclusion is reached by use of the discriminant, b^ = 4ac, which holds when the 
quadratic equation has equal roots. See supra note 239. In the expression x^ + (p - 2h)x + (2ph -
2p^) = 0, a = I, b = (p - 2h), c = (2ph - 2p^). Substituting this into b^ = 4ac: 
(p - 2h)^ = 4(2ph - 2p^) 
. 4ph + 4h^ = 8ph - 8p^ 
9p^ - 12hp + 4h^ = 0 
Once again we exploit the fact that, where roots are equal, b^ - 4ac = 0. Because this is so, the 
standard solution to the quadratic equation reduces to x = -b/2a. In the last quadratic expression, 
X = p, a = 9, b = -12h. Hence, p = 12h/18 and h = 3p/2. 
243 The slope is negative because x and y are in reciprocal relations with regard to the normal. 
Below is a diagram of the Cartesian progress in question. 
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the negative reciprocal, the tangent's slope is 1/2. 
Is this the result that calculus obtains? Using the technique of 
implicit differentiation on = px, we obtain 5y/5x = p/2y. But since it 
is given that y = p, we obtain 6y/5x = 
This ability to obtain the tangent algebraically and without any use 
of the increment is, according to Hegel: 
the brilliant device of a genuinely analytical mind, in comparison 
with which the dogmatically assumed proportionality of the 
subtangent and the ordinate with postulated infinitely small, so-
called increments, of the abscissa and ordinate drops into the 
backgrounds. (290)^'*^ 
Hegel complains that "it is by no means self-evident that such a 
derivative equation is also correct." (290) The derivative "yields only a 
proportion" between 8y and 5x. (290) Yet y and x are quanta. These 
can be made into infinite series—"functions of potentiation." When this 
is done, the values of x and y are altered. Now it is no longer certain 
that the proportion that previously governed in 5y/5x still holds. "All 
that the equation 5y/6x = P expresses is that P is a ratio and no other 
real meaning can be ascribed to 6y/6x. But even so, we still do not 
know of this ratio = P, to what other ratio it is equal." (291) 
Furthermore, Hegel charges, calculus claims, for instance, that, 
where (x-3)^=0, 6(x - 3)^/5x = 2x - 6, but it fails to validate this 
conclusion. It is validated "from another source"—from the Cartesian 
244 Hegel points out that, in a quadratic equation with equal roots, the coefficient of the term 
containing the unknown in the first power is twice the single root (in terms of its absolute value). 
This can be seen easily in (x - 3)^ = - 6x + 9 = 0. Obviously, the unique answer is x = 3, and 
this is half the coefficient of the second term (|6|). Consider also the derivative of the above 
formula—2x -6 = 0. Calculus obviously agrees that the derivative is related to a quadratic 
equation in which a unique root is half the coefficient of the second term. (To be precise, Hegel 
uses the examples of d(x - ax - b)/8x = 2x - a, and d(x^ - px p q)/5x = 3x^ - p. I have changed the 
example to something more easily digested.) 
245 Brilliant Descartes' method may have been, but the above example involves x = y = p. For 
any other value of x and y, Descartes' method becomes, at best, monstrously complex. It is no 
wonder that Descartes' method is "nowadays mostly forgotten," (289) as calculus fmds the slope 
of the tangent with delightful ease, for any point on the curve. 
x'+/-2hx+2ph-2p^=0 
Cartesian Tangential Method 
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algebraic method of equal roots. (291) Instead what calculus does with 
(x - 3)^ = 0, is to equate zero with y and proceed accordingly. 
Calculus has this further fault. Given that quanta are equally 
functions of potentiation, it ought to explain that any magnitude is the 
function of other magnitudes. It does not do so. It simply leaves the 
magnitudes as given. 
The Omitted Constant. With regard to x^ - 6x + 9 = (x - 3)^ = 0, 
the derivative function is 2x - 6. The constant (9) is omitted without 
discussion. Hegel thinks that this omission means that, according to 
calculus, the constant plays no part in the determination of the roots if 
these roots are equal. The determination of the roots was exhausted, by 
the coefficient of the second term of the quadratic equation. But this is 
not so. In Descartes's example (and in the example just given), the 
constant was the square of the roots, which therefore can be determined 
from the constant as well as from the coefficients. The constant is thus 
a function of the roots. 
Terminology. Hegel offers an observation about the names 
"differentiation" and "integration." The character of these operations 
belie their names. To differentiate is to posit differences. But the result 
of differentiating is to reduce the dimensions of an equation, and to omit 
the constant is to remove an element of difference. The roots of the 
variables are made equal. Their difference is canceled. 
Meanwhile, in integration, the constant must be added again. The 
previously canceled difference is restored. The names assigned to these 
operations help to obscure the essential nature of the matter—the 
qualitative nature of the increment. 
Mechanics.Physicists have their own interpretation of the 
differential calculus. Velocity (or motion) has already been 
mentioned. 248 The formula s = ct,249 "offers no meaning for 
differentiation." (292) But the equation for the motion of a falling body 
(s = at^)25o does so, and 6s/5t = 2at. 2at "is translated into language, and 
This is my interpretation of the following passage: 
The functional calculus, it is true, is supposed to deal with functions of potentiation and 
the differential calculus with differentials; but it by no means follows from this alone 
that the magnitudes from which the differentials or functions of potentiation are taken, 
are themselves supposed to be only functions of other magnitudes. Besides, in the 
theoretical part, in the instruction to derive the differentials, i.e. the functions of 
potentiation, there is no indication that the magnitudes which are to be subjected to 
such treatment are themselves supposed to be functions of other magnitudes. (291) 
247 '"Mechanics' refers to the study of the rest and motion of bodies . . . under the action of 
normal mechanical forces ... Its principal eoneems are space and time, motion and flow, force 
and energy, mass and inertia, equilibrium and disequilibrium, impact and elasticity." Ivor 
Grattan-Guinness, Hegel's Heritage in Applied Mathematics, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, 
supra note 11, at 201, 202. 
248 5ee iupro text accompanying notes 197-99. 
249 Where s is distance, t is time, and e is velocity. 
250 In this formula, a stands for the acceleration effect of gravity. 
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also into existence" (293) as a factor in a sum. The sum is the attractive 
force of gravity and 2at is supposed to be "the force of inertia, i.e. of a 
simply uniform motion." (293) 2at implies "that in infinitely small parts 
of time the motion is uniform, but in finite parts of time, i.e. in actually 
existent parts of time, it is non-uniform." (293) 2at implies "that if 
gravity ceased to act, the body, with the velocity reached at the end of 
its fall, would cover twice the distance it had traversed, in the same 
period of time as its fall." (293) This, Hegel proclaims, is unsatisfactory 
metaphysics. "[T]he end of the period of time in which the body has 
fallen, is itself still a period of time; if it were not, there would be 
assumed a state of rest and hence no velocity." (293) 
When physics uses the differential in arenas in which there is no 
motion, "even more illegitimate formalism of inventing an existence 
occurs.'(293) Hegel thinks this occurs in the analysis of the behavior of 
light ("apart from what is called its propagation in space") and m the 
application of quantitative determinations to colors. (293) 
The motion described by s = at^ is found empirically in falling 
bodies. The next simplest motion is s = ct^, but no such motion is found 
in nature. Yet s^ = at^ is Kepler's third law of the motion of planets in 
the solar system, Hegel says.^^' Now 6s/5t = 2at/3s Hegel suggests 
that a theory that explains the motions of the planets from the starting 
point of 2at/3s^ "must indeed present an interesting problem in which 
analysis would display a brilliance most worthy of itself. (294) Perhaps 
Hegel is being sarcastic here.^^^ 
The application of calculus to physics is not interesting, Hegel 
complains.254 gut the analysis of trajectory (in ballistics) is significant. 
251 Here s stands for the semimajor axis of an ellipse—i.e., the farthest distance possible 
between the planet and the center of the sun. The variable t stands for the period of the orbit (for 
earth, one year). . j r 
252 This is so on the implied differential method, wherein we differentiate both sides ot 
Kepler's formula by t. Hence 5sV5t = (5sV6s)(8s/8t) = 3s\8s/8t), and 8at /8t = 2at. Combining 
these results: 
3s\8s/8t) = 2at 
8s/8t = 2at/3s^ 
253 Hegel believed Newton's fame was unjustified—that he merely reformulated Kepler's 
third law, and that Kepler deserved the crown. Science of Logic at 343-44; see also id. at 365 
(complaining that Newton's great reputation protects his theories from criticism); PHILOSOPHY 
OF NATURE, supra note 200, § 270 ("It has subsequently become customary to speak as if Newton 
were the first to have discovered the proof of these laws. The credit for a discovery has seldom 
been denied a man with more unjustness."). This, commentators complain, is unfair to Newton, 
who unified Kepler's and Galileo's laws in a single theory of gravitation. Borzeszkowski, supra 
note 53, at 78; Wahsner, supra note 197, at 87-88. One commentator suggests that Hegel was 
guilty of "grotesquely exaggerated patriotism." Ihmig, supra note 206, at 400. But see Robert 
Weinstock, A Worm in Newton's Apple, in HEGEL AND NEWTONIANISM, supra note 11, at 430 
(strongly agreeing that Newton is overrated). 
254 Borzeszkowski disagrees and states that Hegel "ignores the fact that [6x/6y] creates a new 
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if trajectory is a curve defined by the higher powers. To construct such 
a curve, transitions are required from "rectilinear frinctions i.e., 
straight lines. (294) In other words, a cannon ball exits the muzzle of the 
cannon in a straight line but, thanks to gravity, converts its trajectory 
into a parabolic curve. These rectilinear functions, "as functions of 
potentiation," are derivatives that must be "obtained from the original 
equation of motion containing the factor of time." (294) The factor of 
time, however, is eliminated when the rectilinear functions are derived, 
and the powers in the original equation are "reduced to lower functions 
of development." (294) Such considerations lead to "the interesting 
feature of the other part of the differential calculus" (294)—^presumably 
the part that deals with infinite series. 
The Integral Calculus. Hegel has now concluded his comments on 
the differential calculus.His next subject is the integral calculus. 
Hegel thinks it to be an advance that the integral calculus no longer 
views itself as a method of summation.^^^ 
The integral calculus, "as everyone knows," is the converse of the 
differential calculus. (295) The starting point is the derived function, 
and one travels back to the "primitive"^" function from which the first 
function is derived. 
What is the meaning of the primitive formula that the integral 
calculus discovers? The ratio of the abscissa and the ordinate. The 
differential calculus, on the other hand, deals only with the ratio of 
Sy/6x. 
The usual method of the integral calculus entails the use of the 
quantity, and that on account of the duality in space-time and velocity, it also created the 
possibility of representing physically the fact that "to move means ... to be in this place and not 
to be in, at one and the same time." Borzeszkowski, supra note 52, at 78 (footnote omitted) 
(citing 1 G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 273 (E.S. Haldane trans., 
1963)). Borzeszkowski also chastises Hegel, who spends much time on Lagrange, for having 
neglected Lagrange's Analytical Mechanics, which, Borzeszkowski feels, would have beeii 
instructive. Finally, Hegel wrongly accused physics of asserting the self-identicality of rest and 
motion and an inability to describe how one changes into another. Borzeszkowski asserts that 
physics views "rectilinear uniform motion as being equivalent to rest." Borzeszkowski, supra, at 
80. 
255 He terminates with this grand summary: 
Its nature has been found to consist in this, that from an equation of power fiincUons 
the coefficient of the term of the expansion, the so-called first function, is obtained, 
and the relation which this first function represents is demonstrated in moments of the 
concrete subject matter, these moments being themselves determined by the equation 
so obtained between the two relations. (294) 
To translate, calculus reveals a relation—8y/8x. The differentials (8x and 8y) are the qualitative 
moments in Quantum. x- • • i. • . i 
256 Integral calculus stands basically for the area under a curve. One view of it is that integral 
calculus adds together the infinitely narrow rectangles that run from the curve to the abscissa. 
This vision of summation, however, is what Hegel is rejecting. According to Boyer, [tjhe 
definite integral is defmed in mathematics as the limit of an infmite sequence and not as the sum 
of an infinite number of points, lines, or surfaces." BOYER, CALCULUS, supra note 175, at 50. 
257 Hegel calls this the "original formula." (297) 
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infinitesimal difference. Thus, the area under a curve is infinitely 
divided up into "trapezia" (296)—that is, trapezoids whose parallel 
sides are the ordinate (yo) and another ordinate (yO separated only by 
6x. The unparallel sides of the trapezoid are the abscissa and the curve 
itself. The area under the curve is thus the rectangle entirely under the 
curve, plus the right triangle sitting atop the rectangle, formed by the 
abscissa, the ordinate and the arc. "[T]he square of the arc element is 
supposed to be equal to the sum of the squares of the two other 
infinitely small elements." (296)^58 
The primitive formula derived fi'om a function taken as a 
derivative is the area under the curve that the formula expresses.^s? The 
derivative constitutes the "quadrated curve" at the top of infinitely 
narrow trapezoid under the curve. But, Hegel complains, the integral 
calculus mechanically notes the relation between the derivative and the 
primitive—that these constitute a proportion. It "spares itself the 
trouble of demonstrating the truth of what it simply presupposes as a 
fact." (297) The integral calculus has "found out from results already 
known elsewhere, that certain specific aspects of a mathematical object 
stands in the relation to each other of the original to the derived 
function." (297) 
In the integral calculus, the primitive function is derived. The 
derivation is given. But it is 
not directly given, nor is it at once evident which part or element of 
the mathematical object is to be correlated with the derived function 
in order that by reducing this to the original function there may be 
found that other part or element, whose magnitude is required to be 
determined. (297) 
In other words, a ratio is formed between the derivation and the 
primitive, but the sides of the ratio are not really described by the 
integral calculus. "The usual method" is to assign to the derivative the 
status of the infinitely small. (297) This derivative (taken as the top of 
the trapezoid whose sides are the ordinate and whose bottom is 6x) 
produces a right triangle of three infinitely small sides—the derivative 
as hypotenuse, the ordinate and abscissa as the other two sides. This 
triangle, together with the rectangle below it, make up the area under 
258 xhis is an extremely loose interpretation of Hegel's rather mystifying interpretation. In 
order to compensate for the curve's failure to be parallel to the abscissa, the integral calculus 
takes the average of the two ordinates and forms a rectangle, which is roughly bisected by the 
curve. This corresponds to taking the area of the rectangle entirely below the curve, plus the 
"right triangle" that sits atop this rectangle. ^ 
259 This can be seen as follows. Take a primitive function, such as y - x . by/Ox - 2x. 
Integral calculus now describes the primitive as y = hx8x. This last expression (ExSx) 
represents the ordinate (y=x^ + c) times the abscissa (8x). In short, the area under the curve is 
divided into infinite quasi-rectangles, as defmed.by the ordinate times the abscissa. Such is the 
meaning of the expression i2x8x. The integral sign (f) indicates summation of all these quasi-
rectangles, thereby encompassing all the area under the curve. 
2128 C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 23:6 
the curve, once the totality of such trapezoids are summed. 
The transition from such so-called elements of the area, the arc, etc., 
to the magnitude of the total area or the whole arc itself, passes 
merely for the ascent from the infinite expression to the finite 
expression, or to the sum of the infinitely many elements of which 
the required magnitude is supposed to consist. (298) 
That is, 5x or 6y represent infinite, qualitative moments. Yet the 
integral calculus makes finite what is truly infinite—a Notional fault. 
For this reason, "[it] is therefore merely superficial to say that the 
integral calculus is simply the converse of the differential calculus." 
(298) 
Lagrange. Lagrange did not smooth out these problems. "The 
declared object of his method" was to "provide an independent proof of 
the fact that between particular elements of a mathematical whole, for 
example, of a curve, there exists a relation of the original to the derived 
function." (298) In other words, Lagrange undertook to prove the truth 
of integral calculus, but could not proceed directly, because the 
derivative contains "terms which are qualitatively distinct"—that is, 5x 
or 5y, which are not quantities. All that can be shown is "the mean 
between a greater and a less." (298) In other words, the integral 
calculus always takes a rectangle defined by 6x at the base and two 
infinitely close ordinates as the vertical sides. These sides are averaged, 
so that, in the resulting rectangle, the average ordinate is always too 
great or too small for the area under the curve. From this it is 
"deduced" that "the function of the ordinate is the derived, first function 
of the function of the area." (298)^®° 
Archimedes. Hegel sees Lagrange translating Archimedean 
principles into modern terms. Archimedes taught that 
the arc of a curve is greater than its chord and smaller than the sum 
of the two tangents drawn through the end points of the arc and 
contained between these points and the point of intersection of the 
tangents. (299) 
Archimedes' method was, through repetition, to render the 
difference between arc and the chords or tangents smaller and smaller 
through subdivision.^®' 
260 Hegel puts it this way: 
From the development of the condition that the required magnitude is greater than the 
one easily determinable limit and smaller than the other, it is then deduced that, e.g. the 
function of the ordinate is the derived, first function of the function of the area. (299) 
It is generally true that the differential caleulus views the curve as the fust derivative of the area 
under the eurve. That is, the plane is rendered into a line by differential calculus. 
261 Archimedes was important in the history of the calculus. See BOYER, CALCULUS, supra 
note 175, at 50-53. Archimedes calculated the area under an arc by fmding the area of the 
triangle, which we will call A. He then took the lines XZ and YZ as the bases of two new 
triangles with their vertex on the curve. The areas of these triangles were found to be V* of A. 
Again, each side of these new triangles became the bases of newer triangles, whose area was 
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"[T]he formalism of the infinitesimal directly presents us with the 
equation 6z^ = 6x^ + 6y^," Hegel writes (299). This must be taken as an 
example of the Pythagorean theorem, and it reflects the fact that the 
integral calculus measures infinitesimal changes at the top of each 
infinitely narrow trapezoid beneath a curve. Lagrange, starting from 
this premise, showed that "the length of the arc is the original fimction 
to a derived function whose characteristic term is itself a function 
coming from the relation of a derived function to the original function 
of the ordinate." (299) In other words, there is a circular relation to 
differential and integral calculus. Differential calculus produces the 
derivative from the primitive, and integral calculus produces the 
primitive from the derivative.^^^ 
calculated to be 14 of the prior triangles. This was continued so long as patience held out. The 
sum of all the triangles constituted the area under the arc. Archimedes calculated this to he 
A(14 + '/4^ + '/4^ ... 1/4""') = (4/3)A 
The higher the value of n, the more the answer approached (4/3)A. 
262 Antonio Moretto reads Hegel as pointing to Lagrange's apagogic reasoning (reasoning hy 
process of elimination). Lagrange assumed a curve, y = f(x) > 0. The area under this curve, 
hounded hy the ordinate, abscissa and some value of y, is F(x). Assume y is increasing between x 
and (x + i). Now let us isolate the area under (x + i) - x as F(x + i) - F(x). It is true that 
(1) if(x) < F(x + i) - F(x) < if(x + i) 
This expresses the fact that the height of the ordinate—f(x)—times the / (the increment in x) is 
less than the height of the ordinate further on times the increment—or if(x + i). In other words, 
f(x) is rising over this interval. Meanwhile, the area of the interval—F(x + i) - F(x)—is an 
average of the rectangles described solely hy if(x) or if(x + i). 
Lagrange next uses the Newtonian binomial expansion, supra note 181, hut truncates the 
series. He stipulates: 
(2) £(x+i) = f(x) + if(x+j) 
Strictly speaking, the binomial expansion method implies that the very last term of (2) is if(x), 
hut j is defined as 0 < j < i. In other words, j is an increment smaller than the smallest increment. 
Basically, (2) as rearranged states: 
(3) [f(x + i)-f(x)]/i = f(x+j) 
The expression in (3) simply says that the slope (f(x + j)) is the ratio of the difference between 
the ordinates f(x + i) - f(x) divided hy the abscissa (i). 
Next, Lagrange expands F(x + i) hut truncates the series at the end of the third term of the 
expansion. 
(4) F(x + i) = F(x) + iF'(x) + i^F"(x + j)/2 
(2) and (4) are now substituted into (1) to obtain 
(5) i[F'(x) - f(x)] + fF"(x + j)/2 < i^f(x + j) 
Lagrange now draws attention to [F'(x) - f(x)]. He reasons (apagogically) that either [F'(x) - f(x)] 
= 0, or it does not. If not, (4) does not hold universally. Hence, hy apagogic reasoning, F'(x) -
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Both Archimedes's method and Kepler's "treatment of 
stereometric objects"^®^ entail use of the infinitesimal, and this 
prestigious heritage, Hegel complains, "has often been cited as an 
authority for the employment of this idea in the differential calculus." 
(299)264 "xi^e infinitesimal signifies, strictly, the negation of quantum as 
quantum" (299)—the proposition that, Hegel repeatedly charges, 
mathematicians do not confi-ont. The methods of Valerio^®^ ^nd 
Cavalieri^^^ get better marks. Their work centered on the relations 
between geometrieal objects. "[T]he fundamental principle is that the 
quantum as such of the objects concerned, which are primarily 
considered only in their eonstituent relations, is for this purpose to be 
left out of account, the objects thus being taken as non-quantitative.'" 
(299-300) They fall short, however, of bringing to the fore the 
"affirmative aspect" or ''qualitative determinateness" of 5x (300).^®'' 
This aspect will be made explicit, Hegel promises, in his discussion of 
the Ratio of Powers, with which Quantity finally concludes.^^^ 
Lagrange, however, is credited with bringing this affirmative aspect to 
notice, "with the result that the procedure which is burdened with an 
unlimited progression is given its proper limit." (300) 
Hegel concludes this second longest of all remarks by reaffirming 
f(x) = 0, or F'(x) = f[x), and thus integral calculus is vindicated. See Moretto, supra note 103, at 
158-59. 
The expression in (5) can be usefully interpreted if we divide both sides of the inequality 
by i and then solve for i. We get: 
(6) i > [F'(x) - fl:x)]/[f(x -t j) -(F"(x + j)/2)] 
If I can think of an i larger than the right side of the inequality, then (1)—true by definition—is 
true only if F'(x) - f(x) = 0. 
That Lagrange was guilty of alternation between a segment too large and a segment too 
small can be seen in (1), where if(x) < if(x -I- i). Nevertheless, Hegel praises Lagrange's method 
because it proves an insight into the translation of the Archimedean method into the 
principle of modem analysis, thus enabling us to see into the inner, true meaning of the 
procedure which in the other method is carried out mechanically. (299) 
In other words, Archimedes' method was literally exhaustive and mechanical, but Lagrange was 
able, albeit through apagogic reasoning, to calculate the area under a curve without exhaustion. 
263 Stereometry is the art of measuring solids. 
264 Hegel may be thinking of Simon L'Huilier, who, in a "prize-winning essay" published in 
1787, proposed that "the method of the ancients, known under the name of Method of 
Exhaustion, conveniently extended, suffices to establish with certainty the principles of the new 
calculus." BOYER, CALCULUS, supra note 175, at 255 (citing L'FIuilier's Exposition elementaire 
des principes des calculs superieurs). 
265 Luca Valerio is the author of De Centro Gravitatis Solidorum. In this work, he anticipated 
the notion of limit later adopted in calculus. See BOYER, CALCULUS, supra note 175, at 104-07. 
266 Buonaventura Cavaliere was Galileo's student who favored use of the indivisible. Id. at 
117. Boyer describes Cavalieri as not sharing "the Aristotelian view of infmity as indicating a 
potentiality only . . . ." Id. 
267 The affirmative nature of Quantum's quality becomes a major theme in Hegel's chapter on 
Quantitative Relation. See infra text accompanying notes 287-305. 
268 See infra text accompanying notes 296-300. 
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that his goal is to describe the Notion, not to reform calculus as such. In 
any case, a review of calculus for its appreciation of Quantum's Notion 
would have been inductive only (and hence of poor truth content). 
The subject matter of the calculus, Hegel says, is "the relation 
between a power function and the fimction of its expansion or 
potentiation, because this is what is most readily suggested by an insight 
into the nature of the subject matter." (298) The calculus readily 
exploits addition, logarithms, and "circular functions," but these are 
merely convenient to the enterprise—not essential. The calculus has "a 
more particular interest in common with the form of series namely, to 
determine those functions of expansion which in the series are called 
coefficients of the terms." (301)2^9 The calculus, however, concerns 
itself with the relation of the original function to the coefficient of the 
first term. The series aims at exhibiting a number in the form of a sum. 
The infinite on display in the series has nothing in common with the 
affirmative qualitative determination on display in the calculus. 
In the calculus, Hegel complains, an expansion occurs by means of 
the "the infinitesimal in the shape of the incrementr (301)2™ But this is 
achieved "externally," by the will of the mathematici^. 
Mathematicians do not develop the notional implication of ox. The 
series, "which in fact is not what is wanted" by consumers of the 
calculus, has the fault of producing "an excess"—a remainder "the 
elimination of which causes the unnecessary trouble." (301) Lagrange 
favored the series and so had this difficulty. But Lagrange's method at 
least brought to notice "what is truly characteristic of the calculus. 
(301) The forms of 6x and 5y are not forced into objects by Lagrange. 
Lagrange "directly demonstrated to which part of the object the 
determinateness of the derived fimction (fimction of expansion) 
belongs." (301) 
Remark 3: Further Forms Connected With the Qualitative 
Determinateness of Magnitude 
In the previous Remark, Hegel emphasized the qualitative nature 
of the infinitesimal. This qualitative dimension was present in the 
power fimction—a fimction involving x^ or a higher power. There is a 
weaker form as well, which is the subject of this remark. This form 
appears in the context of geometry. 
From the analytical side, power relations are formal and 
269 It will be recalled that the derivative is, in effect, the coefficient of the first term, as m 
8y/8x = 5, where f(x) = 5x + c. The Maclaurin series was likewise an infmite series of the 
coefficient ofthe first term. See iwpra note 170. 
270 This can be observed in the difference quotient, described supra m the text accompanymg 
notes 169-73. 
2132 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:6 
homogeneous. "[T]hey signify numerical magnitudes which as such do 
not possess that qualitative difference from each other." (302) But when 
these concepts are used by geometers, qualitative determinateness is 
"manifested as the transition from linear to planar determinations, from 
determinations of straight lines to those of curves, and so on." (302) 
Spatial objects, as Hegel had earlier emphasized,^^^ are by nature 
"given in the form of continuous magnitudes." (302) But they likewise 
are to be taken as discrete. Thus, a plane is an aggregate of lines, the 
line an aggregate of points. 
Integral calculus derives the point from the line, or the line from 
the plane. (For example, given a point designated as 5, the line 5x + c 
can be derived through the integral calculus.) The starting point is 
simple, compared to the concrete, continuous magnitude that is derived. 
It is important, however, that the starting point be self-determined. That 
is, the point is without dimensions. It is not "determined," but rather 
determines itself. The point, then, like 5x, is qualitative.272 
Hegel calls the summation of points into a line or of lines into a 
plane the "direct method." (303) This may be compared to the indirect 
method that begins with limits; between these limits lie the self-
determined element—the goal toward which the method advances. For 
example, if we may speak of the area of the circle, 7i is an infinite series. 
Hence the area of a circle (nr^) only approaches the limit because K is 
never complete. Between the limit and Ttr^ there is always a remainder. 
The result in both methods comes to the same thing—the law for 
progressively determining the required magnitude without the 
possibility of reaching the perfect, finite determination demanded. 
Kepler was the first to develop the direct method, starting with the 
discrete as the starting point. He expresses this in his analysis of 
Archimedes' first proposition of cyclometry.273 According to this first 
proposition, "a circle is equal to a right-angled triangle having one of 
the sides enclosing the right angle equal to the [radius] and the other to 
the circumference of the cirele." (303)274 Kepler interpreted this to mean 
that the circumference has infinite points in it, each of which could be 
271 See supra text accompanying note 92. 
272 It will be recalled that the point as automatically generative of the line first appeared in 
Hegel's discussion of Limit. See Carlson, supra note 4, at 521-22. The point that immediately 
goes outside of itself may fairly be called quantitative, but to the extent it logically produces the 
line proves that the point is immune from external reflection and therefore is also qualitative. On 
the point as leading from the derivation of time and space in Hegel's philosophy of nature, see 
Lawrence S. Stepelevich, Hegel's Geometric Theory, in HEGEL AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE (Stephen Houlgate ed., 1998). 
273 Cyclometry is the measurement of circles. 
224 Miller erroneously writes "diameter" instead of radius. Since the circumference is 2jtr and 
the radius is r, and since the area of the right triangle is '/2(27cr)(r), the area of the right triangle is 
Ttr^, the area of a cirele. 
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regarded as the base of an isosceles triangle."5 The apex of each 
trilngle is the center of the circle. In this vision, the circle becomes an 
infinite set of extremely thin "pie slices," and the area could thus be 
calculated"^ "[H]e thus gives expression to the resolution ot the 
continuous into the form of the discrete." (303) This description of the 
infinite, however, "is still far removed from the definition it is supposed 
to have in the differential calculus." (303) Discrete elements 
can only be externally summed up . .. [T]he analytic transition from 
these ones is made only to their sum and is not simultaneously the 
geometrical transition from the point to the line or from the line to 
the plane. (304) 
Hegel implies that only speculative philosophy can draw from discrete 
poiSs or line the continuous quality that they have with lines or 
I3I3.IICS 
A moment of qualitative transition occurs, which entails recouree 
to the infinitely small. This recourse, Hegel says, is the difficulty. To 
dispense with this expedient, "it would have to be possible to show that 
the analytic procedure itself which appears as a mere summation, m tact 
already contains a multiplication^ (304) +1, 
But such an admission involves a fresh assumption about me 
application of arithmetical relations to geometrical figures. According 
to this assumption, arithmetical multiplication constitutes a transition to 
a higher dimension. Thus, the multiplication of lines produces a plane. 
(For example, the area of a square with side x is x .) Here 
multiplication is not merely an alteration of magnitude, but the 
production of a qualitative spatial character. Repeating themes from 
earlier chapters,"^ Hegel insists that "the transition of J® Ime into a 
plane must be understood as the self-externalization of the line. (304) 
Likewise the point externalizes itself into the line and the plane into a 
volume 279 
With regard to the transition from plane to volume, Hegel remarks 
that the self-externality of a plane (two dimensions) should involve the 
multiplication of a plane by a plane, thereby creating a four-dunensional 
object "[G]eometrical determination," however, reduces ttie 
dimensions to three." (305) This is because space, "represented as an 
expansion outward from the point," is "a concrete determinateness 
275 An isosceles triangle is one that has two equal sides. 
276 5ee Moore, it/pra note 173, at 139-41. .u • f h,it 
277 I, can be noted here that Archimedes' simple method does not rely on the mfmitesimal, bu 
Kepler's method does so rely-a Hegelian fault. See Moretto, supra note 103, at 160. 
278 Carlson, supra note 4, at 520-23. ,u r,t thp 
279 "This " Hegel states, "is the same as the representation of the Ime as the m 
point, and so forth." (304-05) Motion, however, includes a determination o^ime 
in this representation rather as merely a contingent, external alteration of state. (305) This 
so "from the standpoint of the Notion which was expressed as a self- extemahzation. (305) 
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beyond the line in the third dimension." (305) Hegel suggests that 
Kepler's law (s^ = at^)^®" has a spatial side, which is geometrical, and a 
temporal side which is merely arithmetical. 
"It will now be evident," Hegel observes, "without further 
comment, how the qualitative element here considered differs from the 
subject of the previous Remark." (305) In the power relation at the heart 
of notional calculus, "the qualitative element lay in the determinateness 
of power." (305) This point relates to what Hegel will say of the Ratio 
of Powers in the next chapter: when x-x = 16, x determines itself, so 
long as 16 stays fixed. This self-determination is qualitative in nature 
and stands for Quantum's recapture of its being, which was entirely 
external at the beginning of Quantity. 
The Quality present in geometry is different. "[HJere, like the 
infinitely small, it is only the factor as arithmetically related to the 
product, or as the point to the line or the line to the plane, and so on." 
(305) The qualitative transition from the discrete to the continuous "is 
effected as a process of summation." (305) 
This summation, however, does imply multiplication. This comes 
into view when the area of a trapezoid (or "trapezium," as Hegel's 
translator calls it) is said to be the sum of two opposite horizontal, 
parallel lines, divided by two, times the height.^^i The height is 
represented to be the set of infinite lines which must be summed up. 
These lines "must at the same time be posited with negation." (306) 
That is, they are so infinitely narrow that "they have their determination 
solely in the linear quality of the parallel limits of the trapezium." (306) 
These trapezoids "can be represented as the terms of an arithmetical 
progression, having a simply uniform difference which does not, 
however, require to be determined, and whose first and last terms are 
these two parallel lines.(306) The sum of such a series, Hegel, 
explains is "the product of the parallels and half the amount or number 
of terms." (306) This product is "the specific magnitude of something 
which is continuous'"—the height of trapezoids without width. (306) 
This sum can be viewed as the "multiplication of lines by lines." (306) 
That is, the sum is a geometric area—"something having the quality of a 
plane." (306) Implicated is "the qualitative element of the transition 
from the dimension of line to that of plane." (306) 
280 It will be recalled that s stands for the setnimajor axis of an ellipse, and t stands for the time 
of the orbit. See supra text accompanying note 205. 
281 Hegel's formula is "the product of the sum of two opposite parallel lines and half the 
height." (306) Where the parallel lines are {a, b} and distance between a and b is h, the formula is 
(a + blh 
2 
282 Hegel does not have in mind the trapezoid that forms an element of a definite integral here. 
He has in mind a trapezoid with real area and, furthermore, tipped on its side so that the parallel 
lines are horizontal. 
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The method of representing planes as sums of lines is also used 
when multiplication is not entailed. Hegel considers this formula 
circle = major axis 
ellipse minor axis 
where the diameter of the circle is the same length as the major axis.^^^ 
Each ordinate of the circle thus corresponds to an ordinate of the ellipse. 
The relation of the corresponding ordinates is the same as the proportion 
of the major axis to the minor axis. Therefore, the sum of all the 
ordinates must be in like proportion. Hence, proportionality likewise 
makes the leap from discreteness to continuity. "[T]o be swayed by the 
representation of a plane," Hegel remarks, "or to help it out by adding 
the idea of sum to this one moment, is really to fail to recognize the 
essential mathematical element here involved." (306) 
Cavalieri. Hegel returns to Cavalieri, who received relatively good 
marks for resisting the quantification of Cavalieri used 
indivisibles {i.e., qualities), rather than infinitesimals. The indivisibles 
were lines when he considered a plane, and squares or circles when he 
considered a three dimensional object. These indivisibles he called the 
regula. 
Hegel quotes Cavalieri as follows: 
all figures, both plane and solid, are proportionate to all their 
indivisibles, these being compared with each other collectively and, 
if there is a common proportion in the figures, distributively. (307) 
By this means, Cavalieri proved the proposition that parallelograms of 
equal height are proportional to their bases.^^^ these 
figures that are equidistant from and parallel to the base have the same 
283 Such a figure looks like this; 
Circle and Ellipse with Common 
Diameter and Major Axis 
284 See supra text accompanying notes 265-68. 
285 Actually, any line within the parallelogram, will of course be of the same length as the 
base. Therefore, it follows that lines equidistant from the base of their parallelogram would, of 
course, bear the same proportion. 
2136 C A R D O Z O  L A W  R E V I E W  [Vol. 23:6 
proportion as the two bases have. The line, however, is not presented 
by Cavalieri as "the whole content of the figure." (308) Rather, the line 
is the content only "in so far as it is to be arithmetically determined." 
(308) Properly, "it is the line which is the element of the content and 
through it alone must be grasped the specific nature of the figure. (308) 
Hegel now reflects on "the difference which exists with respect to 
that feature into which the determinateness of a figure falls." (308) This 
is the figure's external limit. Where the determinateness of a figure is an 
external limit, the continuity of the figure "follows upon the quality or 
the proportion of the limit." (308) When the boundary of two figures 
coincide, the figures are equal. In parallelograms of equal height and 
base (and hence of equal area), however, only the base is an external 
limit. The height, upon which proportion depends, "introduces a second 
principle of determination additional to the external limits. (308) To 
prove that parallelograms are equal when they have the same base and 
height, Euclid reduced them to triangles—continuous figures limited 
externally." (308) Cavalieri, in his proof of the proportionality of 
parallelograms, was careful to state that we never know the amount of 
lines in a parallelogram—an amount Hegel names "an empty idea 
assumed in support of the theory." (308) Cavalieri spoke only of the 
magnitude of proportional lines. Because the space of the parallelogram 
is enclosed within limits, the magnitude of the lines is likewise enclosed 
within the same limits. Hegel paraphrases Cavalieri as saying, "the 
c o n t i n u o u s  f i g u r e  i s  n o t h i n g  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  i n d i v i s i b l e s  t h e m s e l v e s  . . .  i f  
it were something apart from them it would not be comparable. (309) 
According to Hegel, Cavalieri meant to distinguish "what belong 
to the outer existence of the continuous figure from what constitutes its 
determinateness." (309) In constructing theorems about the figure, we 
must attend to the determinateness alone. In stating that "the 
continuous is composed or consists of indivisibles, Cavalieri implicitly 
located continuity of the figure as external to the figure. 
[I]nstead of saying that "the continuous is nothing other than the 
indivisibles themselves," it would be more correct and also directly 
self-explanatory to say that the quantitative determinateness of the 
continuous is none other than that of the indivisibles themselves. 
In other words, continuity is immanent to the indivisible itself, a fact to 
which Figure 11(a) speaks directly. Nevertheless "Cavalieri does not 
support the erroneous conclusion that there are greater and lesser 
infinites which is drawn by the schools from the idea that the 
indivisibles constitute the continuous." (309) Cavalieri says that he took 
the aggregate of indivisibles not as an infinite number of lines, but in 
so far as they possess a specific kind of limitedness." (309) Any proofs 
by Cavalieri are free from "any admixture of infinity." (309) His 
method reduces to "the conception of determinateness as an external 
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spatial limit." (309) c it ic Hpael 
With regard to the coincidence of geometric figures, it is, Hegel 
says, a "childish aid for sense perception." (309) In fact, if ^i^ngles are 
congruent we have only one triangle before us. This smgularity of the 
triangle is its true qualitative determinateness, "m its distinction from 
what is given in intuition." (310)2^^ 
With parallelograms, Hegel observes that the height and equality 
of the angles are distinct from the sides ("the external limits ) of the 
figure (310) This gives rise to an uncertainty. Besides the base, are we 
to take the vertical side of the parallelogram as an external limit or the 
height'' If we compare a square with an extremely acute parallelogram 
with the same base and height, the parallelogram^^^ may look bigger 
than the square. The side of such a parallelogram is indeed longer than 
the side of the square. Such a longer line may seem to launch more 
infinite lines than the shorter side of the square. "Such a co^e^ 
however, is no argument against Cavaheri s method. (310) 
aggregate of parallel lines imagined in the two parallelogram 
presupposes the equidistance of the compared lines froin their base. 
From this it follows that the height, not the side of the parallelogram, , 
with the base, the determining moment.^^s 
286 The point here is that Euclidean geonretry "has not entirely 
embroiled in what is sensory: the congruence of plane figures is reduced to the POf *ility ot 
:;;;tLn,td slmply b^means of the figures' being moved with a rigid motion. Moretto, 
as wen as the validity of h^oh^ati^ 
By means of the modem procedures of abstract algebra, 
siLs of a triangle and the angle between them are given, the class of all the infinitely 
many triangles congment to that given, is unambiguously defmed. 
of . a..pu» over b.»ae. C™l»l a.d 
Andreas Tacquet (who lived in early seventeenth century Holland). According to Carl Boye , 
racquet denied that^hje.s^of^a SsTitlL 
Sfedr™'regard to a c^ne formed by a right triangle encompassing the axis, the two 
innarentlv disagreed as to which line should be taken as the discrete element that determines the 
fTof thfc^L According to Tacquet's objection, Cavalieri's atomistic method represents 
:^ n^i of the one P-lIel to the base and perpendicular to the axi. 
ieSs are radii of the circles of which the surface of the cone is made If this surface is 
taken to be the sum of all the circles, "such a result elashes with the truth formerly taught and 
demonstrated by Archimedes" (311)-that a cone is formed by revolving the ^ ® aemonsiraieu y assumption . . . that a 
"ni : Z wa . ~,n.« .»«!. » b«b 
wrj ^all" (3U)) answers this objection by Tacquet. To determme the surface of the ng^ 
anded cone it is not the axis but the hypotenuse of the triangle of the cone which must be take 
Se irti when it spins around in a circle, generates the surface. Presumably, the point here 
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Hegel finally concludes. The intention of foregoing remarks on the 
calculus, he says, "has been to bring to notice the affirmative meanings 
which, in the various applications of the infinitely small in mathematics, 
remain so to speak in the background." (312) In the infinite series, as 
well as in Archimedean cyclometry, the infinite means this: the 
reduction of the arc to the straight line cannot be effected. (312) 
Presumably this means that calculus cannot be achieved by purely 
arithmetic means. 
A distinction, Hegel says, is introduced between the continuous 
and the discrete which makes the continuous appear as if it does not 
possess any quantum.^^^ (For example, the number of points m a line 
segment cannot possibly be assigned, because there are infinite points 
there.) By breaking down continuous objects into discrete 
infinitesimals, the difference appears to be quantitative. In toth, the 
difference is qualitative. If the magnitude of one line is multiplied by 
the magnitude of another, we have "the qualitative alteration of the 
transition from line into plane; and to that extent a negative 
determination comes into play." (313) That is, qualitative alteration 
obliterates and negates, whereas quantitative alteration does not. For 
this reason, the introduction of the infinite, thereby quantifying what 
should be qualitative, "only serves to aggravate [the difficulty] and 
prevent its solution." (313) 
If I have any readers left at this point, they may finally move on to 
consider a mercifully short chapter on quantitative ratio, which will 
stand for a qualitative relation. 
III. QUANTITATIVE RELATION 
Quantum is an infinite being. It changes quantitatively but it 
289 
is that, since the axis is shorter than the hypotenuse, it generates fewer lines than the hypotenuse, 
and this is what contradicts Archimedes'privileging of the hypotenuse. 
One may fairly ask why Hegel, in a work that unfolds the very spirit of the universe, felt 
compelled to mediate disputes such as this. 
 At this point, Hegel sets forth this apparently mystifying sentence: 
This difference appears arithmetically as a purely quantitative one, that of the root and 
power, or whatever degree of powers it may be; however, if the expression is to be 
taken only c aantitatively, for example, a:a^ or d.a = 2a:a = 2:a, or for the law o 
descent of a falling body, t:a^ then it yields the meaningless ratios of l:a 2:a, l;at; m 
supersession of their merely quantitative aspect, the sides would have to be held apart 
by their different qualitative significance, as s = at, the magnitude in this way bemg 
expressed as a quality, s a function ofthe magnitude of another quality. 
In the above sentence "d.a^" is peculiar. 1 have interpreted "d." to mean 8a /8a - 2a, and da to 
mean 2a:al Furthermore, I take "t:a'" to be a misprint, stemming from the German addition. 
Properly this should be "t:at^" or time as compared with acceleration. The entire sentence states 
that a and a^ for instance, or t and at^ are qualitatively different, but if these are made into 
quantitative ratios, they are the meaningless expressions of 1/a, or 1/at. 
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remains what it is qualitatively?'^^ Accordingly, "[t]hc infinity of 
quantum has been determined to the stage where it is the negative 
beyond of quantum, which beyond, however, is contained within the 
quantum itself. This beyond is the qualitative moment as such."(314) 
At this stage. Quantum is a unity of the qualitative and the quantitative. 
Thus, the third chapter of Quantity is a chapter of Speculative Reason, 
just as first chapter represented the Understanding and second chapter 
represented Dialectical Reason. 
Quantum at this advanced stage is ratio. Ratio is "the 
contradiction of externality and self-relation, of the affirmative being of 
quanta and their negation." (315) Its distinct feature is that it is 
"qualitatively determined as simply related to its beyond." (314) 
Quantum is continuous with this beyond, and the beyond is another 
Quantum. The relation between Quanta, however, is no longer 
externally imposed. These Quanta have recaptured an integrity that 
more primitive Quantum did not have. Their integrity is that they have 
no integrity. 
In becoming other, these quanta show their true selves: because 
they are as much Other as they are themselves. 
[T]he other constitutes the determinateness of each. The flight of 
quantum away from and beyond itself has now therefore this 
meaning, that it changed not merely into an other, or into its abstract 
other, into its negative beyond, but that in this other it reached its 
determinateness, finding itself in its beyond, which is another 
quantum. (314) 
Here Hegel implies that Quantum cannot distinguish itself without the 
aid of the Other. Therefore, the Other is as much the stuff of self as it is 
Other. Hence, in distinguishing the other. Quantum finds itself.^^' The 
quality of Quantum, then, is "its externality as such." (314). 
At stake here is not just one Quantum and its beyond (another 
Quantum), but the relation between these two quanta. Thus Quantum 
"is not only in a ratio, but it is itself posited as a ratio." (314) Each 
extreme then has to be taken as a singularity and also as a mediation. 
290 MARCUSE, supra note 38, at 64 ("A being which is immediately identical with its 
respective quality such as to remain the same throughout all its qualitative transformations, is no 
longer qualitatively hut quantitatively determined,"). 
291 In this passage, Hegel echoes perhaps the most famous passages he ever wrote—the Lord-
Bondsman dialectic in the Phenomenology. PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 10,11178-215. In this 
dialectic, two warriors try to subjugate each other. One succeeds and becomes the master, the 
other the slave. But the master discovers that the other is truly himself. The master is thus 
reduced to dependency. Likewise, in ratio. Quantum attempts to distinguish itself by expelling 
the Other, only to find that the Other is as much itself as itself is. 
Errol Harris calls "The Quantitative Relation or Qualitative Ratio" a chapter that is "more 
technical than philosophical." HARRIS, supra note 15, at 140. But perhaps he underestimates its 
importance. In any case, the Ratio of Powers, with which the chapter ends, is a very lucid and 
powerful demonstration of the qualitative moment in the heart of Quantity. 
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The extremes have grown concrete. 
Hegel concludes his short introduction to ratio by describing the 
three sections into which the present chapter is divided. First, we have 
Direct Ratio (A/B = C). Here the qualitative moment is not yet explicit. 
Rather, it still shows the retrogressive mode of having its externality 
outside itself. Direct Ratio shows all the defects of the Understanding. 
Second is Indirect Ratio, or Inverse Ratio (AB = C). Here Dialectical 
Reason holds forth. A modulation occurs here between the quanta as 
they negate each other. Third, we have the Ratio of Powers (A^ = C). 
Here Quantum (A) reproduces itself. When this middle term is posited 
as a simple determination, we have reached Measure—the unity of 
Quantity and Quality. At this moment, the rightward leaning chapters 
of Quantity will give way to the centrist chapters of Measure. 
The culmination of this chapter, then, is the Ratio of Powers—A^ = 
C. The middle term, however, is a definition of the absolute.^^^ shall 
we say, then, that the universe (C) is A^? Yes, in a sense, if A stands for 
some "thing" (or Unit). This chapter—Quantitative Relation—in effect 
argues that all "things" define all other things, even while remaining a 
thing-in-itself. Hegel is therefore describing a universe of deeply 
contextual unitary "things."^^^ 
292 Every proposition of the Understanding and Speculative Reason is a vision of the Absolute. 
Dialectic Reason, in contrast, is purely a critique of the Understanding's proposition. Carlson, 
supra note 4, at 533-34. 
293 Professor Terry Pinkard is scathing about the ratio of powers. He proclaims it 
so idiosyncratic to Hegel's system that it offers little insight to anyone who has not 
accepted the entire Hegelian outlook—lock, stock and barrel. It is not one of the things 
that even Hegelians have seen fit to develop, and there is good reason for this lack of 
interest. 
PINKARD, supra note 33, at 52 (citation omitted). This criticism strikes me as out of order. If 
Hegel is developing a theory of metonymic meaning, this chapter—substrate to the concept of 
Measure—should not necessarily be expected to yield "useful" dividends to common sense. The 
chapter does indeed further develop what Quality and even tfeedom are. 
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A. The Direct Ratio 
Direct Ratio can be drawn as follows: 
Figure 17 (a) 
Direct Ratio 
In Figure 17(a), Direct Ratio is immediate. Yet the ratio is 
nevertheless expressly a relation of quanta. These quanta are other to 
the Direct Ratio, and so the determinateness of the ratio lies in an other. 
Yet Direct Ratio also has its otherness inside itself as well, as it is an 
infinite being. 
Direct Ratio (A/B = C) is itself a Quantum. Hegel insists on 
calling this the exponent—a confusing choice of words. For 
mathematicians, C is a quotient. Where A^ = C, 2 is the exponent. 
What Hegel means by exponent, however, is simply the relation 
between the two quanta making up the ratio. Thus "the exponent, 
simply as product, is implicitly the unity of unit and amount." (320-21). 
As a Quantum, C is the unity of Unit and Amount, per the laws of 
sublation. Unit stands for Being-for-self, and Amount stands for "the 
indifferent fluctuation of the determinateness, the external indifference 
of quantum." (315) Earlier, Amount and Unit were moments of 
Quantum. Now, each of them are quanta on their own. Hence, an 
infinite regress is before us. Every quantum is in turn an Amount and 
Unit, which are in turn quanta. In short, we have passed into the realm 
of the quantitative infinite. 
As Figure 17(a) indicates, C is a "simple determinateness" (316)— 
a paradox because determinatenesses are complex. Nevertheless, this 
coheres with the complex-but-simple nature of the extremes at this stage 
of the Logic. Thus, the exponent is a Quantum. As such it is 
complex—an Amount. The exponent is also simple and hence 
qualitative—a Unit. Hegel explains the qualitative nature of the 
exponent as follows. Take A/B = 2. If an outside force determines that 
B = 5, then the exponent determines that A = 10. This power of the 
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exponent over its parts is the exponent's qualitative nature at work. 
Thus, Hegel can write that the determinateness of the sides of the ratio 
(A or B) lie beyond themselves. There is but one determinateness 
common to both sides of the ratio, and it is located in the exponent. 
The two sides of the ratio (A/B) thus work to constitute C. It 
follows, then, that each side is less than Quantum, compared to the 
exponent. A and B are reduced to Unit and Amount. 
But didn't Hegel just tell us that each side was a Quantum? Why 
now say that each side is less than Quantum? In order to emphasize 
that, at this late stage, outside force cannot simply have its way with the 
sides of the ratio. The exponent (C, a Quantum) disciplines the sides of 
the ratio (less than Quantum). The integrity of the Direct Ratio 
therefore implies the servile dependence of the sides. Recall that Direct 
Ratio is the Understanding's interpretation of the Infinite Great/Small in 
Figure 16(a). The infinitely Small (5x) was unnameable. But, when 6x 
is part of a Direct Ratio (C=6y/6x), it is perfectly determinate. C 
therefore reigns over A/B. 
Hegel refers to this incompleteness of the sides as a negation. What 
this means is that the sides of the ratio are no longer independent. Only 
the exponent of the ratio lays claim to quality. The sides of the ratio are 
the negative to that quality. They embody quantitative difference. 
But, if the sides are incomplete, this does not mean that the 
exponent294 is itself complete. C is still Unit or Amount and so it is 
incomplete. If A/B = C, then A = B/C. The quotient C can take A's 
place with ease. When it does, it is incomplete. C, therefore, is "not 
posited as what it ought to be ... the ratio's qualitative unity." (317) 
B. Inverse Ratio 
If Figure 17(a) emphasizes the immediacy of ratio. Figure 17(b) 
emphasizes its incompleteness, which Hegel has named a sign of 
negativity. 
Here Hegel calls it "exponent as quotient." (316) 
295 In this sense, I disagree with Mute's analysis of Direct and Indirect Ratio, the sum total of 
which is as follows: "In Direct Ratio ... the two quanta unified in the constant exponent increase 
or diminish together. In Indirect Ratio they vary inversely and so in closer relation ... ." MURE, 
supra note 17, at 120 (1965). It is hard to sustain the view that the two sides of the Indirect Ratio 
are in "closer relation," when the function of the Indirect Ratio is to emphasize the qualitative 
difference between either side and the exponent. 
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Figure 17 (b) 
Inverse Ratio 
The fault of Figure n(a) was its failure to be iiniuediate ai^d 
imtnune from outside manipulation. An external reflection had to 
determine whether C was the exponent or whether « w® one o^ 
subordinate sides. Thus, in C = A«, C is exponent. But it is likewise 
Unit/Amount in A/C = B. That is 
In the Inverse Ratio, the exponent is some Quantum. That is 
the exponent stays put and does mt migrate over to ^  ^ 
equal sign. Apparently, we are not to multiply A = BC by 1/C which 
3ld rfJeal She exponent to be no different from the Unit/Amount. 
Rather, we are to consider A as fixed. 
Certainly it is odd that the fault of Direct Ratio—its openness to 
outside manipulation-becomes the virtue of 
denends on outside fixity to differentiate it fi-om Direct Ratio. But 
recall that Quantum is by now the Quality of the 
precisely was Quantum's openness to outside manipulation. In other 
words, the integrity of Quantum is its lack of integrity. That is what the 
fixity ofthe exponent represents. if A is 
When C = A/B, A and B had a direct relationship. If ^ 
increased and C stayed constant, B also increased. Now, ^^en A BC 
and the exponent stays fixed, B and C are in an inverse relationsh^. If 
B increases, C must fall in value. When the exponent is fixed, B and C 
L fluctuate wildly. Flueteafion "is fheir 
contrast to the qualitative moment as a fixed limit they have t 
character of variable magnitudes, for which the said fixed ^ a 
infinite beyond." (320) But there is a limit to this inverse relatmns p^ 
Whereas the mathematician can cause B to fall and C ^ "se t 
mathematician cannot force B to zero. Otherwise, the exponent, which 
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is supposed to be fixed, is destroyed.^^^ This resistance of B (or C) to 
the mathematician's will is a sign that Inverse Ratio has recaptured its 
Quality. 
Speculative Reason seizes upon the resistance of B and C. In this 
refusal of B and C to go to zero, they are equal qualities—immune from 
outside manipulation at least to this one small extent. Since B — C as a 
qualitative matter, the in-itself of A = BC is A = BB, or A = B^ the 
Ratio of Powers. Here the first B determines the value of the second B. 
The second reciprocally determines the value of the first. If A = 16, the 
mathematician has no option but to admit that B = (4, -4}. 
Each side of the Inverse Ratio, then, "limits the other and is 
simultaneously limited by it." (319) Yet once the side of the ratio 
achieves its in-itself—its potential—it establishes its independence from 
the other side. "[T]he other magnitude become[s] zero." (319) It 
vanishes. Obviously this last point cannot be taken mathematically. If 
one side of the ratio (B) is zero, the other side (also B) must likewise be 
zero, and B^ is no longer equal to A > 0. Rather, the point is that the 
first B enjoys Being-for-self. If so, then it is indifferent to the second B, 
from whom it is a nothing—a void. But since B = B qualitatively, both 
B's are zero. They erase themselves and remove their being to a middle 
term. 
Hegel summarizes the Inverse Ratio as follows: 
The general result ean be indicated by saying that the whole, as 
exponent, is the limit of the reciprocal limiting of both terms and is 
therefore posited as negation of the negation, hence as infinity, as an 
affirmative relation to itself. (320) 
In other words, the exponent is limit to the sides and the sides are 
likewise limit to the exponent. The negation of the negation is, 
precisely, the refusal of either side to disappear and becomes zero. A 
limit is now located in the sides of the ratio. These sides negate the 
superiority of the exponent. Now the sides speak for themselves as to 
what they are (within the confines of the externally fixed exponent). 
Of the sides, Hegel makes two final points: (a) Ratio has an 
296 Geometrically, B and C are in hyperbolic relation and could be portrayed as follows: 
Hyperbola 
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"affirmative aspect," (321) which is presumably immunity or fixity in 
general. Yet, because each side of the ratio cannot be raised to equality 
with the exponent, each side is, in a sense, fixed. This fixity the 
refusal of B or C to equal A—means that each side is "implicitly the 
whole of the exponent,"(321) since the Inverse Ratio is about fixity.^®? 
Yet (p) the same refusal is a negative moment. B and C are constituted 
by a Spurious infinite, which fhistrates the mathematician who strives to 
make them equal to the exponent. This resistance to manipulation is the 
"negation of the self-externality of the exponent." (321) This very 
resistance is the resultant middle term, which is therefore posited as 
preserving itself and uniting with itself in the negation of the indifferent 
existence of the quanta, thus being the determinant of its self-external 
otherness." (321)^^^ 
C. The Ratio of Powers 
The Ratio of Powers is shown in Figure 17(c): 
Figure 17 (c) 
Ratio of Powers 
Hegel says of the Ratio of Powers (B^ = 16, for example) that it is a 
"quantum which, in its otherness, is identical with itself and which 
determines the beyond of itself." (321) That is, given the requirement of 
B^ and the exponent of 16, the one B determines itself and its other. At 
this point. Quantum "has reached the stage of being-for-self." (321) 
Here "quantum is posited as returned to itself." (322) 
In earlier stages, we could never tell whether B or C was Unit or 
297 This "equality" of a given side of the ratio with the exponent justifies Professor Mure's 
remark; r i. u r-
In Ratio of Powers, where one [i.e., the exponent] is a higher power of the other [i.e., a 
side of the ratio], they relate, iff follow Hegel, so closely that they are fully equivalent 
to the exponent, and the total expression is true infinity. 
MURE, supra note 17, at 120. A True Infinite becomes other and remains the same. Hence, the 
sides become the exponent, in the sense that each is fixed. Fixity stands for quality here. 
298 Andrew Haas unsuccessfully points to Inverse Ratio as evidence that Hegel's Logic does 
not have a triune structure. He writes, "in the 'Inverse Ratio'. . . the second moment has only two 
sub-moments " HAAS, supra note 8, at 79. This is not a fair point. The entire chapter is 
triune. The three moments are Direct Ratio (Understanding), Inverse Ratio (Dialectical Reason), 
and the Ratio of Powers (Speculative Reason). 
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Amount. Now B = B, so that Unit is Amount. For this reason the Ratio 
of Powers is "posited as determined only by the unit." (322) The 
quantum (B) may undergo alteration, separate and apart from the Ratio 
of Powers, "but in so far as this alteration is a raising to a power, this its 
otherness is limited purely by itself." (322) 
Hegel refers to the Ratio of Powers as qualitative yet external—an 
apparent contradiction. Where the exponent is fixed, the variable B is 
determined only by the other B. Hence, its determinateness is external. 
But B is equally internal-, "this externality is now posited in conformity 
with the Notion of quantum, as the latter's own self-determining, as its 
relation to its own self, as its quality." (323) "[I]n so far as the 
externality or indifference of its determining counts," (323) the Ratio of 
Powers is still Quantum. At this moment it "is posited simply or 
immediately." (323) But also at this moment "it has become the other of 
itself, namely, quality." (323) In going outside itself, Quantum stays 
within itself, "so that in this very externality quantum is self-related" 
and hence "is being as quality." (323) 
We have presented B^ = 16 as an example of the Ratio of Powers. 
In it, B is unalterable, and thus B has recaptured its Quality. But is it 
not the case that outside forces can erase 16 and choose, say, 25 instead, 
thereby changing B? Of course, Hegel admits, but nevertheless the 
Ratio of Powers "has a closer connection with the Notion of quantum." 
(322) In it. Quantum has reached the full extent of its Notion "and has 
completely realized it." (322) It expresses the distinctive feature of 
Quantum, which Hegel describes as follows: 
Quantum is the indifferent determinateness, i.e., posited as sublated, 
determinateness as a limit which is equally no limit, which continues 
itself into its othemess and so remains identical with itself therein. 
(322) 
Why is Quantum a determinateness? It will be recalled that 
Determinateness was another name for Limit. it stands for a unity of 
being and nothing. So Quantum, as Number, is the unity of Amount 
(being) and Unit (nothing). Number—an early version of Quantum— 
was indifferent to its Quality. It depended on external reflection to 
determine which of its parts was Amount and which was Unit. But now 
that indifference is sublated. Number is now the Ratio of Powers, 
which resists outside manipulation. Nevertheless, Amount and Unit are 
indistinguishable precisely because they are equal (B = B). Each side 
of the ratio stays what it is and yet it determines itself in its other. It 
both "remains identical with itself" and goes outside itself.^"" 
299 Carlson, supra note 4, at 519. 
300 Trying hard to tart up an otherwise dry chapter, Andrew Haas writes that the Power 
Relation is 
a relation of potencies . .. The mathematician cannot help but speak (always) the 
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Quantum is also said to be "the difference of itself 
(322) How is this so? If we contemplate, BB - 16, clearly the first B 
Silhable from .he second B, -f only 
location each has on this printed page. Nevertheless, B - B, and so t 
the first B is different from the second B, it is differentitself. 
no self-identical entity, of which Hegel is so thoroughly critical. 
To have a selfhood that is different from itself is ^ 
Quantum to be a ratio. At first, in Direct Ratio, ratio showed itself m an 
immediate form There, "its self-relation which it has as exponent m 
c^atuo £ differences, counts only as the fixity of a„ amouttt of he 
unit" (322) Presumably, this means that, in Direct Ratio, where e 
TL.d MaoLt is fixed. Yet the exponent itself was not qualitatively 
differer^t from Unit or Amount. Direct Ratio was not what it ought to 
have been In the Inverse Ratio, the exponent is only m principle the 
toermLL of the sides of the ratio. In fact, B and C can fluctuate 
ureatlv but they never quite become zero. For this reason the expone 
is affir^native in that it has an independence from its ^ e 
Quantum which is exponent relates itself to 
Powers, however, self-relation extends to the sides of the Ratio 
asth^xp^en summarizes the entire journey that 
Quantity hTZde-a journey that is now at 
fir^t oDDOsed to Quality. But Quantity was itself a Quality— a purely 
S-reC dl^miinateness distinct from the determinateness of its 
other from quality as such." (323) Ironically, Quantity learned to resist 
Quality and in its resistance, it showed itself to be a Quality, y a i g 
it Beca,ne its other. "Quantity... is 
which is no longer indifferent but has returned into Itself. (323) 
argtlLity is ttot just a Quality. "[1]. is the truth of quahty 
itself" (323) Without Quantity, there could be no Quality. 
On tLW of Measure, Hegel notes that a double transition^ 
necessary. Not only does one determinateness continue i"to the other 
but the other determinateness continues into the original one. Thu , 
Powers is the inseparable unity ^"^ss' impotent self-externalizing of Quantity 
ETlritS ?i.« sit* rli'tt„f«i». 6-s. cs „d 
'irS5'S-r,rO.,,».»da=»n,m«ll.s«ther.id.of.t..n,tio.s,. 
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contained in Quality. "This observation on the necessity of the double 
transition," Hegel remarks, "is of great importanee throughout the 
whole compass of scientific method." (323)^03 
The name of the partnership between Quality and Quantity is 
Measure. 
Remark 
Hegel's study of Quantity ends with a short remark. Here Hegel 
criticizes an unnamed philosopher's description of the Notion. In this 
philosophy, immediate Notion was named the first power. Rendered 
determinate. Notion was called the second power. In its return to itself, 
wherein it is a totality, it was the third power. Power used here, Hegel 
states, belongs to Quantum. They do not correspond to Aristotle's 
dynamic notions. 
The power relation "expresses determinateness in the form or 
difference which has reached its truth." (324) But this Notional truth is 
appropriate only for the primitive stage of Quantum. It is not 
appropriate for the Notion as such. "Differences which are proper to 
quantum are superficial determinations for the Notion itself and are still 
far from being determined as they are in the notion." (324) In the 
infancy of philosophy, Pythagoras used numbers to designate universal 
distinctions, but the first through third powers referred to above are little 
better than numbers. 
[T]o retrogress from [thought] determinations to those of number is 
the action of a thinking which feels its own incapacity, a thinking 
which . . . makes itself ridiculous by pretending that this impotence is 
something new, superior, and an advance. (324-25) 
It is unhelpful, Hegel suggests, to borrow mathematical terms to 
describe the Notion. If these are merely symbols for the true Notion, 
then the Notion would first have to be derived logically and then 
symbolized. But, upon deriving the Notion, the symbols become 
superfluous, as we would have before us the direct Notion. Use of mere 
forms simply evades "the task of grasping the determinations of the 
Notion." (325) 
CONCLUSION 
"A main result of the science of logic is to repudiate quantitative 
303 This double exchange is what Slavoj Zizek named the "chiasmic exchange of properties." 
Carlson, supra note 4, at 468 (citing SLAVOJ ZLZEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO; 
ENJOYMENT AS APOLITICAL FACTOR 39-41 (1991)). 
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definition of the absolute, and to retrieve qualitative definition."^"'' 
Across the "quantity" chapters, we have seen how an exclusive 
quantitative perspective falls apart. 
At first. Being expelled otherness so that it could be all by itself— 
independent fi-om the negative. But it discovered that, in this mode. 
Being expelled all its content and became Quantity. Quantity stands for 
the very act of expelling all content. 
Quantity discovers, however, that it has an integrity that it cannot 
expel—a limit that preserves its content within itself. "This inability to 
reach its bourne Hegel describes as eine Ohbmacht des Negativen—a 
weakness of the negative—in that what it abolishes by its own 
cancelling immediately reasserts itself."^"^ 
This reassertion of what is canceled is nevertheless "other." Hence, 
in Quantitative Infinity (Figure 16(a)), Quantum goes outside itself to a 
beyond. The infinitely big or small number can never be named. Yet, 
in going beyond its limit. Quantum discovers that its own content is 
beyond the limit. In this sense. Quantum returns to itself when it 
exports its content to the other. It shows what it is when it shows it is 
nothing. This return will later be called reflection-into-self—the 
hallmark of Essence. For now, it can be noted that the nature of being 
has changed. Whereas in the fust three chapters Being constituted 
expelling the negative, now Being constitutes expelling its own self and 
therefore, in this act of expulsion, accomplishes a return to itself. This 
return to self is still implicit and will remain so in the last installment of 
the Doctrine of Being—Measure. It becomes express in Hegel's theory 
of reflection. 
304 BUTLER, supra note 20, at 143. 
305 HARRIS, supra note 15, at 136. Theodor Adomo refuses to accept any weakness of the 
negative and so disagrees with Hegel's entire system. But this amounts to a dogmatic insistence 
on the self-identity and irreducibility of the negative, an irony of which he seems to be unaware. 
THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 119 (E.B. Ashton trans., 2000). 
